Sinking That Ship Is Not Enough

A distant ship navigates the open ocean beneath a cloudy sky

(This article was written by Hermann Tertsch and appeared in El Debate. No basta con hundir ese barco)

A young Iraqi man comes up from behind a 16-year-old girl standing on the platform waiting for her train. Suddenly he pushes her and sends her falling onto the tracks just as a freight train was passing. Just like that, for no reason. It happened 15 days ago. It has only become known now. Because for two weeks the local authorities and the state police tried by every possible means to prevent the fact from becoming known. They attributed the girl’s death to an accident. And they stubbornly denied that anyone had been involved, least of all an immigrant. They went on denying the truth until two days ago, with the police and the other authorities covering up the crime to the very end against all the proof and evidence gathered by the journalists who have revealed the scandal.

That is already happening all across Europe, but in Spain, star pupils that we are, with even greater cynicism if such a thing is possible. In Spain the authorship of crimes and serious offences is being denied. And blame is also being turned back onto the victims in order to cover up the perpetrators for the mere fact of their being immigrants. Also concealed or denied are the offences of those, Spaniards and foreigners alike, who run the highly lucrative business of bringing in illegal immigrants in supposedly legal fashion under the cloak of humanitarian action and rescue. Which is as false as the German police’s versions in the case of the girl in Göttingen. Neither humanitarian action nor rescue. We are talking about a regulated traffic that they bring in systematically with appointments arranged by traffickers on both sides.

Now a great many frauds have thrown their hands up over Santiago Abascal’s very graphic and accurate phrase that the slavers’ ship must be “confiscated and sunk”, in reference to the best known of Spain’s freebooting human-trafficking vessels, the Open Arms. Abascal has said nothing he has not been saying for almost a decade. Before, there were few of us saying it. Today we are already millions and soon we will be a majority holding that certainty. The criminals who are sinking Spain by encouraging an invasion that endangers all Spaniards and the nation itself must be sunk.

It is delightful to see how the talk-show panellists, so smugly conventional, all of them of both sexes, have worked themselves into a fury because Abascal wants to sink a ship full of refugees. No, you manipulating horde, Abascal did not say that. Abascal said that the ship must be confiscated and afterwards sunk. “That slavers’ ship must be confiscated and sunk”.

And he did not say it, but it is certainly his intention, because it is the intention of everyone who wants to restore respect for the borders and for Spanish law, that audits will have to be demanded not only of Open Arms but of all these organisations that are at this moment collecting fortunes in public money to house and maintain those whom their colleagues bring in. There are many people here becoming multimillionaires. Not only by trafficking in Venezuelan oil and all manner of things through the Dominican Republic. With the refugee industry, the immigrant industry, the unaccompanied-minor industry, with delirious invoicing paid by their friends in the administration. Abascal is once again entirely right. The sinking of the Open Arms will be a fine ceremony to mark the end of the era of contempt for borders and of incentivised invasion.

To benefit this industry, society must be kept from seeing the dramas this invasion generates daily across the whole of Spain. And there exists an express will, not only in the PSOE and its communist and separatist partners but also in the PP, to protect criminals and their acts with silence or concealment because they are immigrants. Denying it makes no less clear the will to protect the traffickers of illegal immigration, especially that link in the chain which is financed by the administrations and which are the special troops of the left and the far left known as NGOs.

They are called, in what is already an act of cover-up, Non-Governmental Organisations when they are exactly the opposite: they are fully governmental organisations, financed in large part, some of them entirely, with public money.

The NGOs devote themselves to what governments want but cannot do officially and publicly. Among other things, maintaining with public money an immense network of cadres wholly identified with their leftist ideology.

Germany, as this sad case in Göttingen once again exposes, has been the pioneer in these concealments, ever since those mass rapes and assaults in Cologne under Merkel which they tried to deny even when there were hundreds of victims and witnesses. The German authorities’ will to cover up is permanent and absolute. As it has been in thousands of cases in these past years, some of them known, others not. In Germany the security that was one of the treasures of the Federal Republic since the war has collapsed. The person chiefly responsible for Germans no longer being able to live as they did before is, of course, Angela Merkel, who in September 2015, with her total opening of the borders and the colossal pull effect of her proclamation that Germany would take in everyone in need, broke the balance of German society forever.

Today many believe that all of it formed part of a plan by a Merkel who had joined the CDU after the fall of the Berlin Wall without having genuinely abjured her communist militancy, and that her opening of the borders was really an act against the German nation. She never concealed her rejection of national symbols and ceremonies, and the image in which she contemptuously removes a German flag that had slipped into the photograph after an electoral victory is famous. Among those convinced of this is the man who was her head of the secret services at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans Georg Maassen, whom she dismissed because he debunked a journalists’ hoax about a pogrom by far-right extremists in Dresden that Merkel had made her own. Merkel did not forgive Maassen for proclaiming the truth before the media. There had been no far-right crime, which is the kind the social-democratic two-party system goes looking for. What there has been in Dresden ever since is an unceasing series of deaths of Germans at the hands of immigrants. And that the media do not trumpet as they did with the false pogrom.

Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Mutual Assured Destruction Doesn’t Deter Escalate to Win

A B-52 Stratofortress bomber flying in a clear blue sky

(This article was written by Peter Huessy and appeared in RealClearDefense. Mutual Assured Destruction Doesn’t Deter Escalate to Win)

Mutual assured destruction or MAD is not an American doctrine or military strategy. Those who believe MAD is how America deters nuclear armed adversaries assume that any use of nuclear weapons by the United States will be massive. And that any alternative such as the limited initial use of nuclear force, will quickly escalate to a full scale nuclear conflict with both attacker and retaliatory nation being destroyed. Given such assumptions, it is considered logical to assume U.S. deterrent strategy is fixed on massive retaliation and destroying most of the industry and population of our adversaries as that is the only possible use of such weapons.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, a MAD strategy was indeed considered but jettisoned by the United States some 65 years ago. For example, President Kennedy noted an all or nothing strategy made no sense: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy – or of a collective death-wish for the world.” Kennedy succeeded in adopting a strategy far short of all-out retaliation that came to be known as “flexible response” which in 1974 was fully developed by James Schlesinger and eventually codified in a 1980 PDD or Presidential Defense Directive 59.

Whether the United States has 10,000 or 1500 strategic nuclear weapons, our forces were designed to have a secure retaliatory capability at any level of conflict. The objective was to end any conflict as soon as possible and at the lowest level of destruction. But the U.S. goal was not to burn an adversaries cities to the ground. U.S. deterrent strategy was to hold at risk what our adversary valued—an adversary’s leadership, security forces that keep the leadership in power, key war supporting industries and the key weapons used to propel aggression.

Critics of current U.S. deterrent strategy assume that no nuclear armed adversary of the United States believes in “fighting” a nuclear war, so the U.S. should drop its long held deterrent strategy and go “back to MAD” or something like it. But at the same time, many of these same critics join the abolitionists to support a minimal number of nuclear weapons but only to “deter” but not engage in “warfighting.” If conflict breaks out and these weapons will not be used even in retaliation. This takes our nuclear deterrent off the table and reduced to only a bluff.

What then of the multiple nuclear threats by Russia over Ukraine? Such threats are often dismissed as mere bluff. Many may find this idea comforting. After all, if no nuclear armed nation has plans for the limited use of nuclear weapons, and everyone has adopted MAD, the United States need not be concerned with the nuclear balance.

Thus, the mistaken notion that the U.S. has a MAD strategy plays into the hands of Russia and China. These two nations both seek to be able to escalate or threaten to escalate in a crisis or conflict with a limited use of nuclear weapons. The objective is to get the United States to stand down and not come to the defense of her allies, a restraint to give Russia and China a strategic advantage.

Unfortunately, much of the current commentary on nuclear threats still assumes the U.S. and its adversaries maintain a mutual assured destruction strategy as the best means to avoid any use of nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobson’s recent book “On Nuclear War: A Scenario” describes mutual assured destruction strategy—which she assumes the U.S. maintains—as simply MAD or crazy. She posits that any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost automatically result in the all-out use of such weapons, leading to nuclear winter and killing billions. And as such, she calls for the entirety of American nuclear deterrence to be jettisoned.

What Jacobson ignores is that our adversaries of the West have sought military advantage through enhanced nuclear weapons. The Soviets sought to put nuclear weapons in space; then built a huge first strike missile force; then deployed thousands of medium range SS-20s to intimidate and split NATO; and most recently built a theater strike capability to keep the United States and NATO from coming to the robust defense of its allies.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent was never a one size fits all and automatically “fit for purpose.” For example, the U.S. and NATO faced a huge conventional military threat from the USSR from the beginning of the Cold War on the plains of central Europe. The Warsaw Pact tank armies were not matched by U.S. conventional forces whose cost would have bankrupted the U.S. Treasury. The alternative was an extended nuclear “umbrella” over Europe, primarily aimed at Soviet tank armies. Thus, in the initial Cold War period, the U.S. assumed a nuclear conflict would most probably grow out of an initial conventional war.

