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November 25, 2024
Securing NATO's Southern Edge: Tunisia's Strategic Value in a Changing Mediterranean

By Olfa Hamdi, November 25, 2024 | Africa-US Forum | DACOR Bacon House Washington DC.

Ladies and gentlemen, Distinguished colleagues and guests, both present in person and online,

Good morning,

I speak to you today at a critical moment for Tunisia and the Mediterranean region. Our nation, historically a cornerstone of stability at NATO's southern edge, stands at a crossroads that will reshape the security architecture of the entire region.

Let me share with you a telling moment that crystallizes our current crisis:

In December 2023, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stood in Tunisia's presidential Carthage palace making threats against the United States - broadcast on our state television - Tunisian civil society leaders and political leaders were being imprisoned for defending democratic institutions and the rule of law.

This moment is not merely about global power politics. While others may frame such events within the narrative of a polarized world order, I am here to present a more urgent reality: that of a nation fighting to preserve its democratic transition, secure its borders, save its economy and protect its people.

Tunisia's crisis today is not about choosing sides in global politics - it's about survival and renewal. It’s about security and stability in Tunisia and North Africa. As some geopolitical actors exploit our vulnerabilities, they compound an already critical situation, creating what I believe is the most significant threat at NATO's southern border today.

I speak to you as an engineer who has taught in Tunisia's military institutions and served as the youngest woman to lead our national airline's reform. My perspective on NATO partnership with Tunisia comes from direct experience with both Tunisian security governance and ground political reality.

Let me be clear from the outset: what I present today is not mere political opposition, but rather a rational, evidence-based analysis of the diplomatic, economic, and security policy implications of Tunisia's current trajectory on NATO’s southern border security and stability.

This analysis draws from concrete data and documented patterns of institutional change.

My ultimate goal through this analysis and policy recommendations presented today is to help the Tunisian people make their way out of the current multifaceted crisis.

The strategic question before us isn't whether Tunisia matters to NATO - we know it does. The question is why this vital partnership is failing to achieve its potential at a time when Mediterranean security challenges are exponentially growing.

Tunisia's position at the center of the Mediterranean's southern shore makes it vital for three key security domains: counter-terrorism coordination across North Africa, migration flow management between Africa and Europe, and maritime security in the central Mediterranean.

Our deep-water ports, particularly Bizerte and Zarzis, located at critical hub of fiber optic submarine networks, provide crucial access points for Mediterranean naval operations.

But today, this strategic asset is being systematically compromised, hurting and threatening the People of Tunisia and our allies and partners.

Let me outline the crisis we face:

First, our institutions are being deliberately dismantled. The regime's explicit "breaking down of western state machinery" - echoing Lenin's own words - isn't mere rhetoric. It's a systematic ideological experiment and program that has devastated our economy and security capabilities.

The World Bank confirms Tunisia as the only country in the MENA region failing to recover to pre-pandemic GDP levels. Our middle class, once 70% of the population and cornerstone of regional stability, has contracted to 46% in the past 3 years.

The parallels with Venezuela's collapse are stark and deliberate. Just as Venezuela's leadership rejected "Western financial diktats" before its economic implosion, we're seeing the same playbook in Tunisia, but at the heart of the Mediterranean Sea.

The regime's systematic assault on economic international and domestic institutions includes undermining Central Bank independence and forced local bank financing of state budgets, starving the Tunisian private sector of access to financing, communist-type asset seizures and expropriation of private businesses, disruption of commercial courts, and punitive taxation policies driving Small and Medium businesses into unprecedented bankruptcy rates or informal sector sliding.

The consequences are severe: When a state cannot maintain basic economic functions, cannot control inflation, nor prevent its workforce from sliding into the informal economy, its capacity for effective security partnership fundamentally erodes.

Youth unemployment has reached 40%, with over half a million Tunisians leaving the country in just four years. Over 60% of Tunisians express their active desire to leave, legally or illegally - data thoroughly documented by polling organizations and US Non-Governmental institutions operating in Tunisia.

Second, our security institutions are being politically weaponized. The regime's hijacking of the National Security Council and militarization of the presidential election management compromises the professional integrity and apolitical legacy of our security forces - forces I've worked with directly at our War College, Naval Academy and Staff College and that I can attest to their highest integrity and commitment to professionalism. In fact, Tunisia’s defense apparatus ranks first among all Arab countries in the Government Defense Integrity Index as measured by Transparency International.

Third, we're witnessing a dramatic strategic foreign policy realignment of Tunisia. Chinese control of the Bizerte port - historically crucial for NATO's Mediterranean operations - isn't just about infrastructure management or EPC construction. It's about compromising a key strategic asset that directly affects NATO's operational capacity.

Meanwhile, Saied's unprecedented visit to Tehran and meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei in May 2024 signals a dramatic shift in alliances.

Iranian leadership celebrates the rollback of Tunisian reforms, particularly praising the active dismantling of Tunisian women's rights - achievements that made Tunisia a beacon of progress in the Arab world. While Venezuelan and Russian officials are invited to observe our presidential elections, civil society and independent observers and political party observers including our party are systematically excluded.

The impact on NATO's interests is direct and severe, amplified by a documented pattern of US policy failure, unfortunately:

Over the past years, the US administration adopted "strategic patience" and democratic support withdrawal as formal policy - evidenced by the State Department Country Integrated Strategy and a documented pattern of diplomatic actions.

When opposition leaders were imprisoned, US silence followed. When the regime militarized election management through the National Security Council, US silence followed. When electoral laws have been violated, US silence followed. When it harassed Western diplomatic missions, US silence followed.

In Tunisia, the current minority regime’s escalating hostile anti-American rhetoric in state media deliberately rekindles the hostile environment that led to the 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. That attack, happening in the middle of the Tunisian people’s fight against radicalism, left a lasting mark on U.S. institutional memory and security protocols, creating the deepest rift in U.S.-Tunisia relations. Today's systematic pattern of hostility isn't just concerning - it deliberately threatens decades of carefully built trust between our nations and people.

This policy of "silence that sometimes flirts with enablement" has had devastating consequences not just for the Tunisian people, but for NATO's strategic interests.

Avoiding direct confrontation with hostile regimes may be understandable from a diplomatic perspective, but not at the expense of completely sidestepping core American foreign policy tenets and mutual defense security interests, not when minority regimes take local populations and state institutions hostage with the classic bait and switch Leninist strategy.

This diplomatic deterioration leaves Pentagon-Tunisian Defense cooperation increasingly exposed, isolated, and vulnerable.

The damage extends beyond Tunisia's borders. Over the past three years, the regime's racist rhetoric about black legal and illegal migrants has severely damaged Tunisia's deep-rooted relationships with African partners - relationships crucial for successful collaborative migration management.

From my direct interactions with leaders from Ghana to South Africa, from Ethiopia to nineteen sub-Saharan African countries, I can attest: African nations are united in wanting their people to prosper at home, in Africa. The West doesn't need to convince us to keep our people home - a prosperous Africa for our people to stay and thrive is at the heart of our modern political dilemma.

Instead, Tunisia's current collapse threatens to accelerate migration pressures across the Mediterranean and between African nations. When our counter-terrorism capacity, demonstrated in successes like the 2016 Ben Guerdane operation, erodes as security forces are diverted to protect regime interests rather than national security, the entire regional security architecture weakens.

The path forward requires immediate strategic policy recalibration, with a fundamental shift in how we approach the relationship between diplomacy and defense.

As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once remarked, "Diplomacy is the art of restraining power." This principle is especially crucial when confronting the erosion of democratic institutions and the rise of authoritarianism in a strategically vital partner like Tunisia. Yet current policy has inverted this relationship - leaving defense cooperation to bear the burden of failed diplomatic engagement.

Let me be clear: Diplomatic engagement must be the first line of defense, rather than leaving Pentagon-Tunisian defense cooperation as the only remaining bridge. Foreign policy focused on shared values provides the political cover for safe and solid security cooperation - not the other way around. When we allow diplomatic relationships to erode while relying solely on military-to-military ties, we compromise both.

To address these challenges, and building on Tunisia’s US NON-NATO ally status, I propose the establishment of a new strategic framework - the Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework. Named after the ancient city-state of Carthage - modern-day Tunisia - whose legacy of maritime power and cross-Mediterranean influence still resonates today.

Drawing direct inspiration from NATO's successful Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean Dialogue frameworks, combined with the successes of the Georgia-NATO commission, this platform would significantly expand upon their proven models while anchoring security cooperation in shared values and institutional excellence.

Let me elaborate on why this new framework is essential and how it would operate:

The Carthage Cooperation Dialogue would transcend the limitations of existing regional forums and training centers that focus primarily on consultation and training. As a NATO-backed, regionally-owned, Tunisia-hosted and facilitated, security and development framework, it would have real operational power.

Where the Istanbul Initiative created important channels for dialogue with the Middle East, the Carthage Dialogue would coordinate joint security operations across North Africa and the Sahel with other African nations, drive concrete institutional reforms, and establish rapid response protocols for emerging threats. It would integrate critical priorities from climate security to food security into our regional defense planning, while fostering professional standards that reflect our shared commitment to the rule of law.

Tunisia's position as the hub of this initiative leverages our unique advantages. We stand at the intersection of Mediterranean and Sahel security zones, maintaining deep historical ties with both European and African partners.

Our experience in counter-terrorism coordination and migration management, coupled with our professional military institutions' legacy of regional cooperation and tradition of independent judiciary, makes us ideally suited to host this framework.

The Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework would pioneer a new model of regional ownership. Rather than following previous NATO initiatives that were sometimes perceived as externally imposed, this framework would give African nations direct agency in shaping regional security architecture.

Through dedicated working groups led by regional experts and a permanent secretariat in Tunis, we would integrate development and economic priorities with security objectives while building capacity for regional forces to lead joint operations.

This framework would develop common protocols for maritime security and disaster and emergency response. Through technological cooperation and protection of critical infrastructure, we would build regional resilience against economic and political destabilization.

For Tunisia specifically, hosting the NATO-backed Carthage Dialogue would reinforce our historic role as a bridge between Europe and Africa while creating concrete incentives for maintaining professional security institutions. It would generate economic opportunities through strategic infrastructure development and strengthen our democratic republic institutions through value-based security partnerships.

Most importantly, it would restore our position as a reliable regional partner while upholding our tradition of independent judiciary and professional security forces.

This isn't just another diplomatic forum - it's a practical mechanism for integrating diplomatic, political, economic and security functions, empowering NATO's regional partners while securing shared interests.

By imbuing the Carthage Dialogue with real political weight and material resources, we signal NATO's long-term commitment to North Africa and the Sahel's stability and prosperity through partnerships anchored in shared democratic values.

Most importantly, this framework addresses the strategic depth of North Africa and the Sahel in ways existing frameworks have failed to achieve. By linking security cooperation with economic and financial development and stabilization, institutional integrity, and democratic values, it creates a comprehensive approach to regional stability - one that recognizes that lasting security can only be built on the foundation of strong democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Let me finally address a critical security concern that underscores the stakes of Tunisia's current trajectory. In the years following the 2011 uprising, Tunisia faced an unprecedented challenge: thousands of our youth were recruited into regional conflicts, making us one of the largest per capita sources of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, engaged in many sides and fronts.

This wasn't merely a security crisis – it was a profound failure of state and social and economic institutions to provide hope and opportunity for our young people. Through dedicated reforms and democratic governance, we successfully closed this dark chapter.

However, today's systematic dismantling of these same institutional and democratic safeguards, pushing Tunisia’s vibrant political forces to clandestine activity, coupled with the regime's removal of entry visa requirements for Iran and Iraq, creates dangerous new vulnerabilities. Tunisia has historically maintained robust defenses against organized crime networks, ranking among the region's leaders in combating transnational criminal activities.

But the current regime's policies risk transforming our country into an open corridor between NATO's southern border and states of concern like Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.

In addition to the threats to on our tourism and service-centered economy, mostly built on the security guarantee of our professional security forces, the implications extend far beyond our borders – when democratic institutions erode, the vacuum is often filled by clandestine networks that threaten regional security.

We are fighting to prevent the kind of economic and political collapse that historically makes youth vulnerable to exploitation by foreign actors and criminal networks. This isn't abstract policy – it's about preventing the concrete security threats that emerge when democratic safeguards fail.

The choice facing NATO today isn't between stability and democracy - that's a false choice. It's between supporting Tunisia's managed democratic transition or accepting uncontrolled collapse at your southern flank. Supporting Tunisia's democratic forces while containing institutional breakdown isn't just about Tunisia - it's about preserving NATO's entire Mediterranean security strategy.

The Tunisian people's resilience remains our greatest asset.

Our vision for a Third Republic anchored in freedom, democracy, and rule of law prioritizes institutional continuity and carefully crafted economic and financial transition reforms. We seek stability through growth and enhanced professional management, not through suppression.

Tunisia's position as a critical node connecting Mediterranean security architecture cannot be maintained through geographic location alone. It requires strong institutions, professional capabilities, and democratic legitimacy - all of which are at risk under the current regime's ideological experiment. An experiment the Tunisian People did not vote for or chose.

Knowing the Tunisian People, and given the expanded security guarantee that the NATO-backed Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework would provide, anchored in regional peace and stability, African-NATO nexus cooperation, and with a professionally and politically managed transition, I believe Tunisia will be able to welcome investment opportunities from eastern and western and African powers.

With such frameworks and guarantees, Tunisia would not fall into the tragic fate of Venezuela, but will mirror’s Spain post Franco’s democratic transition and cultural renaissance. Tunisia would mirror Portugal’s 1974 transition period leading to Portugal democratic and economic renewal.

I Tunisia’s future development years focused on professional competence dominating governance without compromising political necessity, cultural authenticity combined with modernization and the strengthening of the integration between the economic and security spheres.

Finally, I extend my gratitude to the US-Africa Forum, to Mr Adam Powell III for the keen interest he showed my and Tunisia, and the broader policy research community - from Johannesburg to Washington - for your continued analysis of Tunisia's strategic importance.

I am deeply moved to see attendees from nearly all five continents joining us today - your presence is a powerful testament to Tunisia's enduring place in the hearts of the international community.

Your innovative policy recommendations, political journeys, and research initiatives are vital as we navigate these challenges.

We welcome your continued engagement in examining Tunisia's unique case and its implications for regional security.

Thank you.

Olfa Hamdi is an senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank.

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