By: Eli M. Gold, President

President Donald J. Trump and his partners on the Gaza Board of Peace deserve credit for pursuing what so many before them could not achieve, a serious effort to end the Gaza war through Hamas’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, and a new governing structure for Gaza.

If this plan succeeds, President Trump will be remembered as the president who did what many of his predecessors could not do, move this conflict from endless war toward a real political settlement.

The Board of Peace announcement is bold. Very bold. It says Hamas has agreed to a detailed roadmap for the next phase of the Gaza ceasefire after months of negotiations led by Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the United States. It says Hamas has committed to a plan for giving up all its weapons and that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will follow. It also says the agreement could bring a better future to the people of Gaza and security to the people of Israel.

That is the promise. Really? Does anyone believe it will actually hold?

The plan is detailed. No one can say it lacks moving parts. It ties Hamas’s disarmament to a phased Israeli withdrawal and to the rise of a new Palestinian governing body, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). It also relies on the International Stabilization Force (ISF), which was authorized under United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 2803, to help enforce the arrangement, support demilitarization, train police, and help stabilize Gaza while Israel pulls back.

On paper, this sounds orderly. Hamas gives up weapons. Israel withdraws in stages. NCAG takes over. ISF supports the transition. An international verification body confirms compliance at each step. It is all very neat. The region, unfortunately, is not.

Start with the mediators. Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the United States are presented as the countries guiding this process. The problem is obvious. Three of those countries are not trusted champions of Israel’s long term security. They may be useful mediators. Fine. That is not the same thing as being reliable guarantors of peace for Israel. Not even close.

Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly taken a hostile line toward Israel. Qatar has long tolerated, enabled, or funded institutions and media ecosystems that are deeply hostile to Israel. Egypt’s public language during this war has also been sharply critical of Israel. These are not background details to be politely set aside. These are the details. They go to the heart of whether this arrangement can survive its first serious test.

That test will not come only from rockets or missiles. It may come from buses, cars, knives, suicide bombs, or loosely organized cells that operate without formal command structures. If Hamas or one of its proxies, members, supporters, or successor networks turns to those methods, who really believes Qatar, Türkiye, and Egypt will come forcefully to Israel’s defense? Who believes they will say clearly that Israel is right and the attackers are wrong? History suggests otherwise. Repeatedly.

That is one of the central weaknesses in this plan. It assumes that mediation can become moral clarity. That would be nice. It would also be new.

The second problem is governance. The roadmap says Gaza will move to NCAG, a Palestinian body meant to assume civilian administration and internal security. It also says Gaza will be governed by the principle of “One Authority, One Law, One Weapon.” That is a clean phrase. It fits nicely in a document. It is also much easier to print than to enforce.

Hamas is not just a militia. Hamas is a movement that has ruled Gaza for years through ministries, schools, mosques, charities, family networks, and neighborhood influence. A document can say Hamas will have no role in governance, directly or indirectly. Wonderful. That does not make it true. Men do not disappear because a paper says they no longer matter. Networks do not vanish because an international committee says they are dissolved.

If Hamas is removed in name, who rules in fact? That question remains unanswered. Will it be NCAG? Will it be Hamas under another label? Will it be a joint reality in which technocrats sit in offices while old power networks control neighborhoods? That is not a side issue. That is the issue.

Will this also become a backdoor, or perhaps more honestly a front door, to the larger political question of why Gaza is being handled separately from the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority (PA)? If Gaza is placed on one political track while the West Bank remains on another, what exactly is being built here, peace, or a new formula for Palestinian fragmentation? And if the Palestinian Authority is supposedly the eventual destination, why is Gaza being treated as though it can be politically reorganized in isolation from the rest of the Palestinian national question? Would this, in the end, become the front door for a renewed push for contiguous Palestinian land, stitched together from Gaza, the West Bank, and whatever else can be leveraged out of Israel under pressure? If Gaza is “stabilized” under this framework, does that then become the model and the political lever for demanding a continuous strip of Palestinian territory running from Sea to the River?

The same problem applies to disarmament. Reports on the plan describe an eight-month process in which Hamas’s tunnels are destroyed, heavy weapons are collected, and additional arms are surrendered in stages. Israeli withdrawal is linked to verification that disarmament is actually happening. That sounds disciplined. In practice, it creates endless room for dispute. Which may be the most realistic part of the plan.