As technology improved, however, a new threat emerged: a potential Soviet pre-emptive first strike seeking to eliminate much of the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent, followed up by a subsequent conventional invasion of Europe.

In 1963, the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent consisted of 6000 nuclear warheads while the Russians had 600 warheads. As President Kennedy remarked, this strength and particularly the newly deployed Minuteman missiles were as he said, “my ace in the hole,” that gave the United States the strategic advantage that peacefully ended the Cuban missile crisis.

However, by the time the next decade ended, the 1972 SALT “arms control” treaty process allowed the USSR to deploy 7800 warheads compared to the U.S. force of 8700 warheads, (revealed by a 1983 DoD Net Assessment.) Most worrisome were 3000 highly accurate SS-18 missile warheads, with the overall Soviet nuclear force projected to grow to over 24,000 warheads by 1993. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told Congress in 1974, “the Soviets are going for a first strike force and there is no doubt about it.” The SS-18 eventually did indeed hold at risk the entirety of the U.S. land-based ICBMs, the only highly accurate U.S. deterrent force, leaving the U.S. without the ability to hold at risk key Soviet assets.

This perceived imbalance was known as the “window of vulnerability” and leave U.S. leaders exactly where President Kennedy had previously worried would be the case. The U.S. solved the strategic equation of the window of vulnerability—the USSR empire was brought down. The U.S. deployed the accurate D-5 submarine launched missile and Peacekeeper land based ICBM to its deterrent, the Soviet SS-20s were banned by treaty, SDI was initiated, and the START arms control process brought Russian warheads down to under 2000, a near 80% reduction.

In April 1999 Russia’s President Yeltsin decreed that Moscow develop highly accurate, small, low yield, battlefield useful nuclear weapons. And as former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned decades ago, these nuclear weapons were designed precisely to “escalate to win” a conventional conflict or crisis between Moscow and Washington.

Putin thinks the U.S. will not want to risk escalation and the possible massive use of nuclear weapons. That is why Putin has made exactly these threats over NATO’s intervention in the war against Ukraine. The previous administration stood down and did not provide Ukraine the needed military capability to effectively take the fight to Moscow. In addition, Russia assumes the relative weak U.S. theater nuclear forces cannot deter escalatory threats from Moscow. This point was emphasized by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report in laying out the opening of what could be described as a new window of vulnerability.

The U.S. is indeed now developing a greater theater nuclear deterrent to close the technology gap. However, simply improving conventional deterrent would not be sufficient. As the U.S. military has repeatedly emphasized, if adversarial nuclear forces are introduced into a conventional conflict, the assumed U.S. advantage “does not hold.” In short, the U.S. conventional military advantage disappears.

In conclusion, the central tenets of mutual assured destruction no longer apply as MAD itself has long been jettisoned. More importantly, our adversaries believe the actual first use of nuclear weapons must no longer be assumed to be taboo. That is the new threat that must be deterred by the U.S. and its allies. The dilemma is that the U.S. needs time to resolve this theater deterrent shortfall but the aggression calendar of our adversaries may not necessarily wait until completed.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Exploring the Dangers of Huawei’s Control of Communications and Data in Spain

Executive Summary

Through the efforts of high ranking Spanish politicians of both major parties, Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecommunications giant, has been contracted by the Spanish government to manage critical systems, including judicially authorized wiretaps and the Sistema Integrado de Interceptación Legal de las Telecomunicaciones (SITEL), despite Spain’s alignment with European Union (EU) and NATO policies restricting Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure although, ironically, the government of Pedro Sánchez has included Huawei in the Security Operations Center (SOC) 5G, a public entity in charge of the supervision and certification of security in 5G networks and services, joining representatives of NOKIA and Ericsson.

China’s involvement in sensitive communications and data systems raises significant concerns about US national security, cybersecurity, and geopolitical risks posed by Huawei’s role in Spain, with a particular focus on the potential threats to US personnel stationed at military bases and stations in Rota, Algeciras, Morón, Torrejón and elsewhere.

These bases are critical to US and NATO operations in Europe, the North Atlantic and North Africa, and Huawei’s access to sensitive data could compromise operational security, intelligence-sharing, and the safety of US forces.

Focusing specifically on the security implications for US military bases in Spain—Naval Station Rota, Morón Air Base, Torrejón Air Base, Algeciras (and other strategic ports),—given Huawei Technologies’ role in managing Spain’s sensitive communications, data systems, including judicial wiretaps, SITEL, and the proliferation of Chinese made EVs known to collect an abundance of data.

The presence of US personnel at these bases, which are critical to US and NATO operations, amplifies concerns about Huawei’s potential to compromise operational security, intelligence-sharing, and personnel safety.

This Report explores the specific vulnerabilities, risks to US base security, and mitigation strategies to safeguard US forces in Spain, and provides recommendations to mitigate these risks and strengthen Spain’s alignment with Western security frameworks.

Introduction

Huawei’s growing presence in Spain’s telecommunications and data infrastructure, particularly through contracts to manage judicial wiretaps and support SITEL, has sparked alarm among Spanish law enforcement, EU partners, and US officials.

While Spain has restricted Huawei’s role in 5G network cores, its continued reliance on the Chinese company for sensitive systems creates a paradox that undermines national and allied security. This is especially concerning given the presence of US military personnel at key bases in Spain, including Naval Station Rota, Algeciras (a frequent port for US naval operations), Morón Air Base, and Torrejón Air Base.

These bases support critical US and NATO missions, including missile defense, air mobility, and intelligence operations. This white paper analyzes the dangers of Huawei’s control over Spain’s communications and data systems, with a focus on:

1. National Security Risks:

The potential for Chinese government access to sensitive data under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law.

2. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities:

Technical risks in Huawei’s systems that could be exploited to compromise data.

3. Risks to US Personnel:

The specific threats to US military operations and personnel at Rota, Algeciras, Morón, and Torrejón.

4. Geopolitical Implications:

The impact on Spain’s relationships with the US, EU, and NATO

5. Case Studies and Precedents

Data breach cases in the UK, US, Africa and the Snowden case.

6. Chinese EVs:

The risk posed by Chinese electric vehicles’ increased use in Spain

7. Recommendations:

Policy measures to protect US personnel and align Spain with allied security standards.

Background

Huawei’s Role in Spain

In the context of the Socialist government’s increasing isolation in the world stage and an almost irrational and anachronic animosity towards the West, Spain has moved closer to Iran, Russia, China and terrorist organizations like Hamas. This is not dictated by any kind of affinity on the part of the Spanish people, but by the stubborn refusal of an unpopular government to move aside and, to the degree it is capable, create conditions to finance its permanence in power.

Thus, Huawei has been awarded contracts worth €12.3 million to provide storage systems (OceanStor 6800 V5) for judicial wiretaps and technical support for SITEL, a system used by Spanish law enforcement and intelligence agencies to intercept communications related to terrorism, organized crime, and espionage. Despite Spain’s exclusion of Huawei from 5G network cores—following EU and NATO recommendations, although the government included the company as an advisor in SOC-5G, —these contracts, awarded between 2021 and 2025, highlight a contradictory approach to cybersecurity. The Spanish government claims compliance with the National Cryptologic Center’s guidelines, but concerns persist about Huawei’s access to sensitive data, and the Spanish government continues to grant them almost unfettered access.

US Military Presence in Spain

Spain hosts several critical US military installations:

Naval Station Rota, is a joint US-Spanish naval base hosting US Navy destroyers equipped with Aegis missile defense systems, critical for NATO’s ballistic missile defense. NAVSTA Rota supports Naval Forces Europe Africa Central (EURAFCENT), 6th Fleet and Combatant Commander strategic priorities by providing airfield and port facilities, security, force protection, logistical support, administrative support and emergency services to all U.S. and NATO forces. Situated on a 6,100-acre Spanish Navy base, NAVSTA Rota provides cargo, fuel and logistics support to units transiting the region, supporting U.S. and NATO ships with three active piers; U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aircraft with a 670-acre airfield; and the largest weapons and fuels facilities in Europe, all located within a single, secure fence-line.

Algeciras, is a strategic port used by US naval vessels for resupply and operations in the Mediterranean. Alas, last year Spanish authorities refused entry to American flagged ships bound for Israel, and recently the Federal Maritime Commission excluded Algeciras from a key route, in favor of Tanger Med in Morocco.

Zaragoza Air Base,once an American base, was transferred to Spain in 1992, but remains a key hub for US Air Force mobility and logistics operations in Europe, same as Torrejón Air Base, once home to the US Air Force’s 16th Air Expeditionary Wing, and NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre, now relegated to mostly for official visits. Zaragoza was used during the Gulf War, Operation Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan.

