(This article was written by Peter Huessy and appeared in RealClearDefense. Defending America or Inviting an Attack?)
Many Americans want to avoid entangling the USA in unnecessary foreign wars. They also want the government to spend money smartly. But given the serious nuclear and missile threats facing the United States, meeting such objectives will take clear thinking and smart strategy.
One new idea from research analysts at the CATO and Quincy Institutes to both save money and avoid wars is to stop the Golden Dome missile defenses now being proposed by the Administration.
These critics have adopted the strange idea that the U.S. will use a missile defense shield not to defend the country but to hide behind such defenses while making dangerous preparations for a first strike against the Russians and Chinese.
Years ago, this was described by Ploughshares Joe Cirincione as a “first the shield and then the sword” strategy. Such critics opposed even the Congressionally initiated limited shield of 44 interceptors the Bush administration deployed in California and Alaska twenty years ago to defend against missile attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.
So, these missile defense critics are now standing reality on its head. The good guys—the United States—are really the bad guys. And nations whom we thought were evil— such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China—are now understandable, even benign—they may be planning to attack us but only because the “evil” U.S. is planning on building defenses.
Just so you understand, let me go over this again. For the United States, the critics now contend that building a defense would apparently be riskier than not building any defense at all. The United States would be making the world more dangerous because Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, fearing the U.S. was planning to strike first, would plot to get in the first punch. So, to prevent such a pre-emptive strike, the United States has to make it easy for the bad guys to strike us first.
Now the critics’ logic is not clear, but apparently by eliminating any defense of our homeland from ballistic or cruise missiles in the first place, the bad guys would refrain from ever attacking us. Sort of a “peace through submission” strategy. Leave the U.S. at risk, totally vulnerable, as we can then rely on enemy totalitarian powers and their terrorist agents to solely decide whether to keep us safe. Strangely, on this the critics such as Joe Cirincione agree with China and North Korea—the Golden Dome says Pyongyang would be “highly dangerous” and “could be used for offensive purposes” while Beijing says Golden Dome will “start an arms race.”
The opponents also think the Golden Dome defenses won’t work because they assume the technology being sought will be based on the Israel Iron Dome missile defense technology. Even though Israel has successfully intercepted thousands of incoming missiles and rockets from Hamas and Hezbollah over many years, those destroyed targets have not been intercontinental ballistic missiles of hypersonic speed.
However, the Israeli accomplishments were still extraordinary. Its interceptors were able to shoot down rockets even updating their software in real time. Given the very limited number of terrorist rockets and missiles that have broken through Israel’s defenses, the coercive and blackmail nature of the terrorists weapons have been much diminished. Even though perfect protection isn’t possible, the central purpose of missile defenses was nonetheless achieved.
Critics, however, still insist that since the U.S. would probably be defending against much longer range missiles, Golden Dome cannot duplicate the Israeli success. And that high speed missiles coupled with decoys and counter measures can spoof a defense unlike shorter range rockets.
But to date tests show the missile defenses against long-range missiles succeed as high as seventy percent of the time, and against all missiles and rockets, even upwards of more than ninety percent in the real world. And unlike many critics, missile defense proponents such as Uzi Rubin, Hank Cooper and Trey Obering have actually directed the building of real-world workable missile defense systems including elements in space. Which are now deployed around the world. And with a technology now vastly more capable than when missile defenses such as SDI were first proposed.
Now is the United States shaking up international stability by building the Golden Dome? Actually, the United States has shown remarkable restraint in building only 44 missile interceptors to protect the continental United States. While also markedly reducing our deployed nuclear forces from near ten thousand strategic long range systems to 1550 under New START, while also in 1991 simultaneously and unilaterally eliminating over 90% of our theater nuclear systems.
Despite U.S. restraint, Russia and China have major dual use defenses deployed in far greater numbers than any U.S. systems. According to the Atlantic Council, “Russia’s and China’s extensive development of homeland missile defenses gives lie, to an extent, to [the] contention that U.S. missile defenses are uniquely destabilizing.” Further explains the Council, “Numerically extensive Russian and Chinese missile defenses… could alter the strategic-forces balance with the United States if not accounted for in U.S. strategic forces policy.”
