By: Ahmed Zawitey, Director General of Kurdistan 24 Media Foundation
Kurdistan’s Territory and Population
I am not merely referring to Greater Kurdistan, which extends between more than four countries in the Middle Eastern region: Turkey in the southeast, Iran in the northwest, Iraq in the north, and Syria in the northeast. It also extends, accordingly, into parts of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
These areas encompass nearly half a million square kilometers. However the global Kurdish population, inclusive of Europe and America, exceeds 45 million, per legitimate Kurdish sources.
For the purpose of brevity, my focus in this article entails the area of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which is almost half its real size in area and population in this country, more specifically, the areas under the administrative governance of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq.
The area of this region is 45 thousand square kilometers, and its population is nearly 7 million, not including the so-called disputed areas between Baghdad and Erbil, according to Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. Such areas are in close proximity to the region administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Amidst Complex Geography and Tense Security
When reflecting upon its narrow border, the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which is geographically complex, politically and security tense, threatened by all its neighbors, north and south, east and west, a startling truth presents itself regarding how the region has been exposed for more than seventy years to twentieth century wars between the Kurdish movement demanding its rights to self-rule in Iraq and the successive ruling regimes in Iraq. Such struggles spanned from the monarchy in the forties and fifties, through the two slaves, Karim Qassem and Salam Arif in the sixties, and then Saddam Hussein in the seventies and eighties. Upon further scrutiny of historical turmoil, a question emerges - How did this region manage to endure for more than 32 years?
Despite acute obstacles, it transformed into the most stable region in Iraq, in terms of security and economic development, particularly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 by American forces. In Iraq, this metamorphosis involved rebounding from a war diverse in its complexity - from resistance against the occupier, to terrorist operations targeting every urban area (including land and people), a sectarian struggle, the collapse of prominent Iraqi elites (mainly Sunnis) to the era of ISIS, which occupied a third of Iraq and left it a devastated area, between 2014 to 2017.
The Kurdish of the Present Remember History
After the end of the war on ISIS and Baghdad’s resulting euphoric feeling of victory, as the government, the army and armed militias were at the height of their power.
Historically, Saddam and his army after the end of the eight-year war with Iran in 1988, felt similar levels of euphoria. However, he carried out the Anfal operations, consisting of invading Kurdistan, bombing it with chemical weapons, destroying 4,500 villages, and kidnapping more than 180 thousand Kurdish citizens. Said citizens were buried alive in the deserts of the center and the south. Legitimate Kurdish sources convey the armed Kurdish movement was obliterated in totality.
When the Kurdish side is not strong in many aspects, it remains strong in terms of its historical memory, which preserves images of tragedies that are replicated from one decade to another, a memory that led him to feel that a threat similar to what happened in 1988 was returning again from the south. Hence the hastened step to proceed with a referendum on its independence from Iraq on September 25, 2017 was to eradicate this ever-present threat. Unfortunately, Kurdish expectations were proven wrong, unsurprising however if we consider the lack of international support and threats from neighboring countries who sought to strangle the region within itself! After the referendum, initiatives were taken in order to preserve what remained of the region and its powers, but hostile steps by Baghdad against the region continued and intensified, resulting in the following results:
1. The Kurdish role in Baghdad was weakened by comparison to the strengthened of the role of the Shiite parties which dealt hostilely with the Kurdistan region.
2. The Federal Court took negative measures against the region and withdrew its powers. The negative impact of these decisions involved:
* Canceling the Kurdistan Parliament’s ability to hold elections, the date of which has not yet been set. Indeed, the court, itself, is postponing the holding of these elections under various pretexts, and thus, the Iraqi Kurdistan region is currently undergoing a period of legal vacuum.
* Preventing the Iraqi Kurdistan region from exporting its oil, thus leaving the region without a budget.
3. Not disbursing the Iraqi Kurdistan region’s share of the Iraqi budget, including disbursing employee salaries, thus harming the economy in the region, which was in a better condition than the rest of the Iraqi provinces more than a decade ago.
