By: Adinda Khaerani Epstein, Adjunct Fellow

The ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and larger US–China contestation are pressing issues the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN") needs to address. With such diverse member states, the bloc’s ability to be an effective body on these major security issues in the region has been severely tested.

In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi

who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions, citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The US–based Carter Center, which had a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in ten states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on the election day. Per an Amnesty International report, over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the coup d'etat, including at least 1,345 people in 2023.

Reactions from fellow ASEAN Countries

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Association aims to promote regional peace and security, as well as economic growth. Due to the complex security dynamics in the region, the former design seems to be the group’s priority. ASEAN subsequently expanded and the numbers slowly grew, as Brunei became a member in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, Timor-Leste in 2022 was granted an official observer status and in principle approval by ASEAN countries to become a full member of the association at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN Centrality, a concept that relies on assumption that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the regional bloc. The concept was first used at the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explained that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and, in order to effectively function, the member states needed to be united.

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from the fellow ASEAN member states. The regional bloc has been chaired by four countries since the military coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been particularly successful in resolving the crisis as, three years after the coup, forging a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.

Most founding members were alarmed over the developments in Myanmar. Indonesia expressed a serious concern over the military take-over in Myanmar, calling for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore took the same stance, expressing grave concern and expressed hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and Singapore echoed these sentiments, viewing the developments with considerable unease. The Philippines followed the situation with deep concern, particularly over the personal safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, flatly described the coup as an internal matter and advocated no comment be made. Newer members generally shared Bangkok's sentiment.

That member states were divided between expressions of serious concern and a hands-off approach illustrated that the regional bloc has lacked a united stance. Even as early as five months after the coup unfolded, the division were seen when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy, with only six ASEAN members voting in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar itself, who was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand abstained.

ASEAN consists of countries with significant differences, including their political systems – which may have played a role in the divided responses toward the overthrow of the democratically elected government, as well as their approach to the ongoing post–coup troubles. Only three members — Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — are considered to have democratic systems.

Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar for decades was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The United States and European Union states accused SLORC of human rights violations and suppression of democracy activists. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy was the way to secure regional security as well as the country's socio-economic development. Despite objections from the United States, Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. Today, the bloc finds itself in a challenging situation where it needs to find a way to manage Myanmar’s membership amidst continued civil unrest.

In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (“FPC”), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special envoy of ASEAN; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.

In contrast to the West imposing sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders were united and opted to keep the communication channels open with the junta, balancing between engagement but carefully not to give legitimacy to the military regime.

In October 2021, the ten member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet the jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government's lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised an option, as the group has no mechanism of expulsion, let alone any specific mention about expelling its members in a situation when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.

Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, during his tenure as ASEAN Chair the following year, was criticized by ASEAN fellow members, Indonesia and Malaysia. His visit to Myanmar undermined what the group has agreed, which is to withhold the junta’s recognition until they start to cooperate.

As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This move constituted a different approach by the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed an individual as a special envoy to Myanmar. Jakarta favored a non-megaphone diplomacy, a quieter approach where not every diplomatic activity was disclosed and maintaining a position that, until there was progress on the implementation of the FPC, no representation from Myanmar at ASEAN meetings would be accepted, except at the non-political level. Still, the junta did not heed Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and with no punitive actions applicable under ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, nothing more was done.

During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo pushed back against the accusation of the division within the regional’s bloc by stating that differences of opinion didn’t mean there was no unity, a view that strains credulity.

This year's chair, Laos, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, a similar move from Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022, which only highlighted once more the bloc’s inability to speak with one voice.

ASEAN and the South China Sea

As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members have also been divided with regard to Chinese encroachment in its naval backyard.

Looking at the dynamics between member states on South China Sea (“SCS”) concerns, the expectation of an ultimately fruitful South China Sea Code of Conduct (“CoC”) negotiation, which constitute guidelines created to ease the tension in disputed waters by defining rules of related parties, needs to be managed. A CoC is hoped to have a more meaningful impact than the previous non-legally binding document signed by ASEAN members and China in 2002, yet it remains a discussion whether a CoC will even be legally binding. ASEAN and China have been working on a CoC for over two decades but within the former, unity once more proves elusive. The claimant countries who often involved in incidents with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, support the agreement to be legally binding, while countries that are closer to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, prefer to avoid any conflict.