In addition, critics don’t understand the likely missile threats the U.S. seeks to neutralize and why such a challenge can be met. An effective EMP threat, for example, could be from a single missile. A terror attack aimed at a major American city could be a few missiles surreptitiously launched from the sea, from a freighter with a pop-up missile. Russia could be threatening an escalate to win strategy, as Putin has done in Ukraine, where an attack might involve a limited number of missiles aimed at U.S. forces or allied bases overseas. In addition, Russian LRCM performance in Ukraine shows severe survivability issues with up to 70-90% being intercepted by missile defenses. And an attack could be inadvertent or accidental, and by definition limited, where a missile defense would be a great protective asset.
Now an attack on the United States involving an all-out massive use of missiles could also occur. And to be sure, defenses could not stop 100% of such an attack. Although defenses could defeat or blunt or seriously complicate any attempted disarming strike. However, Russian development of nuclear attack options such as escalate to win but short of an all-out disarming strike is seriously worrisome. As James Howe argues, Russia is deploying nuclear forces to conduct selected nuclear execution options on adversary nuclear forces, bases, admin/political centers and war production with the objective to limit damage, control escalation and achieve victory. Missile defenses such as Golden Dome makes such attacks less likely to succeed or heighten the uncertainty in the minds of the attackers, which is the essence of deterrence. Adding a theater nuclear capability such as a Navy based cruise missile also would strengthens deterrence.
Nonetheless, the ability to intercept one or a limited number of missiles could be the difference between the survival of a nation or its destruction. As former House Speaker Gingrich has explained, an EMP attack could send the United States economy back to the early 18th century. And defenses need not protect the airspace above Paraguay or Lichenstein or the Himalayas and can be deployed preferentially to target missiles launched from Russia, China, North Korea or Iran.
The 2003 Gilmore Commission concluded it was critical that the U.S. protect thirty two of its most important infrastructure nodes, the destruction of which would cause widespread harm amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars and even millions of lives. And whose destruction former IRGC head Soleimani explicitly referenced as an Iranian objective. Israel’s ability to defend its nation from Hamas and Hezbollah missiles and rockets reportedly prevented in 2015 what was estimated to be a possible two-thirds sudden drop in Israel’s GDP.
Our adversaries may in all likelihood seek to surreptitiously attack the United States. That is the basis of the decades long tactics of terrorists and their state sponsors. Nation state sponsors of terror and wars of national liberation hide their shadowy role precisely to avoid retaliation, and to render impotent U.S. deterrent capabilities. Defense helps solve that dilemma and buys the defending nation the time and space to eventually strike back. That strengthens not weakens deterrence.
Such future surreptitious attacks are not going to be a massive, all-out missile attack the U.S. can see coming. Any deliberate such enemy attack with multiple hundreds or more warheads [the Armageddon option] would only be coming from China or Russia. Both would understand that any such attack would probably immediately precipitate a massive U.S. retaliatory response that would essentially cripple and destroy the leadership and key military assets of the bad guys. Any such initial strike on their part would thus be suicidal. And adding a robust U.S. defense against just such an attack further complicates the objectives of these rogue attackers, making any such attack even more suicidal.
Opponents of missile defense are apparently blind to these geostrategic realities. Yes, the U.S. territory to be protected is indeed vastly larger than Israel. But Israel has protected its country from literally many thousands of missiles, rockets and drones, while the U.S. would most likely have to protect itself largely from multiple dozens of such missiles, a technology challenge we can win.
To be clear, few are arguing that a massive attack against the United States involving thousands of warheads can be effectively stopped by missile defense. That Armageddon type attack would definitely invite a major U.S. retaliatory strike, and one potentially involving a retaliatory strike of more than one thousand nuclear warheads of all kinds. The U.S. is markedly improving its nuclear deterrent to stop just such threats. Golden Dome is not a substitute but an adjunct to this deterrent capability.
Thus, proceeding with Golden Dome adds to deterrence and involves collectively putting together in a layered approach some dozens of existing and new missile defense systems, sensors, interceptors and other technologies, many acquired over the past four decades.