Pretexts to Disturb Stability
The process of hostility towards the stable, safe, and most developed region in Iraq did not stop at what happened above. Rather, it reached the most precarious step threatening this region, which is the bombing of it and its civilian facilities by bomb-laden drones via militias affiliated with Iran. The matter escalated to a more dangerous level through Iran’s strategic targeting, i.e., the regional capital, Erbil, was attacked with ballistic missiles under the pretext of Israeli Mossad sites.
The Kurdistan region vehemently denied Mossad affiliation in detail, and its position was confirmed by the security and parliamentary investigation committees which were formed in Baghdad. These committees confirmed that the bombed site was the home of businessman Peshraw Dizayee. Of note is that businessman Sheikh Baz, whose residence was also identically bombarded by ballistic missiles a year and a half prior, had likewise been accused of Mossad affiliation.
Peshraw Dizayee, however, succumbed from the attack, along with members of his family. Sheikh Baz survived his attack due to him not being present during the strike on his house. Peshraw Dizayee held a predominant role in transforming Erbil into the most developed city in Iraq in the last twenty years.
The second accusation leveled at Erbil by Iran and its allies in Iraq is the presence of American bases in the region, but what is conspicuously striking is that no drone directly targeted these bases they are referring to. The casualties were centered on Erbil and its citizens.
Iran’s Deceptive Targeting of Erbil
In short, the Kurdistan Regional Government (the KRG) is the only region in Iraq which has not yet submitted to Iranian-directed demands, as opposed to the Shiite and some Sunni groups in Iraq; also, despite the submission of a Kurdish party competing with the administration of Erbil, namely the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Talabani’s party (in Sulaymaniyah). Erbil, specifically the Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by the leader Masoud Barzani, has eluded Iran until now.
Iran's broadcasted reasons for its basis of bombing purported Israeli Mossad headquarters are misleading. Rather, it knows before anyone else that they are not Mossad sites. In fact, it could be argued that if such Mossad sites existed, Iran would not have dared bomb them.
Behind its apparent declared messages are other secret messages, which are to forcefully align Erbil, specifically the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its head, Masoud Barzani, to its side, just like other Iraqi Shiite and Sunni leaders. When Iran achieves this, it will ensure the formation of the Shiite crescent extending from Qom, through Iraqi Kurdistan, all the way to Qamishli in Syria.
Iran’s intent is the crescent will have safe passage, which cannot occur if this crescent passes through central or even southern Iraq. Reaching the Mediterranean Sea thus severs Turkey's influence and influence in Iraq through Erbil and through the Kurdistan Democratic Party, in addition to inflicting a loss on America by removing its strong local ally, which is the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Killing Two Birds with One Stone
By bombing Erbil, Iran aims to kill two birds with one stone. Its reasons are two-fold. It regards the Iraqi Kurdistan region to be an impediment to its desire for regional control. Secondly, it sends a posturing message to the Americans about the range of distances that Iranian missiles can travel and the accuracy of the target of these missiles. These missiles fell less than one kilometer from the American Consulate in Erbil, which is considered the largest American consulate in existence, and less than five kilometers from the American military base inside Erbil Airport.
A Diplomatic Message in response to a Military Pronouncement
Iran's military message led the United States to deliver a diplomatic message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, the content of which has not yet been revealed, but leaks indicate that the message is about the ongoing negotiations between the two sides regarding the steps of the American withdrawal from Iraq, and the threat of the return of ISIS if that occurs, and the transformation of the relationship between the two parties, from being a relationship of allies, and the Americans militarily supporting the Iraqi side, to a normalized relationship between the two countries. The American message to Iraq, so quickly and coincidentally after the bombing of Erbil, is indicative of a response to the Iranian threat to its forces in Iraq.
The Iraqi Foreign Minister exhibited great interest in this message, declaring that it was an important message, which subsequently was followed by a meeting of the Iraqi Council of Ministers. This means that the Iraqi and American sides gave positive signals about the negotiations to shift the mission of the American forces from the fact that the two parties are allied and that the American forces are present at Iraqi request to merely establish bilateral relations between two countries.
The Iraqi governments, firstly, and the American governments, secondly, wanted, with their positive signals, to reassure the Shiite groups that are demanding the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, as well as to reassure the Iranian side in order to stop sending drones and missiles towards American targets in the region, until the withdrawal steps are achieved, which will take time.
Iranian Proxies Decline the Message
The armed militias inside Iraq, which send explosive drones to the regions they consider allied with the Americans, in Iraq (Kurdistan Region) and Syria (self-administered areas), showed that they did not receive the American message positively, announcing they will not follow this message and will not give it credence, and shall continue targeting American sites.
It is an indirect message from Iran to the Americans that establishing normalized bilateral relations is not enough. Iran’s goal is more than that – to perhaps to scare the Americans away from taking any preventative measures against Iran or bombing Iranian sites.
Thus, an indirect war ensues (which exceeds the limits of the Cold War) - between Iran and the Americans. It takes place on lands which do not belong to either of the two countries, but rather on land that is considered the weakest link at the center of the conflict between the two major powers. Iran may want to preoccupy the Americans, exhaust them, and exhaust them with the intent of keeping them away from a direct war with Iran or strikes inside Iran, and it has succeeded in doing so thus far. Nevertheless, it perceives its easiest and ultimate goal to entail the complete surrender of the Kurdistan region to the Iranian will.
The Return of ISIS
For the Americans, the matter is not limited to this. When Iran is able to forcefully send direct and indirect threatening messages, the Americans also have their own way of responding. In the message they sent to Iraq alluding to the danger of the return of ISIS, this is interpreted to mean that if the Americans withdraw their forces from Iraq and the phase of the alliance between them ends, then the Americans are paving the way for the return of ISIS! Or we can call it the second phase of ISIS.
In the eyes of the Americans, just as Iran is confronting them with loyalist groups and an indirect war, they can take a similar step, which is to pave the way for the return of ISIS to fight the groups loyal to Iran, and perhaps in the future, an ISIS war inside Iran itself, similar to the last operation that killed more than a hundred people inside Iran. Perhaps there are signs in this meaning. When ISIS returns, the Americans and the international coalition will not intervene as they did previously. They will leave it to ISIS to do what it wants without air defense against it. The Americans will say to both sides: Go and fight each other. We remain on the sidelines.
What about Iraq and the Kurdistan region?
The longer the political and security situation between the Americans and Iran remains as status quo, the more this will affect the Iraqi internal situation, and the problems that exist between Baghdad and Erbil will continue sans a solution. Therefore, the Iraqi Kurdistan region finds itself a victim of this situation, as the region has reached its weakest stage in comparison to more than ten years ago.
But if a cat is trapped in a narrow corner, beaten and hurt, and does not find a way to escape, it will inevitably jump towards its attacker’s face. The region also sees itself as being trapped in a tight corner and exposed to material, moral, military and political blows. It has started waving the cards it possesses, as it always declares that it possesses them. Among these cards may be the threat of ending the freezing of the results of the referendum that took place seven years ago, in which more than 90% of the region’s citizens voted. The citizens are in favor of independence, but this will depend on several factors, the most important of which are:
1. The Americans support this option, and this is not excluded if the Iraqi government continues to request the Americans to withdraw, and Iran and the Iranian militias continue their policies towards the region and the Americans.
2. Turkey’s support for this option in exchange for signing alliance cooperation between Turkey and the region, so that the region fully joins the Turkish decision to adopt its agendas in the region. There is no choice left for Turkey if Iran continues its hostility to the region, except for the region to withdraw to its side because the region represents an important depth for Turkey.
3. International, American, and perhaps Turkish permission for the region to re-export its oil for Baghdad has continued to prevent the export of this oil and the region has remained without a budget.