Morón Air Base, since 2015, has been home to up to 3,000 US military and civilian personnel and 40 aircraft of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Africa.

These bases rely on secure communications, intelligence-sharing, and coordination with Spanish authorities and NATO to execute missions effectively. Huawei’s involvement in Spain’s communications infrastructure introduces potential vulnerabilities that could directly impact base security.

Global Concerns About Huawei

Huawei’s ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its obligations under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law have led to bans in the US, UK, Australia, and several EU countries.

This National Intelligence Law mandates Chinese companies to assist state intelligence efforts, raising well-founded fears that Huawei’s systems could be used for espionage or sabotage. Reports of vulnerabilities in Huawei’s equipment, including unpatched interfaces and potential backdoors, further heighten these concerns.

It is, therefore, naïve and irresponsible to consider Huawei as anything other than an instrumentality of the Chinese government and the Communist Party of China at the service of its intelligence services and military operations.

1. National Security Risks

Chinese Government Access to Sensitive Data

China’s National Intelligence Law compels Huawei to cooperate with state intelligence agencies, creating a pathway for the CCP to access data stored on Huawei’s OceanStor systems.

In Spain, these systems handle judicial wiretaps, which include communications related to national security threats. Unauthorized access by Beijing could expose sensitive intelligence, including data relevant to US military operations, movements of US military and civilians at US military posts not only in US bases but at all military installations, given Spain’s role as a NATO ally.

Compromised Intelligence-Sharing

The US has expressed concerns about Spain’s Huawei contracts, with lawmakers like Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Tom Cotton warning that intelligence-sharing could be curtailed if vulnerabilities persist. In a letter to DNI Tulsi Gabbard on 17 July, 2025, Senator Cotton and Congressman Crawford wrote: “Since the first Trump administration, the United States has waged a whole of government effort to remove the threat Huawei equipment poses to American networks, infrastructure, and privacy. Until Spain follows suit, the U.S. Government should ensure that any information shared with the Spanish government is redacted of details that should not be shared with the CCP.”

The Five Eyes alliance (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and NATO rely on secure data exchange, and any breach in Spain’s systems could expose US and allied intelligence, compromising missions supported by Rota, Morón, and Torrejón.

For example, at Rota, where 4,000 US personnel and families reside, compromised data could facilitate foreign intelligence operations, including surveillance or recruitment attempts.

Technical Vulnerabilities in Huawei Systems

Reports, such as the 2019 UK National Cyber Security Centre Assessment, have identified flaws in Huawei’s software, including unpatched vulnerabilities and poor engineering practices. These weaknesses in the OceanStor systems or SITEL infrastructure could be exploited to:

· Install backdoors for real-time data access.

· Deploy malware to disrupt base communications or logistics.

· Manipulate data to mislead US or Spanish intelligence efforts.

Such vulnerabilities could directly affect the operational readiness of bases like Morón, where secure logistics are critical, or Torrejón, where NATO’s air operations depend on reliable command systems.

US shares sensitive intelligence with Spain through NATO and bilateral agreements, particularly for counterterrorism and missile defense operations at Rota and Morón. Huawei’s access to Spanish systems could lead to leaks, prompting the US to restrict intelligence-sharing. This would:

· Limit situational awareness for US personnel, increasing operational risks.

· Weaken joint US-Spain missions, such as those supported by Morón’s air mobility hub.

· Undermine NATO’s collective defense, particularly at Torrejón’s CAOC, whose primary mission is to “plan, direct, coordinate, monitor, analyse and report on the operations of Air Policing means assigned to it in peace time. The unit’s area of responsibility comprises European NATO airspace south of the Alps. Hence Combined Air Operations Centre Torrejón is responsible for some of NATO’s special Air Policing arrangements, such as Air Policing over Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Slovenia.”

2. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

Technical Weaknesses in Huawei’s Systems

A 2019 UK National Cyber Security Centre report identified “significant” flaws in Huawei’s software, including poor engineering practices and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by state or non-state actors. The OceanStor 6800 V5 systems used for wiretap storage may contain similar weaknesses, such as unpatched telnet interfaces or embedded malware, as reported in other Huawei devices. A breach of these systems could allow adversaries to access or manipulate data critical to law enforcement and intelligence operations.

Insider Threats and Lack of Transparency

Huawei’s opaque governance, with reported ties to the CCP through its trade union committee and leadership (e.g., former chairwoman Sun Yafang’s Ministry of State Security background), raises concerns about insider threats. Employees or subcontractors could be pressured to install backdoors or leak data, compromising Spain’s surveillance systems and, by extension, US military communications.

3. Risks to US Personnel

Operational Security at US Bases

US personnel at Rota, Algeciras, Morón, and Torrejón rely on secure communications for mission planning, logistics, and intelligence coordination. Huawei’s access to SITEL and wiretap data could allow adversaries to intercept communications related to US operations, such as ship movements at Rota or air missions from Morón. This could enable adversaries to track US forces, predict operational patterns, or disrupt missions.

Espionage and Targeting of Personnel

Sensitive data stored on Huawei systems could include communications involving US personnel, such as intercepted calls or metadata related to military activities. If accessed by the CCP, this data could be used to target US service members for espionage, blackmail, or cyberattacks. For example, compromised communications could reveal personal details about personnel at Torrejón, increasing their vulnerability to foreign intelligence operations.

Impact on NATO Missions

Rota and Torrejón are integral to NATO’s missile defense and air operations. A breach of Spanish communications systems could undermine NATO’s ability to respond to threats, such as Russian aggression in Eastern Europe or missile launches from rogue states. This would directly affect US personnel tasked with executing these missions.

4. Geopolitical Implications

Strained US-Spain Relations

The US has urged Spain to reconsider Huawei’s role, with warnings from officials like Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander about the risks to bilateral defense cooperation. Continued reliance on Huawei could lead to reduced US investment in Spanish bases or restrictions on joint operations, weakening the US-Spain defense partnership. In a hearing on US Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe, Dr. Wallader stated: “I think the areas of our greatest concern are when China is, largely through technology companies–Huawei is the kind of poster child for that–and so we work closely in sharing intelligence and our information about the risks that that creates for countries in Europe and, more broadly, globally, for them to be able to control their infrastructure, to control their communications. So that is one major line of

effort.

But the other major concern is when we see China seeking majority control of ports, and while there were some instances in Europe some time ago where countries did not take that seriously, they are now very much attuned to that and have taken steps to make sure that even if there is investment it does not allow…”

EU and NATO Misalignment

Spain’s permissive stance on Huawei diverges from the policies of 11 EU countries, including Germany and Sweden, which have restricted or banned Huawei (and ZTE) from critical infrastructure. Besides these eleven countries, 21 have implemented rules allowing their national authorities “to restrict or prevent suppliers considered as high-risk for 5G networks, when deemed necessary.”

Alas, a back door opened wide in Spain creates a potential “weak link” in the EU’s digital security framework, undermining collective defense efforts and exposing NATO operations to risk.

Continued use of Huawei could also embolden other NATO countries to relax restrictions on high-risk vendors, creating broader vulnerabilities for US forces in Europe.

4.3 Human Rights Concerns

Huawei’s technologies have been linked to the CCP’s surveillance of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, raising ethical concerns about their use in democratic countries. Spain’s reliance on Huawei for surveillance systems risks normalizing technologies associated with human rights abuses, potentially eroding public trust in government institutions and complicating US-Spain cooperation on democratic values.

Case Studies and Precedents

United States

The US banned Huawei from its networks in 2012 and added it to the Entity List in 2019, citing espionage risks. In 2022, the Biden administration prohibited Huawei equipment in telecommunications, labeling it an “unacceptable risk.” These measures reflect concerns about Huawei’s potential to compromise military and intelligence operations.

United Kingdom

The UK’s 2020 decision to remove Huawei from 5G networks by 2027 followed a National Cyber Security Centre report highlighting software vulnerabilities. The UK’s experience underscores the risks of relying on Huawei for critical systems, particularly in a NATO context.

African Union Data Breach In 2018

Le Monde reported that Huawei equipment at the African Union headquarters was linked to data breaches allegedly orchestrated by the Chinese government. This incident illustrates the risks of Huawei’s involvement in sensitive systems, with direct relevance to Spain’s wiretap storage.

Snowden

In 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks exposed US intelligence-sharing vulnerabilities, impacting operations at bases like Rota. A Huawei breach could have similar consequences, exposing NATO and US plans.

4. Chinese EVs in Spain

The impact of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in Spain, particularly near US military bases, raises their own significant concerns about national security, data privacy, and geopolitical implications, especially in light of the Israeli investigation into potential spying and data collection by Chinese EVs.

Chinese EV brands like BYD, MG Motor, and Chery have gained traction in Spain due to their competitive pricing, and the Spanish governments commitment to expand its relations with China. The global electric car market is projected to reach 22 million sales by 2025, with China leading in adoption and manufacturing. In Spain, Chinese brands dominate the affordable EV segment, with models like the BYD Atto 3 being particularly popular.