All can now be fully developed, tested and integrated, and put into the field, especially in space. Interceptors are now defending the United States and its allies here and abroad, involving air, land and sea missile and air defense components including Patriot, Aegis, THAAD, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and GBI’s, as well as ground and sea-based sensors and radars. Golden Dome will integrate everything and add the key missing technologies such as space based and laser technologies.
In conflicts involving Ukraine, Korea, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, the Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS, spanning nearly four decades, the United States and its allies have used missile defense for protection or had it available to deter attacks. Thousands of lives and billions in treasure have literally and proactively been saved. Thus, the slander from one Quincy analyst that missile defense is a multi-hundred billion dollar scam is itself a scam.
Apart from how missile and air defenses have worked in the real world, does missile defense make arms control more difficult and create grave strategic instabilities, as critics assert? What does history tell us?
First, the United States signed the ABM treaty ban on defenses in 1972 at the insistence of the Soviets. The Soviets first pushed for the ban in late 1968 as they wanted to catch up with the American offensive forces as they trailed by multiple thousands of strategic warheads. The Nixon administration sold the SALT “arms control” and ABM agreements as a package. Since U.S. missile defenses would be unavailable to limit Soviet first strike capabilities, such offensive capabilities would have to be curtailed through “arms control” or SALT, which was added as an executive agreement to the ABM treaty.
Nonetheless the promises of SALT were false. There was no real arms control but a joint agreement to build up to an agreed upon but very high level. The Soviets deployed at least 3000 SS-18 ICBM first strike offensive warheads despite the ban on defenses, the opposite of what had been promised. In fact, the SALT process codified massive increases and not decreases in Soviet strategic warheads, amounting to a Soviet growth to over ten thousand strategic nuclear warheads from a base of roughly two thousand.
A 1983 net assessment by the U.S. DoD projected Soviet strategic forces by 1993 would reach 24,000 warheads under the SALT process. The Reagan/Bush START reductions became a reality only with the end of the Soviet empire and the leverage the USA created with its offensive modernization, investment in SDI and economic warfare against Moscow.
Ironically, many of the opponents of both SDI and now Golden Dome supported at the time a 1980 Moscow initiated nuclear freeze just as the USSR was completing its nuclear modernization. While simultaneously opposing much of the Reagan-era American nuclear modernization which was just beginning.
Subsequently, some decades later in 2002 the United States finally got rid of the ABM treaty. Shortly afterward, in 2002 and then in 2010, respectively, the United States proceeded to sign two treaties cutting nuclear warheads, under the Moscow and New Start treaties, which reduced strategic nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States from 6000 to 1550, or by 75%. Russia commented at the time that eliminating the ABM treaty was of no adverse consequence.
With the defensive ban in place in 1972, deployed offensive nuclear weapons went up 500%. With defenses possible, after 2002, deployed strategic offensive weapons were cut 75%.
It may be that the era of arms reductions is now over. But we now have the ability to counter a Chinese buildup with both nuclear expansion and a robust defense. And also counter an emerging Russian nuclear breakout, both of which reflect the hegemonic ambitions of Moscow and Beijing. With a combination of offense and defense capabilities, the U.S. does not necessarily have to match Russia and China warhead for warhead but still work to improve deterrence.
Long before the ABM treaty was junked, Russia built its own defenses as now reportedly has China. Blaming America for Russian and Chinese hegemonic ambitions is right out of the propaganda playbooks of the Kremlin’s SVR and Chinese Ministry of State Security. The United States needs to get on with building up its security and dismissing the foolish idea that we are the bad guys and the bad guys are good.
As former defense official and defense expert Pepi DiBiaso explains, “the Golden Dome signals a welcome interest in more comprehensive air and missile defenses for the homeland. It aims to move beyond the missile defense policy framework established decades ago in a far more benign strategic threat environment. That policy narrowly confined the homeland defense posture to a small number of ground-based interceptors and radars to defend against a handful of ballistic missiles from regional powers.
DiBiaso concludes: “Given the ascendance of Russia and China as significant great power competitors, the role of missile defense should be realigned to provide a measure of protection from any adversary who might seek to threaten or strike the United States.” Alternatively, eliminating defenses puts U.S. security at high risk and would give the totalitarian powers and enemies of the United States a big head start in securing hegemonic power over the free world.
Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.