Who decides what counts as real disarmament? Who decides whether enough tunnels were destroyed? Who decides whether enough rifles were surrendered? Who decides when Israel must withdraw from one area to another? Every phase creates room for argument, delay, manipulation, and bad faith. In other words, the usual ingredients.

And even if the formal process works, who believes every weapon will be surrendered? Heavy weapons may be handed over. Tunnels may be destroyed. But small arms are much easier to hide, move, and reuse. A movement that has spent years preparing for war will not be undone simply because it stores a visible portion of its arsenal. That would be convenient. It would also be naive.

Then there is the question of the International Stabilization Force. Resolution 2803 authorized it, and official texts say it will help secure Gaza, support demilitarization, protect civilians, train police, and enable the transition. But even this should be read with caution. International forces can monitor. They can train. They can report. They can buffer. They are rarely able to transform a deeply radicalized political culture. They do many things. Miracles are usually not on the list.

That brings us to the most serious issue of all. Gaza’s problem is not only weapons. Gaza’s problem is the worldview that formed around those weapons. For nearly two decades, children and young adults in Gaza have been raised under Hamas rule, Hamas institutions, and Hamas narratives. A whole generation has been shaped in an environment where hatred of Israel was normalized, violence was glorified, and martyrdom was praised. That does not disappear because someone signed a roadmap.

That is why disarmament alone does not equal peace. It may reduce firepower. It does not remove indoctrination.

The official language speaks of “deradicalization,” tolerance, and peaceful coexistence. Fine. But where are the concrete demands? Where is the binding requirement to change textbooks? Where is the enforcement mechanism for mosque sermons? Where is the plan to remove anti Jewish and anti Israel incitement from media, schools, and civil institutions? Without those changes, one generation hands the grievance to the next, even if the rockets are gone. So yes, the weapons matter. The curriculum matters more.

That is why one question matters so much. With so many countries represented on the Board of Peace, how many do we truly believe will insist on curriculum changes in Gaza that clearly recognise the right to exist for Jews, Christians and other non Muslims, and explicitly affirm the right of the State of Israel to live within secure borders? Will the United Nations?

That question should not be brushed aside. It goes to the core of whether this is a peace plan or a pause.

The United Nations plays a major role in the structure around this agreement. Resolution 2803 endorsed the broader framework and authorized the International Stabilization Force. U.N. channels are part of the aid and reporting architecture. Yet the United Nations has long had a record of treating Israel not as a normal state with legitimate security concerns, but as a permanent defendant before the court of world opinion. That record does not inspire confidence that the U.N. will suddenly become a firm defender of Israel if this arrangement starts to break down. One can always hope. One can also read the record.

Nor should anyone ignore the issue of money. The plan assumes reconstruction, recovery, and a functioning postwar administration. But plans like this live or die on sustained funding, competent administration, and political will. If reconstruction stalls, if services fail, if jobs do not appear, then anger and instability will return quickly. In that setting, the old networks, the old slogans, and the old methods of violence will remain close at hand. Because of course they will.

None of this means the effort should be mocked. It should not. Serious diplomacy deserves serious respect. President Trump and his partners deserve praise for trying to reach an agreement that others never reached. If Hamas truly disarms, if Gaza truly changes, and if Israel truly gains lasting security, the achievement will be historic. That is all true. It is simply not the same as saying it is likely.

Words on paper are not peace. Phased withdrawal is not peace. An international force is not peace. A renamed governing body is not peace. Peace requires something much harder. It requires real enforcement, real political honesty, real educational reform, and real acceptance that Israel is not a temporary fact but a permanent state. That is the part that always sounds so simple in conferences and so impossible on the ground.

That is why the hard questions remain. Who will truly rule Gaza once Hamas is supposedly gone? What happens when violence returns in forms that are easier to deny and harder to trace? Which countries on the Board of Peace will stand with Israel when the first serious post agreement attack takes place? How many will insist that Gaza’s next generation be taught coexistence instead of hatred? Will the United Nations?

These are all questions that must be answered. However, these questions increasingly appear rhetorical in nature.

Eli M. Gold is the President of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based think-and-do tank focusing on foreign policy and defense matters. To learn more about the Gold Institute, visit www.Goldiis.org.