If the use of these EVs near military bases were not a matter of serious concern, their adoption by the Spanish armed forces brings a new level of risk to the fore. The Spanish Army has acquired 170 Chinese-made electric vans for military use, at a cost of €2.5 million (U$S 2.9 million). These vehicles are used in sensitive areas, including near US military bases, such as those in Rota and Morón.

In August 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) implemented a comprehensive ban on Chinese-made vehicles entering military bases, citing fears of data leaks from onboard cameras, sensors, and connected systems. This followed an initial restriction in July 2025 at the Gideonim Communications Corps base and was expanded due to concerns that Chinese EVs could record audio, video, and geolocation data, posing a threat to military operations. The IDF also suspended a tender for BYD Atto 3 vehicles after cybersecurity warnings.

But Israel is not alone in its concerns. The UK banned Chinese EVs from military sites in April 2025, citing espionage risks, and instructed personnel to park these vehicles at least two miles from sensitive sites like RAF Wyton. The US has also proposed regulations to prohibit Chinese tech in connected vehicles due to concerns about data collection and potential remote manipulation.

Indeed, Chinese EVs are equipped with advanced sensors, cameras, and connectivity features that collect vast amounts of data (e.g., up to 1400 GB per hour, though only a fraction is transmitted). Under China’s National Intelligence Law, Chinese companies may be compelled to share data with the government, that is with the Chinese Communist Party, raising fears of espionage, especially near sensitive military installations.

As a former MI6 boss (Ian Williams) so poignantly put it: “EVs are also the perfect tools for sabotage, surveillance and espionage – as well as targeted assassinations.”

5. Implications for US Personnel in Spain

Compromised Operational Security

A breach of Huawei-managed systems could expose communications related to US naval operations at Rota or air missions at Morón and Torrejón, enabling adversaries to disrupt logistics, missile defense, or intelligence operations.

Reduced Intelligence-Sharing

US concerns about Huawei could lead to restrictions on intelligence-sharing with Spain, limiting the information available to US personnel at Spanish bases. This could hinder mission planning and situational awareness, increasing risks to personnel.

Economic and Strategic Dependencies

Spain’s increasing reliance on Huawei risks creating long-term dependencies on Chinese technology, potentially limiting US access to alternative, secure systems for joint operations. This could complicate US efforts to maintain secure communications at its, and NATO’s bases.

6. Recommendations

To mitigate the risks posed by Huawei’s role in Spain’s communications systems and protect US personnel, the following measures are recommended:

· Conduct a Joint US-Spain Security Review

The US and Spain should jointly assess Huawei’s role in SITEL and wiretap storage, focusing on risks to US bases. The review should involve the US Department of Defense and Spain’s National Intelligence Centre (CNI).

· Phase Out Huawei Equipment

Spain should establish a timeline to replace Huawei’s OceanStor systems and SITEL support with equipment from trusted vendors (e.g., Nokia, Ericsson). This aligns with Germany’s 2026 deadline for removing Huawei from 5G networks.

· Strengthen Base Communications Security

The US should deploy independent, encrypted communications systems at Rota, Morón, Zaragoza and Torrejón to reduce reliance on Spanish infrastructure potentially compromised by Huawei, and harden its communications.

· Enhance EU-NATO Coordination

Spain should collaborate with the EU and NATO to develop a unified framework for excluding high-risk vendors from sensitive systems, ensuring alignment with allies and protecting US and NATO personnel.

· Increase Transparency and Oversight

Until Huawei is removed from Spanish communications altogether, Spain should mandate regular audits of Huawei’s systems by the National Cryptologic Center and share results with US and NATO partners to rebuild trust.

· Engage in Bilateral Dialogue

The US and Spain should hold high-level talks to address Huawei concerns, emphasizing the importance of secure communications for joint defense operations and the safety of US personnel.

· Ban Chinese-made electric vehicles

Chinese EVs should not be allowed in an area of at least five miles from any military base, and most certainly should not be permitted to enter any military installation.

· Deploy Independent Systems

It is imperative that, as soon as feasible, Spain move towards replacing Huawei technology with safe and reliable systems readily available in the West. In a rather incomprehensible statement outside of the context of the subservience of Spanish politicians to Chinese ambitions, Esteban González Pons, until recently EU Vice-President, and currently the Vice-Secretary-General of the main opposition party in Spain, declared: “Without Huawei, 5G is not possible.”

It should come as no surprise that there is an investigation in Belgium of over 15 European Parliamentarians, including González Pons, for alleged payments received from Huawei to promote it. Selling influence frequently falls into such absurd affirmations.

Operation “Follow the money” must be supported and corrupt politicians risking the lives of NATO forces must be rooted out of the European Parliament.

· Secure Satellite Communications

Expand use of US-controlled satellite networks for sensitive operations, particularly at Rota for naval coordination and Torrejón and Morón for NATO air operations.

The technology is available, trusted and ready to be deployed.

· Regular Cybersecurity Audits

Conduct frequent audits of base networks to detect and mitigate vulnerabilities, ensuring no integration with Huawei-managed systems.

Conclusion

Huawei’s control of sensitive communications and data systems in Spain, and Chinaa’s corrupt meddling in European affairs poses significant risks to national security, cybersecurity, and the safety of US personnel at Rota, Algeciras, Morón, Torrejón and, indeed, every post in the European and North African theater.

The potential for Chinese government access to judicial wiretaps, coupled with Huawei’s technical vulnerabilities and Spain’s divergence from EU and NATO policies, threatens operational security and intelligence-sharing.

By implementing the recommended measures—phasing out Huawei equipment, strengthening base communications, and enhancing allied coordination—Spain can mitigate these risks, protect US personnel, and reinforce its commitment to Western security frameworks.

Alas, phasing out Huawei equipment is no longer sufficient, without an effective control of an increasing number of Chinese EVs in circulation, even in use by the Spanish military forces.

It is imperative that the US move now to mitigate these risks and ensure the safety of our installations and security of our military personnel.

References

Huawei’s paradox in Spain: No to 5G, but yes to wiretap storage

Spain under fire for contracting Huawei to store judicial wiretaps – POLITICO Fears over Huawei’s use in Spain’s intelligence and police systems

Spain’s Huawei Deal Is a Wake-Up Call for U.S. Federal Procurement Reform – War on the Rocks

Spain chooses Huawei for intelligence wiretaps despite risks –

Spain awards Huawei contracts to manage intelligence agency wiretaps | The Record from Recorded Future News

Spain denies security risk claims against Huawei following US criticism – Huawei Central

Spain’s Sánchez dodges backlash over Huawei deal amid EU and US concerns – Euractiv

Spain confirms using Huawei to store judicial wiretaps, denies security risk | The Straits Times

Spain awarded €12.3 million in contracts to Huawei

Spain: Huawei must not be allowed access to wiretap data in the EU – ARTICLE 19

Huawei to supply Spain with wiretap storage​| Cybernews

Is China’s Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security? | Council on Foreign Relations

British Watchdog Finds ‘Serious’ Huawei Security Vulnerabilities | CRN

UK intelligence finds ‘new risks’ linked to Huawei – POLITICO

The Huawei Dilemma: Why Europe Needs Strong Intelligence Guardrails – The Cipher Brief

US military bases in Spain and their importance

Spain’s contribution to integrated air defense in Europe. Global Affairs. University of Navarra

Israel suspects espionage and bans Chinese cars from all military bases!

Are Chinese electric cars coming to spy on us? | The Week

Chinese electric cars prompt security fears as ‘every major defence supplier is concerned about tech’

The horrifying reality of how China could cripple Britain in one move | World | News | Express.co.uk

The horrifying truth about how China could cripple Britain in just seconds – by barely lifting a finger… as former MI6 boss makes desperate plea to end our reliance on Beijing: IAN WILLIAMS | Daily Mail Online

Los 24 años de Huawei en España: contratos con administraciones, vídeos promocionales y road shows – Libre Mercado

El Gobierno incluye a Huawei en el organismo público que controla el 5G | Economía | EL PAÍS

Estados Unidos expulsa a España de una ruta de comercio marítimo estratégica

United States drops Port of Algeciras from one of its key maritime routes

Huawei, F-35s, and Algeciras: Spain Drifting Away from the U.S. ━ The European Conservative

Maersk Shifts Major Shipping Route from Algeciras to Tanger Med

Naval Station Rota

https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/intel-chairs-cotton-and-crawford-to-gabbard-review-intelligence-sharing-with-spain
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/annual-review/2019/ncsc/index.html
https://ac.nato.int/about/caoc/torrejon
https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC72759/text
https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/08/12/eleven-eu-countries-took-5g-security-measures-to-ban-huawei-zte
https://gaceta.es/europa/sin-huawei-no-hay-5g-posible-la-defensa-de-gonzalez-pons-del-gigante-chino-en-europa-20250313-1340
https://gaceta.es/europa/sin-huawei-no-hay-5g-posible-la-defensa-de-gonzalez-pons-del-gigante-chino-en-europa-20250313-1340

Trump’s Crackdown Delivers Record Crime Drop in DC as Progressive Policies Fuel Urban Lawlessness Nationwide

Let me be clear, I have firm views on illegal immigration. In cases where illegal immigrants are convicted of serious violent crimes such as murder or rape, I believe the penalties should be as severe as possible, including the death penalty. For non-violent offenses, taxpayers should not have to shoulder the cost of long-term incarceration—swift deportation is the better and more practical solution. My concerns about sanctuary cities, however, are less about immigration status and far more about the policies that govern criminal justice. The real threat to public safety is both in how these cities manage offenders—by releasing repeat and violent criminals regardless of status—and in the reality that many among the undocumented population do add to criminality and recidivism. While some migrants seek a better life, data from federal agencies shows that thousands of illegals are arrested or convicted each year for a range of offenses, including serious crimes such as assault, weapons violations, and homicide. With criminal aliens representing a substantial share of ICE removals, their presence and the criminal acts of a subset within this group are pressing concerns when it comes to urban safety.

In practice, the cities most affected by rising crime and recidivism are those led predominantly by Democratic state and local governments. Policy changes—including the removal of California’s Three Strikes law, the abandonment of Broken Windows policing in New York, the reduction or outright elimination of Qualified Immunity for police, and the implementation of cashless bail—have dramatically weakened accountability. Habitual and violent offenders, including those here illegally, know the consequences for repeated offenses are now much less severe. The withdrawal from Broken Windows policing, once credited with the steep drop in New York’s violent crime throughout the 1990s, has instead allowed an environment in which lower-level crimes are ignored, often opening the door to more major criminal acts. Cashless bail policies compounded the issue by creating a revolving door for repeat offenders—many with extensive criminal records—who are arrested and released within hours, only to offend again. Poorly conceived policies in Democrat-run states have enabled rising rates of recidivism, undermining progress made in reducing crime.

The role of governmental policy is directly matched by the impact of the criminal element within the undocumented population. Federal data for 2025 confirms that a meaningful percentage of illegal aliens have been arrested or convicted for more serious crimes, and these numbers are felt most strongly in the urban centers where law enforcement practices are most constrained by progressive policies. Even as some studies show that immigrants overall may not commit more crimes than native-born Americans, the criminal activity of a subset of migrants remains a stubborn reality in shaping the frequency and severity of recidivism.

This dynamic is best seen in New York City, where the mayoral race is being shaped by policy proposals widely considered radical. Frontrunner Zohran Mamdani, supported by progressive groups and running on a Democratic Socialist platform, has publicly pledged to abolish punishments for misdemeanors altogether, stating the city’s police should not waste resources on enforcing minor crimes like theft or shoplifting under $1,000, drug possession, assault without weapons, or drunk driving. According to the New York Post, Mamdani declared, “While police play a vital role, we are currently depending on them to address the shortcomings of our social safety net, which hinders their ability to perform their actual duties”. Local critics warned his proposals would operate as “an E-ZPass for criminals,” encouraging repeated offending while eroding the fundamental sense of order for law-abiding residents. New Yorkers like Chelsea resident Alexander Kaplan have responded, to the New York Post with disbelief: “It’s just difficult to imagine how adults in their right mind could come up with it. I’m not exaggerating, I’m completely serious,” he said. “We’re already suffering from terrible crime. This is going to make it a thousand times worse. And perception matters – just the notion of this would embolden criminals.” If elected, Mamdani could instruct the NYPD to deprioritize such arrests or pressure district attorneys to refrain from prosecuting certain cases, echoing controversial strategies employed in other cities.

While some urban areas struggle with these progressive policy experiments, President Trump’s recent takeover of Washington, DC’s public safety response and the expanded role of the National Guard have produced striking results in the fight against urban crime. By assuming control of the city’s police department and deploying 800 National Guard members, Trump announced, “I am announcing a historic initiative to save our nation’s capital from crime, chaos, disorder, and destitution”. Since federal intervention, the city recorded an unprecedented streak—13 days without a murder—an achievement widely hailed as a historic turnaround for a city previously plagued by gun violence and high homicide rates. According to The Hill, between August 14 and August 26, 2025, Washington, DC saw zero homicides, with just two murders documented since Trump’s assumption of police control on August 11, underscoring the impact of federal oversight and enhanced security protocols.

The broader impact includes a 22% drop in overall violent crime since the National Guard’s arrival, with robberies down by 46%, carjackings down 83%, and car thefts by 21%. Trump’s repeated emphasis has been clear: “We are witnessing a situation of utter lawlessness … this is liberation day in D.C., and we will reclaim our capital”. He has hinted at plans to expand this model to other cities, arguing, “Consider the murder rate in D.C.; it compares with some of the most dangerous cities globally. … In just ten days, crime has decreased by over 35 percent in the capital, thanks to Donald J. Trump’s actions”.

U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Jeanine Pirro has strongly endorsed these aggressive measures. On Fox News, Pirro said, “We’re not going to tolerate crime that is out of control in the nation’s capital … This is the shining city on the hill that our forefathers talked about … and in the end, it is an incredibly violent area”. Pirro dismissed official narratives that crime is down, pointing to the real victims and their families, and said, “You tell the mother of the intern who was shot going out for McDonald’s near the Washington Convention Center, ‘Oh, crime is down’”. She advocated for tough city and youth sentencing laws to ensure dangerous offenders are properly removed from the streets.

President Trump’s initiative in Washington, DC stands as a rare example of federal action producing rapid and significant reductions in violent crime. As national debates rage over lenient policies, cashless bail, and proposals to decriminalize misdemeanors—like those advanced by New York City mayoral frontrunner Mamdani—the dramatic improvements in DC offer a glimpse of what robust enforcement and expanded law enforcement roles can achieve for public safety. The lessons are clear: poorly constructed policies by Democrat-led state and city governments, paired with the documented criminal element among illegal entrants—and advocates pushing for even greater leniency—remain central reasons for persistent recidivism and the rise of crime in America’s urban centers, while strong deterrence and accountability are crucial for reversing these trends.

Eli M. Gold is the president of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC based think-and-do tank.

The Persian Puzzle: Why Understanding Iran’s Ancient Identity May Hold the Key to Peace

Ancient columns at Persepolis, Iran, at sunset

(This article was written by Adelle Nazarian and appeared in The Western Journal. The Persian Puzzle: Why Understanding Iran’s Ancient Identity May Hold the Key to Peace)

Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, no Arab state has dared to confront Israel militarily. The wars have not disappeared — they’ve simply changed hands. Since 2006, Iran has taken the lead in orchestrating hostilities against Israel, not through direct confrontation, but through proxy warfare and ideological manipulation, engineering rage on the Arab street while cloaking its ambitions in sacred garb.

Iran’s Sejjil missile — its name meaning “shards hurled at the deviant” — is emblematic of a regime encased in theological obsession and ritualistic hostility. From alleyway slogans to the polished rhetoric of Tehran’s clerical elite, the Islamic Republic has built a political theology upon the bones of religious grievance. To understand Iran, one must look not just to its nuclear program or sanctions evasion schemes, but to its enduring existential mythology. A radical reorientation of this spiritual architecture — not mere regime change — is the only path to sustainable peace.

For all its strategic rationality, Iran’s foreign policy is ultimately anchored in a dualistic and apocalyptic worldview. Islamic eschatology casts Jews in a disparaging role, and the rebirth of Israel in 1948 triggered something deeper than geopolitical anxiety — it reawakened an ancient wound. Among the Abrahamic religions, Christianity and Islam often battle for narrative dominance, but both maintain a complicated, even subconscious, struggle with Judaism. Iran’s animus toward Israel is as much metaphysical as it is material.

But to truly decode Iran, we must move even further back — beyond Islam, beyond even Zoroastrianism — into a forgotten fraternal conflict with Vedic Hinduism.

This is where the Persian puzzle begins to unravel. Zoroastrianism, long assumed to be Iran’s spiritual foundation, may in fact be a counter-narrative — an ideological reaction to Persia’s traumatic break from the Vedic world. The 4th-century Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus records in “Rerum Gestarum”:

“When Zoroaster had boldly made his way into the unknown regions of Upper India, he came to a certain woody retreat, of which, with its tranquil silence the Brahmins, men of sublime genius, were the possessors. From their teaching he learnt the principles of the motion of the world and of the stars, and the pure rites of sacrifice… and of what he learnt he infused some portion into the minds of the Magi.”

This account suggests what few dare to explore: that Persia’s foundational theology was not born ex nihilo, but was grafted from its Vedic cousins and reformulated through a lens of imperial ambition. Bereft of its spiritual kinship with India, Persia compensated by building an empire of priestcraft and tribal confederation, reaching east and west to forge a new spiritual identity rooted in messianism and separation.

The West’s enduring hope that fissures in Iran’s regime will somehow usher in liberal reform reveals a profound misunderstanding of Persian political theology. What we see in Iran today is not just clerical authoritarianism — it’s a civilizational mirror of India’s own sacred governance, albeit one stripped of pluralism.

Iran’s Ayatollah-led system is an anomaly in the Islamic world. It resembles more closely the Hindu tradition of the philosopher-king, where the sage, not the soldier, leads. Only the most credentialed religious scholars — those with standing in law, theology, and public service — are permitted to sit on the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader is not a monarch but a jurist-king elected for life, in accordance with ancient notions of divine stewardship. It’s as if the soul of the Mahabharata lingers in Tehran’s corridors of power.

The Combatant Clergy Association — simultaneously pious and paramilitary — echoes the Yajurvedic archetype of the warrior-priest. Their embedded influence in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps makes them resilient to internal coups, and their financial oversight inoculates the state against oligarchic capture. The likely heirs to Khamenei’s throne all emerge from this sacred-military class.

Khomeini’s romantic ideal of a “Guardianship of Love” is institutionalized in the Basij, Iran’s youth volunteer force. Structurally and spiritually, it mirrors India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the world’s largest grassroots movement. Even Iran’s flag bears resemblance to the khanda, the Sikh emblem — a spiritual offshoot of Hinduism. That’s no coincidence: Khomeini’s ancestors migrated from India in 1834. The Indo-Persian entanglement is more than historical — it’s foundational.

Yet for all its ideological scaffolding, Iran’s theocracy is haunted by spiritual discontent. It mimics the Vedic hierarchy but lacks its inner light. Its ritualism is brittle, its orthodoxy exhausted. What remains is an ossified version of what once aspired to be transcendent.

Many Iranians tattoo the Faravahar, a Zoroastrian symbol borrowed from the Assyrian deity Ashur, as a gesture of national pride. But it is rarely a call to spiritual renewal. In post-Soviet Tajikistan — another Persianate society — Zoroastrian revivalism failed to animate the soul. It’s an identity marker, not a messianic spark.

Nietzsche confessed to his confidant Johann Heinrich Koselitz (also known by his pen name Peter Gast) that “Thus Spake Zarathustra” was, at its core, an ode to Manu — the ancient Hindu lawgiver particularly known for the Manusmriti, a foundational text on Dharma. That legacy survives in Iran, not through faith, but through yearning. Ever since its rupture from the Vedic order, Iran has been in search of its messiah, its redeemer, its ideological lodestar. One after another — Zoroaster, Khomeini, now perhaps Khamenei’s successors — Iran attaches itself to prophets, not principles.

Today, in the religious underground, serious seekers no longer look to the imams. They are turning to Buddhism. To Hinduism. To the East.

Western efforts to introduce religious streams into Iran that are disconnected from Iran’s earliest spiritual tradition remain largely symbolic. They grasp at the low-hanging fruit, not the roots.

If the United States truly hopes to break the cycle of Iran’s ideological war on Israel and the West, it must broker something far more radical: a spiritual reconciliation, not with the West, but with the East. With the civilizational family from which it once exiled itself.

Only by reawakening Iran’s kinship with its Vedic past can we redirect its vast spiritual energy away from destruction and toward renewal. Such a return may usher in a golden age of peace — or ignite a new crisis of identity. Either way, it won’t be Washington’s or Jerusalem’s war to fight.

It will be India’s.

Adelle Nazarian is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: Trump has world leaders at his fingertips in his fight for peace

This article first appeared on Human Events https://humanevents.com/2025/08/21/shea-bradley-farrell-trump-has-world-leaders-at-his-fingertips-in-his-fight-for-peace)

The recent White House peace summit between President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and seven key European world leaders did not just pave the way for a lasting peace settlement in the Russia-Ukraine War — it firmly established Donald Trump as the most consequential and impactful President of the United States since FDR.

Reports that the seven world leaders came as “bodyguards” to “shield” Zelensky from an “unfair and perilous settlement” are laughable. No, the leaders of Europe – NATO, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Finland – were summoned by Trump to serve his pro-peace agenda and to be instructed by him. Their presence was contingent only on his approval. “When I made the call, they came,” Trump said. “They have respect for our country again … we’ve become the hottest country anywhere in the world.”

Photos of the European leaders in the Oval Office certainly didn’t shout “bodyguards” – but rather whipped subordinates slumping in chairs surrounding the boss’s desk, awaiting their instructions. Power play by Trump? Yes, and these “leaders” deserve it – not one in the past three and a half years tried to negotiate peace for a war in their backyard, not once. No, instead, they enabled and encouraged the war to continue.

Under their Russia-Ukraine policies, a million and a half Europeans have died, Ukrainian infrastructure is devastated, energy crises crippled Europe’s economy, and China and Russia are stronger allies. Instead of calling for peace, these European leaders have cynically used Ukraine and the war to fuel their failing “war economy.”

Indeed, the majority came to Washington, D.C., hoping to convince Trump to continue the war (through stringent NATO security guarantees to Ukraine, unacceptable to Putin) and to encourage Zelenskyy to keep fighting. Trump was diplomatic and courteous but maintained his strong position to bring an end to the war, with a compromise on both sides. Media portrayals of European leaders’ agency in “confronting Trump” are ridiculous and contaminated with lingering Trump Derangement Syndrome (TDS).

President Trump’s success at negotiations between Zelenskyy and Putin, though slower than desired (including by Trump himself), is historic and should be met worldwide with praise, relief, and gratitude.

Zelenskyy, who never came to D.C. before without asking for more weapons, more money, more war, actually said he now supports Trump bringing an end to the war through diplomacy. He is also willing for Trump to organize a trilateral meeting between him, Trump, and Putin, which the White House says Putin agreed to. All of these concessions were unthinkable, even a month or two ago.

Zelenskyy has even said he is open to “land swaps” to end the war, using current front-line borders (including Ukrainian territory captured by Russia since 2022) as the starting point. Amazing, considering Zelenskyy declared for more than three years that only a full Russian surrender of captured territory (including Crimea, taken in 2014) would be acceptable. Zelenskyy even seems to have given up his bid to enter NATO.

Finally, a path for peace has been forged, though it will take more time, patience, and negotiation to reach a final deal. Trump has gained the trust of both Zelenskyy and Putin, Putin having even acquiesced to meet on U.S. soil to discuss peace with Trump in Alaska, three days before the summit.

No one can predict the final outcome, but Trump’s current position is (1) Ceasefire is preferable to stop deaths, but negotiations will continue regardless. (2) The U.S. no longer is “giving anything” (having given at least $200 billion under former President Joe Biden). Still, it is selling the best military equipment on earth to Europe, to give to Ukraine as they wish. (3) Ukraine’s NATO membership is still off the table, but (4) the U.S. will back security guarantees for Ukraine (beyond the previous rare earth minerals deal) where Europe maintains “the first line of defense,” with no U.S. boots on the ground. Still to be hashed out is how close security guarantees will appear to NATO military operations (Zelenskyy wants weapons, training, intelligence, etc.), which will certainly be a sticking point for Putin. Trump sees U.S. security guarantees as necessary to “getting the deal done.”

Number (5) will be the hardest for those who still don’t understand the realities of Ukraine’s situation and what it will take to end the war: territorial concessions on both sides (including Ukraine, the non-aggressor yet “loser”) are likely. Secretary of State Marco Rubio says that “both sides are going to have to give, and both sides should expect to get something.” Putin wants the “fortress belt” in the western part of Donetsk province that he failed to capture, but he is not likely to get it.

Less than one year ago, under Biden and in anticipation of a Kamala Harris presidency, the U.S. planned to support another Ukraine counteroffensive this year, having signed a commitment with Zelenskyy with fixed levels of support for ten years. Throughout the war, Biden sent more and more lethal weapons to Ukraine, escalating the war towards a worldwide disaster. No discussion of “peace negotiations,” just another American “forever war” draining America’s coffers without tangible benefit to actual American taxpayers.

Thankfully, Donald Trump has the wisdom and leadership strength to put a hard stop to anything not in America’s interest. He continues to hammer out a monument of accomplishments on a huge scale and with a rapid pace that infuriates and demoralizes the Left — all while restoring the firm foundation and hope of American greatness that the vast majority of Americans (and our allies) crave.

Dishonest portraits painted by the Left demonizing and downplaying Trump’s peace negotiations are especially ironic given that Trump had nothing to do with provoking this war; nor with former President Barack Obama giving Crimea to Russia, weakening Ukraine; nor with Biden promising Ukraine NATO membership against previous U.S. promises (which Trump warned him about); nor Biden signaling to Putin that a “minor incursion” would be acceptable. Yet as Trump said, “We wanna get it ended … we’re going to have a lasting peace.”