With China claiming almost the entirety of the SCS, there is also a question on what geographical areas that the code should cover and agreed by all parties.

Recently, China and the Philippines were involved in another incident located in Sabina Shoal, which lies

630 nautical miles from China. Manila and Beijing accused each other of ramming into each other’s vessels, marking the fifth incident in one month. The incident occurred just a month after a de-escalation effort from both sides, where both disputants agreed to a provision arrangement that allows Manila to resupply the outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. China makes no secret of its more assertive moves in pursuing its claims in the disputed waters, ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal concluded China’s claims had no legal basis. The tension in the disputed waters has been on the rise since last year and sparked a concern of a possible larger confrontation.

In his speech at the Shangri–La Dialogue this year, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, without mentioning a specific country, condemned China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea. He mentioned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a willful act was close to what gets defined as an act of war. He hinted that, in this case, Manila may ultimately invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States, stating that he believed that his treaty partner holds the same standard. The treaty consists of eight articles that requires both countries to defend each other if another party attacks.

Similar to the Myanmar crisis, the members are not united in addressing the SCS disputes. In 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique amidst tension in the disputed waters, a first since its establishment, with Cambodia blocked the consensus. Its leader at the time, Hun Sen, argued that the issues should be addressed bilaterally, similar to what China preferred. Cracks in the group’s facade were again reflected in July’s post–ministerial,meeting in Vientiane, when host Laos and Cambodia opposed the wording to be put in the joint communique, condemning the coast guard vessel belonging to China in a June collision with the Philippines’ resupply boat.

In next month's ASEAN Summit, member states expect to remain divided on the issue of the Myanmar crisis, between those supporting vocal criticism toward the military government’s lack of commitment on the FPC, as well as rising violence and the junta deciding to again postpone its scheduled general election scheduled for 2025, and those advocating a markedly softer approach.

Member states also remain divided on how to address China’s more aggressive behavior in the disputed waters, particularly against the Philippines. Meanwhile, the CoC negotiation between ASEAN and China will still be a tough one, despite being scheduled to be concluded in the next two years. It’s important to note that not all ASEAN members are having territorial disputes with China; therefore, consensus isn’t easy to reach. The disunity may weaken its negotiation’s position and possibly allowing China to drive a wedge within the group.

There is doubt that China will agree to a legally binding CoC, given its more assertive behavior in the disputed waters, the use of water cannon, ramming incidents with other disputants, and the artificial islands equipped with military facilities, despite the existing but unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, where the disputed parties agreed to resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means and practice self-restraint from activities that would escalate the disputes. More importantly, China openly rejected the 2016 ruling by an international tribunal and sees it as null and void.

ASEAN was built based on a declaration, not a treaty. It provides a platform for discussions through forums over security issues aimed to maintain peace and stability in the region. It has a distinctive way in managing interstate relations, widely known as the "ASEAN Way," relying on consultation and consensus. The style of diplomacy consists of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, preference of non-binding and non-legalistic approaches. Therefore, the CoC is less likely to be a legally binding agreement.

Further, ASEAN has no army in its disposal so cannot project any military power and consequently the group’s diplomatic influence is weakened without such enforcement capabilities.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, mentioned that the economy, including trade and investment will be the priority of Malaysia as ASEAN’s chair next year. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur has decided to join the Chinese – led regional bloc, BRICS, which suggests its approach towards the SCS dispute next year is unlikely to be assertive towards China.

ASEAN’s rotating chair changes annually. Learning from Indonesia’s term as a chair, which has experienced of fully transitioning from an authoritarian system to the world’s third largest democracy, a year wasn’t nearly enough to make a significant progress on the Myanmar crisis. Accordingly, the chances of success for any ASEAN chair to play a key role in finding a solution to the crisis is low.

The decision-making mechanism of ASEAN that consists of consultations and consensus have also raised question on its efficacy in managing current security issues. ASEAN as a regional group should prioritise the interests of the member states, not those of external powers. For that to happen, there is a need for the group to speak in one voice and to restore ASEAN Centrality.