American Strength Must Be Built in America

Foundry workers silhouetted against sparks and molten metal

A nation’s strength cannot be judged just by the magnitude of its economy, the level of its stock market, or the extent of its banking institutions. True national strength lies in a people’s ability to produce the goods needed to maintain their way of life.

The United States needs to have the ability to manufacture medicine for its hospitals, transformers for its electrical grid, semiconductors for its technology, machinery for its factories, vehicles for its economy, and weapons for its defense. It isn’t just losing jobs when a country loses these capabilities; it is, in effect, giving up a certain degree of its independence.

Manufacturing forms the basis of the visible economy. Since most people do not take much time to think about foundations because they are generally out of sight, everyone in the structure eventually feels the effects when the foundation starts to deteriorate.

More than four decades have seen America allow that foundation to erode.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that American manufacturing employment had reached a record high of 19.6 million jobs in June 1979, while by July 2026 it had dropped to about 12.6 million. Although the American population increased significantly over that time, the country had nearly seven million fewer manufacturing workers. This represents a decline of roughly 36% from the 1979 peak.

Part of the decline can be credited to technological advances and increased productivity. Nowadays, modern factories are able to produce a greater amount of goods using fewer workers than was possible in 1979. We ought to welcome any innovation which makes American companies more competitive. As long as automation expands domestic production and gives rise to new opportunities, it is not opposed to the American worker.

Yet productivity by itself does not account for the whole situation. Many companies shifted their production abroad in order to benefit from lower labour costs, weaker environmental protections, government subsidies, and favourable trade policies. The Washington authorities frequently encouraged this kind of transition on the basis of the belief that Americans could design their products at home, manufacture them overseas and buy them at a low price without in any way weakening their national strength.

The theory did not take into account the relationship between production and power.

A blueprint may be useful, but it doesn’t mean it is a factory. A patent cannot carry out the refining of a critical mineral. Software can’t manufacture a transformer without the use of steel, copper, machinery, electricity, and skilled workers. Although financial capital can buy equipment, it cannot immediately recover the industrial knowledge that has been lost over decades.

The effects of a factory closing are not confined to the building itself. Experienced workers either move away or retire. The suppliers vanish. Technical knowledge ceases to be passed on from one generation to the next. Local tax income falls, and the communities lose the economic security which supports families, schools, churches, and small businesses.

Industrial capacity is like fertile farmland. A careful farmer won’t use up his store of seed corn on the assumption that money will bring about a further harvest; instead, he guards the source of future production. For a long time, America regarded its industrial inheritance as if it could be sold without any consequences.

THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCE

The United States is still a major player in manufacturing. According to the Department of Commerce, manufacturing adds approximately $2.9 trillion to the American economy, supports around 13 million workers, and accounts for about 11% of gross domestic product.

The figures show that America still has a huge foundation on which to rebuild and must not be regarded as evidence of the weaknesses which have appeared in key industries.

In 2025, the Food and Drug Administration stated that over half of the pharmaceuticals distributed in the United States were made in other countries. The number of manufacturers in the United States that produced the active pharmaceutical ingredients was 9%. China had 22% and India 44%.

It therefore follows that a large number of the medicines available in American hospitals and pharmacies rely on factories, governments, transportation systems, and political situations which are outside our control.

The trade in ordinary consumer goods is a normal aspect of a sound economy, while relying on foreign countries for essential medicines poses a threat to national security. If a hostile government acts, a regional conflict breaks out, shipping routes are disrupted, or another pandemic occurs, access to those medicines could be interrupted when Americans need them most.

The electrical grid is also coming up against the same problem. According to the Department of Energy, the time taken to deliver distribution transformers has risen from about 3 to 6 months in 2019 to 12 to 30 months in 2023. Transformers are by no means optional equipment since they are necessary for supplying electricity to homes, hospitals, military bases, businesses, and factories.

A modern economy would be no different from a body lacking a properly working circulatory system. Although energy might be available at the source, it could not get to the places where it is required.

There is also the matter of critical minerals. According to the United States Geological Survey, the economic activity of industries that depend on minerals was about $4.09 trillion in 2025, and the United States still relied on China as a major source for 14 of the 33 critical minerals for which the country had the highest level of import dependence.

Such materials are employed in aircraft, electronics, communications systems, batteries, medical equipment, energy infrastructure, plus precision weapons; production halts long before the assembly line reaches the final product if secure access to them is not available.

The danger doesn’t apply only to one particular industry. Modern manufacturing consists of an interconnected system, so a lack of one cheap component can bring about the stoppage of the production of an item worth millions of dollars. This happened to Americans when shortages of semiconductors disrupted car production during the pandemic; a chip that cost only a few dollars was enough to stop the sale of a whole automobile.

Military logistics is a field in which national security planners are aware of this principle; an aircraft, for example, will stay on the ground if one of its critical parts is not available, just as the civilian economy does.

REBUILDING WITHOUT RETURNING TO THE PAST

You don’t need to try to reproduce the economy that existed in 1955 if you want to restore manufacturing in the United States. The aim should be to create the most advanced, productive, secure, and innovative industrial economy in the world.

Modern factories use skilled labour together with robotics, artificial intelligence, advanced materials, precision machining, and digital engineering; although they need engineers and programmers, they also need electricians, welders, toolmakers, technicians, equipment operators, and maintenance professionals.

The future factory ought to be located in America.

There are some positive developments; in July the Department of Commerce announced that TSMC’s intended investments within semiconductor manufacturing in the United States had amounted to $265 billion and the Bureau of Economic Analysis stated that private goods-producing industries had registered an annual growth rate of 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026.

These investments demonstrate that America can attract large-scale production when businesses meet the following conditions: a serious national commitment, access to reliable energy, a skilled workforce, predictable regulation, and a competitive business environment. It would establish the conditions for production without attempting to manage every factory from Washington. Private enterprise remains the most effective engine of progress and development. However, government has a legitimate responsibility to protect national security, enforce fair trade, maintain infrastructure, and ensure that American companies are not forced to compete against foreign governments that manipulate markets and subsidize strategic industries.

Tariffs may be used as one of the tools when foreign countries are engaging in unfair trading practices. Similarly, tax policy, the possibility of reforming it, domestic energy production, research investment, workforce training, and government purchasing are all important factors. It is impossible for anyone policy to overcome several decades of industrial decline.

The nation needs a strategy that continues over election cycles and, as a result, achieves observable outcomes.

The strategy must start with a national evaluation of essential manufacturing capacity. The federal government ought to determine which medicines, minerals, components, machinery, energy systems, and defense products cannot safely be depended on foreign supply chains. It should then assess the amount of domestic capacity that is available, where the most serious gaps lie, and how quickly production could be increased in an emergency.

This evaluation must not turn into yet another report that is left unread in a federal office; instead, Congress should mandate that public updates be issued each year, including specific benchmarks relating to domestic production, workforce development, supply-chain security, and emergency capacity.

THE DIGNITY OF PRODUCTIVE WORK

Restoring manufacturing also needs a change in culture.

For years, too many students were told that success required a four-year university degree. Technical education was often treated as a secondary option, even as employers struggled to find qualified workers for skilled positions.

A machinist who can make a component to the exact required tolerance has valuable knowledge. An electrician working in an advanced factory has a serious responsibility. A welder who is building a bridge, a pipeline, a ship, or a pressure vessel is carrying out work upon which other people’s lives may depend.

Since these jobs require intelligence, discipline, sound judgment, and a good deal of experience, they ought to be regarded as honorable occupations and ways of serving the nation.

Students should have clearly defined routes available to them into apprenticeships, technical programs, engineering, and advanced manufacturing. Businesses should carry out training instead of relying on someone else to create a qualified workforce. The states should make sure that their education programs correspond with the real needs of employers in the local area.

Veterans also have abilities that may enhance American industry. The experience gained through military service includes lessons in accountability, teamwork, maintenance, logistics, technical ability, and the significance of completing a mission. These qualities can be directly applied to leadership in manufacturing and to the carrying out of skilled production.

Families also have a responsibility. Parents must teach their children that dignity is derived from honest work and that having a useful skill can bring about both personal independence and national value. Because of our faith we remember that work consists not simply of a transaction; it is one way in which human beings exercise stewardship, support their families, serve their neighbours, and make a contribution to an ideal greater than themselves.

SOVEREIGNTY REQUIRES CAPACITY

America ought to engage in trade with other countries. We should welcome investment which leads to the establishment of factories in the United States, hires American workers, passes on useful knowledge, and enhances domestic supply chains. Economic relationships can lead to peace and prosperity so long as they are mutual and correspond to the national interest.

Trade becomes hazardous when it leads on dependency in sectors essential towards survival and security. A nation which is sovereign needn’t make every product it uses; it should be able to produce those things it cannot afford to lose. Food, energy, equipment, semiconductors, communications systems, transportation equipment, critical minerals, machine tools, and defense materiel belong within that category. Domestic capacity in these industries should be treated as national infrastructure.

Congress should assess legislation by considering whether it increases or decreases that capacity. Federal agencies have to eliminate unnecessary barriers that stop factories, mines, refineries, power plants, and infrastructure projects from being constructed. Corporate leaders should take national resilience into account together with their quarterly profits. Investors ought to realize that long-term American production can offer both economic value and security.

People have a role that goes beyond voting once every two or four years. Americans can choose to buy goods that are produced in this country when it is practical, they can encourage young people to take up skilled occupations, and they can ask their elected representatives to take account of the state of the nation’s industry. Local communities can accept responsible manufacturing projects and help residents get ready for the jobs that these projects will create.

Rebuilding American manufacturing will be a lengthy process; this is a reason to act promptly rather than one for continuing continued dependence.

The fact that the United States became the world’s leading industrial power was not accidental. Over many generations Americans have put together natural resources, private enterprise, scientific research, skilled labour, faith, and a readiness to build. The result was that their efforts provided for our nation, helped our allies, defeated tyranny, and established the largest middle class in history.

We have inherited the strength that they produced. Our duty is to restore it and pass it on.

A nation that produces necessary goods itself has options; one that relies on other countries must ask for permission, wait, or pay whatever fee the situation calls for. It is this difference that sets economic convenience apart from national sovereignty.

America still possesses the people, the resources, the capital, and the ingenuity necessary to take the lead in manufacturing; what we now need is the discipline to regard industrial capacity as a national priority and the patience to rebuild it properly.

It has to start in Washington, but it can’t stay there; it needs to get to the governors, the legislatures, the schools, the businesses, the churches, the families and individual citizens. The extent of national renewal will finally be seen in the number of factories that are operating, the security of the supply chains, the availability of skilled workers, the reliability of the infrastructure, and the ability of communities to sustain themselves.

American freedom has always rested on the ability of its citizens to build, produce, repair, and serve; if we are to preserve that freedom, we must once again become a nation of builders.

Michael T. Flynn, LTG USA (Ret.) is the chairman of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based think-and-do tank.

Pakistan Is Fueling the Fire in Sudan: A $1.5 Billion Arms Pipeline Raises New Questions in Washington

Armored vehicles in a Sudanese Armed Forces military parade

(This article was written by Maria Maalouf and appeared in The Capitol Institute. Pakistan Is Fueling the Fire in Sudan: A $1.5 Billion Arms Pipeline Raises New Questions in Washington)

The first public appearance of 100 Pakistani-made Mohafiz-V armored vehicles in a Sudanese Armed Forces military parade in Khartoum is more than another weapons delivery in a distant war. It signals a dangerous new phase in Sudan’s conflict—one in which outside powers are helping rebuild military capabilities while diplomatic efforts struggle to stop the bloodshed. The armored vehicles reportedly represent the visible edge of a much larger defense arrangement between Port Sudan and Islamabad, estimated at approximately $1.5 billion. For Washington, the question should not simply be what Pakistan is selling Sudan. The more important questions are who is financing it, what else is being delivered, and whether foreign military support is making an already catastrophic war even harder to end.

The $1.5 Billion Question

The Mohafiz-V is manufactured by Pakistan’s state-owned defense industry and designed for mobility across difficult and semi-arid terrain—the exact battlefield environment found across Darfur and Kordofan. But the armored vehicles may represent only one component of a much broader military package. Regional reports and intelligence assessments cited by the press indicate that the arrangement could include Shahpar-2 reconnaissance and attack drones, loitering munitions, spare parts for K-8 Karakorum light-attack aircraft and Chinese-origin air-defense platforms. If these systems are delivered and operationalized at scale, they could significantly reinforce the Sudanese Armed Forces’ conventional capabilities and potentially change the military balance in key areas of the country. This is not simply an arms sale. It is potentially an attempt to rebuild the conventional advantage of one of Sudan’s principal warring parties.

Washington Should Be Paying Attention

There is an uncomfortable contradiction at the center of the Sudan file. The international community says it wants negotiations, civilian protection and an end to the war, yet sophisticated military equipment continues to enter the battlefield. The United States has already determined that Sudanese government forces used chemical weapons during the conflict and imposed sanctions in response. That makes the arrival of new military capabilities even more troubling. The appropriate international response to the use of prohibited weapons should be greater accountability and pressure—not an expanding pipeline of armored vehicles, drones, munitions and air-defense technology. Every new shipment can strengthen the belief that victory remains possible through military force, and as long as Sudan’s belligerents believe they can win on the battlefield, the incentive to make meaningful compromises at the negotiating table diminishes.

Follow the Money

The financing of the reported Pakistan-Sudan arrangement may ultimately prove as important as the weapons themselves. Reports have described complicated third-party financial channels and changing calculations among regional actors, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Sudanese Armed Forces commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s diplomatic outreach to Riyadh has consequently attracted attention regarding the political and financial support necessary to sustain the SAF’s war effort. These claims require careful verification, and neither Riyadh nor Doha should be assigned responsibility for financing specific weapons without conclusive evidence. But that does not make the underlying question disappear: Who is financing Sudan’s expanding arsenal? A transaction reportedly worth $1.5 billion in the middle of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises cannot be treated as an ordinary bilateral defense contract. The financial architecture behind it deserves scrutiny from Washington and other governments concerned with Sudan’s future.

Pakistan Enters the Red Sea Equation

Pakistan’s involvement carries strategic implications extending far beyond Sudan. The Red Sea is one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, connecting Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and any expansion of foreign military influence around Sudan inevitably becomes part of the broader competition surrounding this strategic waterway. India is watching particularly closely. Indian security analysts have reportedly raised concerns about Pakistan expanding its military footprint near Red Sea and Indian Ocean lines of communication. The possible deployment of Pakistani drones alongside Chinese-origin technologies in an active war could also provide Islamabad with valuable operational experience and battlefield data. Sudan must not become a testing ground for foreign military technology. The combination of Pakistani platforms, Chinese technology and a prolonged African war creates risks that extend beyond the immediate confrontation between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces.

The Proliferation Danger

Sudan is a fragmented battlefield involving armies, militias, local armed groups and competing external interests. That makes every sophisticated weapons delivery inherently dangerous. Drones, surveillance systems, ammunition and other military technologies introduced today can eventually move beyond their original recipients. Weapons proliferation rarely respects borders once states descend into prolonged conflict. The danger therefore extends toward the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Red Sea. Neighboring countries will ultimately bear part of the price through border insecurity, weapons trafficking, refugee movements and increased instability. Commercial interests will pay as well, as continued militarization around Sudan and the Red Sea increases uncertainty for shipping companies, insurers and investors operating along one of the global economy’s most important corridors.

Pakistan’s Internal Controversy

The reported deal is also generating criticism inside Pakistan. Baloch political groups have questioned whether foreign-currency revenues from major defense exports could strengthen Pakistan’s military establishment and ultimately increase resources available for internal security and counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan and elsewhere. Those allegations should be presented as claims by Pakistani opposition groups rather than established facts, but they highlight a legitimate broader issue: where does the money from a reported $1.5 billion defense transaction ultimately go? When weapons exports become an important source of revenue for military-linked industries, financial incentives can begin competing with diplomatic considerations. Sudan cannot afford to become collateral damage in that equation.

More Weapons, Less Diplomacy

The emerging pattern is dangerous but simple: foreign weapons increase expectations of battlefield victory; expectations of victory reduce incentives for compromise; failed negotiations then create demand for additional weapons. Sudan becomes trapped in a self-perpetuating cycle. Pakistan may view the arrangement primarily through the lens of defense exports and strategic influence, while other regional powers may see Sudan through their own security or geopolitical interests. But Sudanese civilians experience the consequences differently—through displacement, destroyed communities, hunger and another year without peace.

Washington Must Follow the Weapons—and the Money

The United States and its partners should demand greater transparency surrounding major weapons transfers into Sudan and the financial networks supporting them. Washington should examine not only who manufactures the weapons but who finances their purchase, who transports them, which intermediaries facilitate the transactions and what political arrangements accompany them. Sudan does not need another international arms race. It needs external powers to stop treating its territory as an arena for geopolitical competition, defense exports and proxy influence. Those who supply the weapons may never pull the trigger themselves. But when foreign governments and military industries knowingly provide the means for an already catastrophic war to continue, they cannot claim to be standing on the sidelines of the fire.

Maria Maalouf is a Senior Media Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.