If Kamala wins, Ukraine will be another ‘forever war’

Two soldiers in camouflage during a tactical operation

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: If Kamala wins, Ukraine will be another ‘forever war’)

In her first election debate, U.S. presidential candidate Kamala Harris made it clear that she has neither plans nor strategy to end the Russia- Ukraine war – an ongoing crisis for which the U.S., under her administration, has promised $175 billion to-date. As vice president, she pledges ongoing (and long term) U.S. financial support for a war of over one million casualties, saying that “America cannot retreat.”

Indeed, the Biden-Harris administration, D.C.-NATO Warhawks and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy insist that “winning” the Russia-Ukraine war by flooding (mostly U.S. taxpayer) money and weapons into Ukraine is the only answer to Russia’s unlawful invasion.

But is it? And if so, what would winning look like?

The Biden-Harris administration’s Ukraine “strategy” this year gave up on the idea of gaining back territory , instead focusing on strengthening Ukrainian forces and the economy against future attacks. Despite the newest U.S. $61 billion aid package, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan believes Russians will continue to advance, and Ukrainian forces should just “hold the line.”

Sullivan even expects another counteroffensive will be necessary in 2025. At the cost, of course, of billions more U.S. taxpayer dollars and thousands more Ukrainian lives.

An estimated over 34,000 Ukrainian civilians and almost 500,000 Ukrainian troops have already become casualities of this war. Last year’s counteroffensive failed and this year, Russia continues making “rapid” advancements in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian troops deployed to the Kursk region of Russia (for reasons somewhat ambiguous), leave Ukraine undermanned .

With an eye toward the presidential election, the Biden-Harris administration also wants to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid by signing a long-term commitment with Zelenskyy, with fixed levels of support over the next ten years . NATO has similar plans to protect Ukraine aid against both a Trump presidency and right-leaning political shifts in European member states.

When will it end? Under a president Kamala Harris, Americans will continue to support war indefinitely.

In 2023, the U.S. State Department announced the U.S. had already given Ukraine the largest U.S. foreign assistance package since the end of WWII and the Marshall Plan. In spite of U.S. economic and border security crises, assistance to Ukraine – military, security, economic, and finanicial – continues to grow significantly.

Supposedly, enormous levels of U.S. support are necessary to push back Russian forces occupying Ukraine’s east and south provinces. “More money, more weapons, are crucial to American interests,” cry the Warhawks, “because Russian forces will continue to roll West!” The cry comes despite the fact that Putin repeatedly communicated that NATO enlargement initiated his invasion, not an intention to expand into Central Europe; despite the fact that invading further west would directly pit Russian forces against thirty-two NATO countries. How absurd.

Diplomacy and security assurances to Russia could have ended this war before it began. Instead, the Biden-Harris administration repeatedly backtracked on previous U.S. policies to increase the number and lethality of weapons sent to Ukraine, even lifting restrictions on U.S. weapons to allow strikes inside Russian borders, risking a U.S.-NATO direct conflict with Russia.

Putin promised a response, warning of “serious consequences.” But Biden-Harris pays no heed; in fact, the administration dangerously justified Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region using U.S.-NATO weapons and killing and injuring Russian civilians.

No matter the cost or risk to the U.S., Ukraine is no closer today to “winning;” it has neither gained back territory nor pushed Russian forces out of Ukraine. But the real cost of the war, the futility of which was predicted but few acknowledged, is hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties, millions of refugees, and devastation of cities and critical infrastructure.

Does the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) line pockets to such a degree that the deadly and mounting costs of indefinite war can be so easily overlooked?

When will it end? Who will end it? The supposed goal to weaken Russia necessitates long-term war and destruction against an enemy that “will fight for as long as it takes.” Hardly anyone says it, but American and Ukrainian citizens bear enormous costs for a futile war only (barely) of secondary interest to U.S. national security — and which could end with diplomacy and negotiation.

Until Ukraine invaded Kursk in August 2024, Putin often indicated he was open to negotiations based on Ukraine neutrality and NATO non-enlargement – an offer repeatedly rejected by the Biden-Harris administration. Yet Ukraine, rife with corruption, dependent on the West, and led by a near-dictator who outlaws political opposition, suspends elections, closes churches, and nationalizes media, is not ready for NATO membership.

Sadly, Biden-Harris’ insistence on making Ukraine a NATO member, subsequently enabling an ongoing full-scale war, “has made Ukraine a victim of misconceived and unachievable U.S. military aspirations .” The U.S. remains by far the largest donor of military assistance, without which Ukraine arguably could not “hold the line” at all.

Though no U.S. troops have yet fought in Ukraine, the current scenario is reminiscent of D.C. Warhawks’s proclivity for foreign “forever wars” – from Vietnam to Afghanistan – born by generations of American citizens. Today our grandchildren are being committed to staggering debt for a war in Eastern Europe that cannot be won.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has even alluded that if the U.S. does not continue to do more, U.S. troops likely will fight in Ukraine.

Guaranteed, if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the presidency in November, American citizens will indefintely continue to support a “forever war” in Ukraine — and the increasingly greater risk of a world-wide, possibly nuclear, war.

Let’s pray that wiser leadership prevails.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

ASEAN Centrality Amidst the Current Regional Security Challenges

The ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and larger US–China contestation are pressing issues the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) needs to address. With such diverse member states, the bloc’s ability to be an effective body on these major security issues in the region has been severely tested.

In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi

who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions, citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The US–based Carter Center, which had a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in ten states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on the election day. Per an Amnesty International report, over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the coup d’etat, including at least 1,345 people in 2023.

Reactions from fellow ASEAN Countries

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Association aims to promote regional peace and security, as well as economic growth. Due to the complex security dynamics in the region, the former design seems to be the group’s priority. ASEAN subsequently expanded and the numbers slowly grew, as Brunei became a member in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, Timor-Leste in 2022 was granted an official observer status and in principle approval by ASEAN countries to become a full member of the association at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN Centrality, a concept that relies on assumption that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the regional bloc. The concept was first used at the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explained that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and, in order to effectively function, the member states needed to be united.

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from the fellow ASEAN member states. The regional bloc has been chaired by four countries since the military coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been particularly successful in resolving the crisis as, three years after the coup, forging a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.

Most founding members were alarmed over the developments in Myanmar. Indonesia expressed a serious concern over the military take-over in Myanmar, calling for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore took the same stance, expressing grave concern and expressed hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and Singapore echoed these sentiments, viewing the developments with considerable unease. The Philippines followed the situation with deep concern, particularly over the personal safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, flatly described the coup as an internal matter and advocated no comment be made. Newer members generally shared Bangkok’s sentiment.

That member states were divided between expressions of serious concern and a hands-off approach illustrated that the regional bloc has lacked a united stance. Even as early as five months after the coup unfolded, the division were seen when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy, with only six ASEAN members voting in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar itself, who was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand abstained.

ASEAN consists of countries with significant differences, including their political systems – which may have played a role in the divided responses toward the overthrow of the democratically elected government, as well as their approach to the ongoing post–coup troubles. Only three members — Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — are considered to have democratic systems.

Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar for decades was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The United States and European Union states accused SLORC of human rights violations and suppression of democracy activists. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy was the way to secure regional security as well as the country’s socio-economic development. Despite objections from the United States, Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. Today, the bloc finds itself in a challenging situation where it needs to find a way to manage Myanmar’s membership amidst continued civil unrest.

In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (“FPC”), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special envoy of ASEAN; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.

In contrast to the West imposing sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders were united and opted to keep the communication channels open with the junta, balancing between engagement but carefully not to give legitimacy to the military regime.

In October 2021, the ten member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet the jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised an option, as the group has no mechanism of expulsion, let alone any specific mention about expelling its members in a situation when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.

Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, during his tenure as ASEAN Chair the following year, was criticized by ASEAN fellow members, Indonesia and Malaysia. His visit to Myanmar undermined what the group has agreed, which is to withhold the junta’s recognition until they start to cooperate.

As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This move constituted a different approach by the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed an individual as a special envoy to Myanmar. Jakarta favored a non-megaphone diplomacy, a quieter approach where not every diplomatic activity was disclosed and maintaining a position that, until there was progress on the implementation of the FPC, no representation from Myanmar at ASEAN meetings would be accepted, except at the non-political level. Still, the junta did not heed Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and with no punitive actions applicable under ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, nothing more was done.

During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo pushed back against the accusation of the division within the regional’s bloc by stating that differences of opinion didn’t mean there was no unity, a view that strains credulity.

This year’s chair, Laos, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, a similar move from Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022, which only highlighted once more the bloc’s inability to speak with one voice.

ASEAN and the South China Sea

As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members have also been divided with regard to Chinese encroachment in its naval backyard.

Looking at the dynamics between member states on South China Sea (“SCS”) concerns, the expectation of an ultimately fruitful South China Sea Code of Conduct (“CoC”) negotiation, which constitute guidelines created to ease the tension in disputed waters by defining rules of related parties, needs to be managed. A CoC is hoped to have a more meaningful impact than the previous non-legally binding document signed by ASEAN members and China in 2002, yet it remains a discussion whether a CoC will even be legally binding. ASEAN and China have been working on a CoC for over two decades but within the former, unity once more proves elusive. The claimant countries who often involved in incidents with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, support the agreement to be legally binding, while countries that are closer to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, prefer to avoid any conflict.

With China claiming almost the entirety of the SCS, there is also a question on what geographical areas that the code should cover and agreed by all parties.

Recently, China and the Philippines were involved in another incident located in Sabina Shoal, which lies

630 nautical miles from China. Manila and Beijing accused each other of ramming into each other’s vessels, marking the fifth incident in one month. The incident occurred just a month after a de-escalation effort from both sides, where both disputants agreed to a provision arrangement that allows Manila to resupply the outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. China makes no secret of its more assertive moves in pursuing its claims in the disputed waters, ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal concluded China’s claims had no legal basis. The tension in the disputed waters has been on the rise since last year and sparked a concern of a possible larger confrontation.

In his speech at the Shangri–La Dialogue this year, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, without mentioning a specific country, condemned China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea. He mentioned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a willful act was close to what gets defined as an act of war. He hinted that, in this case, Manila may ultimately invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States, stating that he believed that his treaty partner holds the same standard. The treaty consists of eight articles that requires both countries to defend each other if another party attacks.

Similar to the Myanmar crisis, the members are not united in addressing the SCS disputes. In 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique amidst tension in the disputed waters, a first since its establishment, with Cambodia blocked the consensus. Its leader at the time, Hun Sen, argued that the issues should be addressed bilaterally, similar to what China preferred. Cracks in the group’s facade were again reflected in July’s post–ministerial,meeting in Vientiane, when host Laos and Cambodia opposed the wording to be put in the joint communique, condemning the coast guard vessel belonging to China in a June collision with the Philippines’ resupply boat.

In next month’s ASEAN Summit, member states expect to remain divided on the issue of the Myanmar crisis, between those supporting vocal criticism toward the military government’s lack of commitment on the FPC, as well as rising violence and the junta deciding to again postpone its scheduled general election scheduled for 2025, and those advocating a markedly softer approach.

Member states also remain divided on how to address China’s more aggressive behavior in the disputed waters, particularly against the Philippines. Meanwhile, the CoC negotiation between ASEAN and China will still be a tough one, despite being scheduled to be concluded in the next two years. It’s important to note that not all ASEAN members are having territorial disputes with China; therefore, consensus isn’t easy to reach. The disunity may weaken its negotiation’s position and possibly allowing China to drive a wedge within the group.

There is doubt that China will agree to a legally binding CoC, given its more assertive behavior in the disputed waters, the use of water cannon, ramming incidents with other disputants, and the artificial islands equipped with military facilities, despite the existing but unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, where the disputed parties agreed to resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means and practice self-restraint from activities that would escalate the disputes. More importantly, China openly rejected the 2016 ruling by an international tribunal and sees it as null and void.

ASEAN was built based on a declaration, not a treaty. It provides a platform for discussions through forums over security issues aimed to maintain peace and stability in the region. It has a distinctive way in managing interstate relations, widely known as the “ASEAN Way,” relying on consultation and consensus. The style of diplomacy consists of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, preference of non-binding and non-legalistic approaches. Therefore, the CoC is less likely to be a legally binding agreement.

Further, ASEAN has no army in its disposal so cannot project any military power and consequently the group’s diplomatic influence is weakened without such enforcement capabilities.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, mentioned that the economy, including trade and investment will be the priority of Malaysia as ASEAN’s chair next year. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur has decided to join the Chinese – led regional bloc, BRICS, which suggests its approach towards the SCS dispute next year is unlikely to be assertive towards China.

ASEAN’s rotating chair changes annually. Learning from Indonesia’s term as a chair, which has experienced of fully transitioning from an authoritarian system to the world’s third largest democracy, a year wasn’t nearly enough to make a significant progress on the Myanmar crisis. Accordingly, the chances of success for any ASEAN chair to play a key role in finding a solution to the crisis is low.

The decision-making mechanism of ASEAN that consists of consultations and consensus have also raised question on its efficacy in managing current security issues. ASEAN as a regional group should prioritise the interests of the member states, not those of external powers. For that to happen, there is a need for the group to speak in one voice and to restore ASEAN Centrality.

When will enough be enough on Ukraine?

The United States Capitol building in Washington

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: When will enough be enough on Ukraine?)

“It’s not enough,” said Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently after deploying U.S.-made F-16s against Russia’s drones and missiles, a theme he uses repeatedly since Russian’s unlawful invasion into Ukraine. Zelenskyy even blames his August 2024 incursion into Russia’s Kursk region on a U.S.-NATO “ naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia” that (so far) restrict him from using U.S. and others’ long-range weapons to strike inside Russian territory.

However, the Biden-Harris administration recently did a major policy reversal to allow Ukraine to use shorter range missiles to strike inside Russia. But no matter how far the U.S. dangerously creeps toward direct confrontation with Putin, no matter the billions donated, Zelenskyy continues to push, cajole, and guilt , into “more.”

When will it be enough to end this war? And who has done more than the U.S.? The U.S. is the largest state donor of aid to Ukraine.

As of August 2024, U.S. Congress passed five bills to appropriate a total of $174.2 billion for Ukraine assistance since Russia’s invasion. This includes: over $55.5 billion in military assistance (weapons, equipment, supplies), $30 billion in security assistance , (law enforcement, intelligence, training), $3.2 billion in humanitarian assistance (healthcare, shelter, food), about $23 billion in financial assistance (grants to purchase weapons) and $65 billion in multiple funding streams for direct economic aid (humanitarian, military, government budget).

The U.S. remains by far the largest donor of military assistance, without which Ukraine arguably could not hold off Russian forces at all. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, is Ukraine’s second largest donor of military assistance at about $31 billion .

The world considers the U.S. an unending source: arguments abound that billions in U.S. aid are not a “dispropportionate burden” on American taxpayers as compared to European partners. But some states, arguably more vested in a regional war than the U.S. – France, Italy, Spain – contribute relatively little, although they are (respectively) the second, third and fourth largest economies of the European Union (EU). Germany, France and Italy account for more than half the EU’s GDP .

France has contributed about $4.2 billion in military support and Italy, between $1-$2 billion . Until Spring 2024, Spain’s contribution to Ukraine military aid was only about $332 million; recently Spain pledged $1.2 billion.

Is reluctance to fund Ukraine’s military an indication these states believe winning the war is futile? Or, like former President Donald Trump has said, do they believe the U.S. will supply whatever NATO members will not?

For further context, U.S. financial aid commitments to Ukraine have been grants, not requiring repayment, whereas almost all the $40 billion pledged (as of June 2024) by the largest donor of financial aid to Ukraine, the EU institutions of the European Commission, Council, and European Investment Bank, have actually been loans .

Some even assert “U.S. aid to Ukraine” is a “misnomer,” and that 61% to 80% of the $175 billion appropriated really benefits U.S. citizens by supporting our “defense industrial base’s decline,” and funding U.S. factories, labor, and service members. This analysis describes U.S. aid to Ukraine as much less ( $107 billion or less) and excludes billions of U.S. dollars that support Ukraine, but are not directly spent in Ukraine , including Ukrainian refugee assistance, programs funded to procure weapons and resources sent to Ukraine, economic assistance to Ukraine through the Office of U.S. Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (ACE), and emergency funds for Ukraine and other countries impacted by its war.

This analysis is misleading, at best. All of the above activities benefit Ukraine fighting their war against Russia, whether money is spent directly in Ukraine or indirectly, including in the U.S. production of weaponry donated to Ukraine.

Besides being misleading, the analysis promotes a non-competitive, non-capitalistic, socialistic economic model. Critical funds – supplied through U.S taxpayers – are diverted to respond to an ongoing war in Central Europe, of only secondary interest to U.S. national security.

Portions of these taxes would be better used to further crucial U.S. interests– such as incentivizing entrepreneurial efforts and competitive companies to innovate, design and build modern weaponry for U.S. national security and defense.

Supplying weapons to Ukraine has blatantly demonstrated that U.S. current weapons systems and tactics are being radically challenged by a new generation of warfare, with a massive shift in warfare techniques, logistics and weapons systems. Yet Congress pays the same defense contractors for weapons quickly becoming obsolete. The “misnomer” narrative, however, reflects routine propaganda sold by the Biden-Harris administration, Zelenskyy, and the D.C. Warhawks. It says that American citizens, despite committing almost $200 billion, including paying salaries and pensions of Ukraine’s public servants during U.S. record-high inflation and border security crises, still haven’t done enough. We must do more, they say. The media barely notes rampant corruption in Zelenskyy’s defense ministry, or that he fired top defense officials for “massive procurement fraud” including of ammunition and military food supplies . As one commentator noted “when does a never-ending supply of taxpayer money begin to resemble “fraud, waste and abuse?”

A new vision for foreign policy is needed in 2025 — one promoting U.S. global leadership and collaboration, but refocusing the (finite) resources of American citizens on priority U.S. national security interests.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

How will Afghanistan feature in the race for the White House?

Aerial cityscape of Kabul, Afghanistan with mountains in the background

(This article was written by Maria Maalouf and appeared in Arab News. How will Afghanistan feature in the race for the White House?)

Three years after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, both Democrats and Republicans are revisiting the incident. Neither side is providing a credible or comprehensive explanation as to why Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban on Aug. 15, 2021. Instead, the lack of an Afghan strategy on the part of both the Biden and Trump administrations is being filled with mutual accusations of “you lost Afghanistan.” The issue now is how the Afghan problem will fit into the 2024 presidential election campaign.

Republicans believe that Democrats are vulnerable on the issue of Afghanistan. It was the Biden administration that failed to stop the Taliban’s onslaught on Kabul and protect the government of then-President Ashraf Ghani. More problematic was the Daesh suicide bombing attack on Kabul airport that killed 170 Afghans and 13 American military personnel during the evacuation.

Republicans in Congress last week released a report, which was the culmination of a three-year investigation into the factors and circumstances that led to the US failure in Afghanistan. Among its findings were: “(The Biden administration) had the information and opportunity to take necessary steps to plan for the inevitable collapse of the Afghan government, so we could safely evacuate US personnel, American citizens, green card holders and our brave Afghan allies.”

Days earlier, as the report on Afghanistan was being finalized, House Republicans subpoenaed Secretary of State Antony Blinken, requesting his testimony on the Afghan withdrawal. So far, he has not responded to their demands. Instead, a State Department spokesperson said: “The secretary has testified before Congress on Afghanistan more than 14 times — more than any other Cabinet-level official. It is disappointing that, instead of continuing to engage with the department in good faith, the committee has issued yet another unnecessary subpoena.” Additionally, a White House spokesperson described the Republican report as “cherry-picked facts, inaccurate characterizations and preexisting biases.”

The timing of the report on Afghanistan holds significant weight in the 2024 election race, but it remains unclear if it will influence voters. The report aims to blame President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris for failing to maintain the pro-Washington government in Afghanistan. According to Texas Republican Rep. Michael McCaul, who chaired the investigation as a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, “at each step of the way, the administration picked optics over security.”

The report itself is a thorough attempt to uncover what happened in Afghanistan. It spans more than 350 pages and includes testimony from numerous senior military officers at the Pentagon. Seven lengthy public hearings were held and about 20,000 pages of State Department documents and correspondence were examined. Among the key sources was retired Col. