(This article was written by Peter Huessy and appeared in RealClearDefense. The Future of Nuclear Deterrence)

In the 30 years between 1914 and 1945, 90 million people were killed in conventional war. Given the potential for conventional armed conflict remained high and nuclear weapons were present among U.S. adversaries, it was widely agreed among the allies that nuclear deterrence was required.

There were sharp disagreements and sometimes acrimonious debates over nuclear deterrent strategy directions. For example, some of the founding scientists who built the first bombs wished the U.S. had eliminated such weapons. Major arguments raged about whether the U.S. should test an H-Bomb—was this going to just add another round in the arms race.

Despite such fights, the nuclear community met some very big challenges. With the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, the U.S. worried the Soviets could range orbiting nuclear warheads over American cities and be able to strike with no notice, especially when compared to the then deterrent largely made up of strategic bombers which took hours to reach their targets. NASA was formed, and with the Defense Education Act the U.S. got into the space and missile business.

When senior USAF officers told Congress that all of U.S. bomber weapons were stored at 14 bases and if eliminated would put the U.S. out of the nuclear business, the nuclear community met the challenge and created the survivable nuclear Triad. President Eisenhower secured Congressional support to build submarines running far out in the oceans and solid-fueled land-based missiles in mid-western silos, both capable of launching at the USSR from thousands of miles away, and ready on a day-to-day basis. Polaris was deployed in 1960 and Minuteman in October 1962.

President Kennedy also wisely adopted a strategy of “flexible response” moving away from simple notions of “mutual assured destruction.” The President was determined to give nuclear armed adversaries an off-ramp option that avoided the stark choice between surrender and suicide.

With the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban nuclear crises, the possibility of nuclear war was placed in stark relief. It was clear that some kind of arms control and mutual restraint was needed. And thus, with the limited test ban treaty, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and then the SALT and START agreements, between 1961-2010 the U.S. led a successful campaign that eventually reduced strategic (long range) nuclear weapons to roughly 2000 deployed warheads from levels that had at one time exceeded 12,000.

With the collapse of the USSR, it was projected that nuclear weapons would be less relevant as the prospects of a nuclear conflict would be very low. It was after all “the end of history” and liberal internationalism would be the norm.

Nuclear weapons budgets dropped significantly as the U.S. officials instead concentrated on taking down terrorism.

But within a decade, the initial superpower cooperative hopes and reset buttons were dashed. Nuclear deterrent imperatives returned.

In 2010 the Administration and Congress nailed down a path for nuclear modernization, finally ending nuclear negligence that had lasted decades.

However, despite relatively stable funding for the last 16 years, and continued support for the current program of record to modernize our nuclear forces, serious divisions within the nuclear community have arisen. Just as the international environment worsened, various proposals—all of which would weaken U.S. deterrence–have been advocated, with the ten most significant being:

Stop nuclear warhead pit production and delay further production to 2050; unilaterally cut U.S. nuclear forces by over 70%, to 217 missiles/500 warheads from 800 missiles/1550 warheads allowed under New START; unilaterally eliminate all U.S. theater or short range nuclear forces from Europe; delete R&D funding for the SLCM-N cruise missile; delete all funding for the space based elements of U.S. missile defense; complicate the strategy of extended nuclear deterrence by adding new commanders in theater; adopt a firm fixed timetable for global abolition of nuclear weapons; lock-in a unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze; reduce the salience of nuclear strategy in U.S. security policy; and finally, remove sole Presidential authority to launch nuclear weapons. Some of these elements have been previously proposed in one fashion or the other, but they still had a common element: as long as nuclear weapons remained, nuclear deterrence itself continued to be a primary U.S. requirement.

However, now a new element has come forward—the dangerous idea of jettisoning nuclear deterrence as a strategy all-together.

What happened?

Well, the loose campaign to abolish nuclear weapons—an idea ongoing since the dawn of the nuclear era—has switched gears. Unable to secure abolition, a new plan has emerged. A campaign to abolish nuclear deterrence itself, even as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of America’s enemies.

What’s the origin of such an idea?

It’s a logical outgrowth of some experts believing that nuclear weapons no longer deter. Or that deterrence is more and more a “bluff” and not real. For example, Ukraine is not deterred by Russia’s nuclear weapons and Iran, and its terror proxies are not deterred by Israel’s nuclear weapons.

Another underlying assumption is that despite 80 years of successful nuclear deterrence, a future breakdown in deterrence is “inevitable.” And that a policy of actually retaliating with nuclear force under conditions of a breakdown in deterrence is foolish “warfighting” (an actually long held assumption by many in the abolition community). And that any initial use of nuclear force, no matter how limited, will inevitably lead to such subsequent widespread nuclear use that nuclear winter and civilization collapse occurs.

This theme has been promoted by Hollywood in at least three new films–Oppenheimer (2023), House of Dynamite (2025) and At the Brink (2026). The recent book (2024) “Nuclear War: A Scenario” has the same message and the re-released 1984 movie “Threads”, originally released in England as part of a campaign to stop the INF nuclear deployments, does as well. None of the movies support sustaining nuclear deterrence, extended or otherwise or accurately acknowledge that for 80 years such deterrence has worked—perfectly. Instead, what is offered are clever slogans, [“global zero”], hardly an effective deterrent alternative especially as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of our enemies.

To deter is serious business. Slogans and fancy worded UN declarations deter nothing. Real deterrence is in the just passed House military bill. As HASC Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL) explained, the full nuclear TRIAD “improves readiness, expands our capabilities and invests in the technologies required to secure our country and protect us from our adversaries.”

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C. based foreign policy and defense think tank.