Trump has tirelessly worked to end the bloodshed in Ukraine and the bleeding of American taxpayer money while working to create peace in multiple international conflicts— Armenia-Azerbaijan, Cambodia-Thailand, Congo-Rwanda, India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, and more. Even in his first eight months, Trump’s status as the World Leader is unparalleled, cementing him as an international figure of consequence and vision far beyond the years of his presidency.

But, as Trump says, speaking about the mainstream media: “the level of hatred and animosity is unbelievable … I’ve solved major wars… that have been going on for 35 and 37 [years] and a couple of quicker ones… but they don’t even write about that. No matter what I do … no matter what deal I make … they’ll say, ‘Trump was absolutely horrible.’ And I’ve lived with that for a long time.” He pauses to consider, “But I won in a landslide … so the people … are the only ones that count, ultimately.”

Over seventy-seven million people, Mr. President. Thank you for making the U.S.A. the greatest and “hottest” nation on earth, once again.

Shea Bradley-Farrell, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, D.C. based think-and-do tank.

Beyond the Hype: Recent Wars Expose the Myth of Adversarial Strength and Force a U.S. Rethink on Global Threats

As global tensions sweep across headlines, American policymakers and the public alike are beginning to reevaluate what truly constitutes a threat. The Iran-Israel “Twelve-Day War” and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict have brought into sharp relief the need to recalibrate how the United States and its allies judge adversarial strength. Today, a clear reassessment is critical—one that puts aside the veils wrought by media-driven perceptions and political agendas and focuses squarely on the real capabilities of those challenging Western interests.

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a bold and coordinated strike against Iranian military and nuclear facilities, a move that quickly became known as the “Twelve-Day War.” In less than two weeks, Israel decisively dismantled both Iran’s offensive and defensive capabilities—a result that stunned a world conditioned to fear Iran’s perceived military prowess. Israeli operations neutralized Iranian military leadership, destroyed nuclear assets, and crippled air defenses, all while neutralizing retaliatory attacks delivered via Iran’s proxies: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Despite initial fears, these attacks failed to alter the strategic situation. Israel’s technological superiority and the defensive cooperation from the United States overwhelmed Iran’s responses.

This outcome revealed a crucial truth: Iran’s real strength was not its direct military power, but rather its ability to finance and coordinate proxy groups throughout the region. For years, the Gulf and broader Middle East have lived under the shadow of Iran’s expanding influence, largely due to Tehran’s capacity to fund armed loyalists. The country’s reputation as a regional giant—amplified by repeated media cycles and political rhetoric—was in fact out of step with reality. Closer scrutiny of the ways Iran launders oil profits and funds its proxies could have led to a more honest assessment of its true threat level. Policymakers focusing only on Iran’s weapons arsenal risked missing the financial and diplomatic networks driving its influence.

Iran’s threat to regional stability essentially operates through relationships with its proxies. By funneling money, equipment, and training to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi groups, Iran has expanded its reach and destabilized Western interests with asymmetric tactics and gray-zone warfare. Yet, Israel’s rapid disruption of Iranian command centers exposed the vulnerability underlying this approach. The real Achilles’ heel was not just military weakness, but the fragility of Tehran’s external relationships, supply lines and financial channels. U.S. intelligence and recent analyses now highlight Iran’s strengths in missile and drone development, cyber operations, and propaganda campaigns, but suggest these tools do not represent the existential threat they are sometimes portrayed to be.

Countering Iran’s strength, therefore, means going beyond headline military assets to targeting the economic arteries sustaining its power. That includes a sharper diplomatic focus on Iraqi relations, and more aggressive pressure on oil laundering operations—the very mechanisms that fund Iran’s destabilizing activities. Western strategy must recognize that Iran’s real leverage is economic and indirect, not conventional military might.

Turning to Russia, the ongoing war with Ukraine stands as a dramatic case study in misperception versus reality. When Russia first invaded, the world largely expected Ukraine to be swiftly subjugated. Instead, as of August 2025, Ukraine continues to resist, and Russian forces have suffered extraordinary losses—U.K. MOD estimates, “approximately 1,000,000 casualties (killed and wounded). Of these, it is likely around 250,000 Russian soldiers are killed or missing.” The scale of attrition has exposed vulnerabilities that most analysts and policymakers failed to anticipate.

From the Obama era through the first Trump and Biden administrations, the U.S. saw Russia as its dominant adversary. Yet this protracted war, now stretching beyond three years, has forced a reassessment. Russia remains formidable in domains such as cyberwarfare and disinformation, but the narrative of unstoppable power has been undermined by the realities of battlefield attrition, tactical missteps, and the resilience of Ukrainian defense.

This uncertain situation also points to the importance of strategy in Western commitments. The incremental, “just enough” military aid provided to Ukraine has proved problematic: it keeps the war ongoing without ensuring victory or a swift conclusion. I have long argued that only robust support or no involvement at all would have served Western interests—a half-measure merely prolongs the suffering, with no strategic benefit.

Despite initial beliefs in their overwhelming strength, both Russia and Iran have demonstrated that their “bark” has been far more formidable than their “bite.” Their leaders—Putin and the Ayatollah—have preferred to project war through perceived rather than actual strength, investing heavily in propaganda campaigns and influence operations – something that Western mainstream-media was all too willing to follow. This approach shapes perceptions internationally even as their actual capabilities have been exposed as more limited than once feared.

For U.S. policymakers, these conflicts stress the urgent necessity to reassess threats. Real danger to America does not always come from adversaries dominating the news cycle with bold rhetoric, but from those who wield tangible capacity to disrupt security and economic stability. Greater emphasis must be placed on understanding the financial and shadow networks behind proxy wars, the vulnerabilities hidden beneath the surface, and the subtle threats—cyber, economic, diplomatic—that don’t make headlines.

As President Trump and European leaders host Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in hopes of negotiating peace, the lessons of the past year have come into stark notice: reputation and rhetoric alone do not define adversarial strength. Real assessment must be built on honest appraisal of capability and intent, not amplified fears or outdated narratives.

The world is more uncertain than ever, but recent events have helped to shatter some longstanding assumptions. Iran, once considered an unassailable regional force, saw its military infrastructure dismantled in less than two weeks. Russia, assumed to be an existential threat to American and European stability, remains embroiled in a war it cannot win easily. The common thread is clear: threats must be measured by real capabilities rather than reputation alone.

For American security, the challenge moving forward is to see through the noise, to base policy on reality rather than perception, and to ensure that future responses are built on genuine understanding. Only by doing so can the U.S. and its allies secure lasting peace, deter aggression, and shape a future that matches the gravity of the moment.

Eli M. Gold is the president of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC- based think-and-do tank.

German Fraud and Failure

Industrial structure with pipes and machinery in Duisburg, Germany

(This article was written by Hermann Tertsch and appeared in El Debate. Fraude y fracaso alemán)

The general degradation of politics and administration in Germany generates stupefaction even among those who have been warning for many years, for several decades, that the policy of systematic social democratic consensus between what were until recently the two great German parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was leading irremediably to failure. Germany is today a country radically different from the one that existed from the economic miracle of the 1950s until 2015, although even then it had already been for years on the path of this misfortune.

Because it soon became apparent that the initially so celebrated Grosse Koalition, to which the Greens and the Liberals later attached themselves in various governments, led to a coordination of the interests of them all that prevented necessary reforms, generated obstinacy in maintaining mistaken policies and ended in corruption and failure. There was no opposition. And without a real opposition there is no correction of policy.

Thus unthinkable things have happened, and not only aberrant decisions in law such as approving a constitutional reform after the elections with the parliament that preceded them, because the composition of the new one had not permitted it. That kind of banana-republic manoeuvre is mixed with a runaway inefficiency in transport and in federal, state and municipal social services and with a corruption previously unthinkable.

There are incredible scandals such as the one that has just broken: the Federal Statistical Office now announces that it has been systematically “getting it wrong” in its quarterly GDP growth figures and that in reality things have been far worse. According to the official information, in 2023 GDP did not fall by 0.2% but by 0.9%, and in 2014 it was not 0.3% but 0.6%. We are talking about many billions of euros. The “errors” of the Federal Statistical Office have of course favoured the Government, the one of that time and the one of today.

The cosmetic treatment of the fall in GDP in 2023 favoured the parties of the previous Government ahead of the elections. And the cosmetic treatment of the 2024 result favours the present government because it will be easier for it to improve upon. In any case, the policy that Friedrich Merz of the CDU is practising in coalition with the SPD really differs in nothing from the previous Government with the Greens and the Liberals, led by the SPD with Olaf Scholz as chancellor, which ended in terrible failure and early elections. As you can see, four parties involved in various combinations in the various governments, all with the same basically social democratic policy that Angela Merkel already imposed in her 16 catastrophic years.

The basic social democratic consensus prevents anything previously done from being called into question. So with all these governments the same immigration policy has been pursued, with brutal consequences for security and quality of life, the same energy policy that has sunk the economy and impoverished society as a whole, the same labour policy that has sunk productivity and, above all, the environmental policy, converted into the ideological totem that automatically eradicates all rationality from the decisions that are taken.

Since the abyss between the reality lived by Germans and the message and the rhetoric of the consensus parties has not stopped growing, the moment has arrived in which all the parties included in it are losing support and only one party is rising, the one that is radically different and that emerged precisely to fill that vacuum left by the absence of opposition, and which according to the latest polls is already the first party, the AfD.

Once a real opposition was finally generated with the AfD, all the parties of the social democratic consensus agreed to brand it far-right and extremist in order to ignore it, to impose a cordon sanitaire, to refuse all cooperation and contact and thus to go on functioning as if that new party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), did not exist. And so they went on governing as if that opposition did not exist.

However, the AfD not only did not cease to exist but has grown without pause until today it is already the first party in Germany, two points ahead of the CDU and doubling the result of the third, which is the SPD. The logical thing would have been that, after the last elections in which the CDU came first and the AfD second, with a brutal failure for the entire left, the first two should have formed a coalition of a new type, clearly on the right, which could have carried out all the reforms of the follies committed that nobody in the CDU denies to be necessary.

But since the boycott of the AfD by all the parties of the social democratic consensus continues, and the CDU persists in keeping itself shut inside that pen with the losing left, the only possible Government after the elections was the one that is now in its death throes, having done nothing but aggravate the situation. September approaches like a black cloud for a Government that the immense majority of Germans consider incapable and already disqualified.

Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

The Cartel of the Wretched

In the interest of fairness and in light of the information received that may affect some of the conclusions in this article (Cartel of the Wretched), we have determined, out of an abundance of caution, to withdraw publication. We regret any inconvenience that the article may have caused.

Sudan: Where the Abraham Accords Face Their Fiercest Trial

Flags of Bahrain and the United States waving against a bright blue sky

(This article was written by Adelle Nazarian and appeared in The Western Journal. Sudan: Where the Abraham Accords Face Their Fiercest Trial)

The Abraham Accords represented a bold recalibration of Middle East diplomacy — driven by American resolve, regional pragmatism, and the Trump administration’s unapologetic prioritization of national interests over ideological dogma. Nowhere was that shift more transformative than in Sudan, where decades of hostility toward Israel were giving way to cautious engagement, economic vision, and a growing appetite for regional integration.

That momentum has since faltered. Under the Biden administration, the strategic clarity that once defined U.S. Middle East policy dissipated. Sudan has been engulfed in civil war, and Washington’s response has been incoherent — marked by ambivalence, moral grandstanding, and a misguided faith in discredited secular elites now aligned with the very forces destabilizing the country.

Roughly one-third of the way through this descent, a critical voice has emerged. In a recent article published by The Times of Israel, journalist Gavin Serkin offers the clearest account yet of how the Sudan-Israel normalization track was derailed — not by popular rejection, but by geopolitical naiveté and diplomatic short-sightedness. Serkin laid bare the contradictions at the heart of Western policy: While Sudan’s army fights to preserve the nation’s territorial integrity, it is the Rapid Support Forces — implicated in mass atrocities — that have found indirect favor through silence and strategic neglect. Among the RSF’s reported backers is the UAE, a country whose strategic interests in Sudan reflect broader efforts to contain instability — though the outcomes of such alignments now warrant scrutiny, Serkin asserted. The UAE denies supporting the RSF militarily and financially.

Notably, the UAE has also been a pioneering leader in advancing regional peace through its role in the Abraham Accords, demonstrating its broader commitment to reshaping Middle East diplomacy through normalization and economic integration. This duality — of visionary regional leadership on one hand and complex entanglements on the other — sets the stage for a most symbolic and troubling episodes Serkin explored.

Though Sudan did not ink its name alongside the UAE, Bahrain, or Morocco, its alignment with the Abraham Accords was no less historic. In 2020, under intense diplomatic pressure and with the promise of removal from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, Sudan’s transitional leaders agreed in principle to normalize relations with Israel — a bold, if tenuous, leap forward. This decision was not merely transactional; it represented a flicker of geopolitical maturity amid a fragile nation’s search for identity and integration. In early 2023, that flicker was reignited as Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen met with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Khartoum, signaling an intent to formalize ties. But weeks later, Sudan descended into civil war. The normalization process — never codified, never ratified — was suspended in midair. Sudan’s place in the Abraham Accords now hangs between vision and void, shaped not only by international will, but by whether the world chooses to engage with the Sudan of today.

Serkin highlighted a devastating symbolic moment: the Israeli foreign minister’s visit to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan just weeks before the war began, followed by near-total silence from Jerusalem as RSF militias ransacked communities and committed unspeakable crimes. That silence has not gone unnoticed. As former Sudanese diplomat Mekki Elmograbi notes in the piece, it felt like being “stabbed in the back.” Such optics have the power to destroy trust.

It appears that writer Serkin chose Mekki Elmograbi to express the sense of shock because Mekki was the first to openly lead a Sudanese-Israeli discussion at the Moshe Dayan Center, representing a reasonable and candid voice from Sudan.

A very important article was recently published in the Wall Street Journal by the French writer Bernard-Henri Lévy, who is well known for his support of Israel — but this time, the article came from an unexpected location: Sudan itself, during a field tour with General Al-Burhan, including counterterrorism forces base where he witnessed preparation for operations against extremists.

In the article, the philosopher and author Bernard delivered an important message from Al-Burhan: that he is willing to continue with the Abraham Accords, but emphasized that a parliament must be in place to ratify the agreement. This can only happen through cooperation with the legitimate government currently under Burhan’s leadership, especially now after appointing a civilian prime minister, Professor Kamil El-Tayeb Idris.

Bernard’s article, titled “Sudan’s Brutal, Forgotten War,” was the result of an investigative trip, reminiscent of his earlier work, including the film “The Oath of Tobruk,” based on his field visits to the uprising in Libya against Moammar Gaddafi.

The miscalculation at the heart of current Western — and to some degree, Israeli — policy is the belief that normalization can be orchestrated behind closed doors, as if Sudan were frozen in time. But Sudan is not static. Its center of gravity has shifted. The army, led by Burhan, retains legitimacy and controls vast portions of the country. Intelligence chief General Ibrahim Mufaddal is now a key counterterrorism partner for Europe. He led successful intelligence diplomacy in Europe and across the region. The reality on the ground has moved on, even as policymakers remain stuck in outdated frameworks.

Worse still is the insistence on treating normalization as a reward for ideological conformity. The fiction that only secular elites are “safe” partners has collapsed. Many of these actors sided with the RSF and lost their mandate. Meanwhile, elements within Sudan’s Islamic and traditional sectors — including some previously opposed to normalization — have grown more pragmatic. They see engagement with Israel not as a betrayal, but as a path to sovereignty and survival.

Sudan is not merely a participant in the Abraham Accords framework — it is, in many ways, their crucible. Unlike the Gulf monarchies whose normalization with Israel was driven by economic pragmatism and shared security interests, Sudan’s engagement was forged in the fires of post-revolutionary flux, where legitimacy is fragile, institutions fractured, and sovereignty contested. If normalization can endure amid Sudan’s civil war, ideological fragmentation, and regional interference, it would affirm the Accords not as a transactional detente, but as a durable architecture for peace — capable of transcending regime type and surviving the volatility of the modern Middle East.

Sudan’s successful normalization with Israel could inspire hesitant African and Arab states, like Algeria or Tunisia, to reconsider their stance, amplifying the Accords’ regional ripple effect and demonstrating that peace can thrive even in complex, post-conflict environments. But if it collapses here, it signals something far more sobering: The promise of Arab-Israeli reconciliation may be confined to boardrooms and strongmen, unable to take root where democratic pluralism or popular agency remain in play. Sudan, therefore, is not the exception — it is the proving ground.

To frame this as “Islamist vs. secularist” is to fundamentally misunderstand the stakes. The normalization process must be decoupled from regime change agendas. Peace with Israel should be a national decision, not the prize of a narrow elite. It must reflect Sudanese realities — not Western preferences.

The danger now is clear: By sidelining real actors on the ground and clinging to failed proxies, the West risks pushing Sudan deeper into chaos and driving normalization into irrelevance. Worse, it risks allowing extremism to reassert itself under the banner of betrayed nationalism.

If the Abraham Accords are to mean anything in Sudan, they must be reclaimed. That means re-engaging with Burhan and national institutions — not because they are perfect, but because they are real. It means abandoning the fantasy that peace can be imposed from abroad and, instead, empowering Sudanese voices to shape their own future — through dialogue, inclusion, and respect for sovereignty.

It was bold leadership that launched the Abraham Accords. It will take bold leadership again to rescue them in Sudan.

Adelle Nazarian is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.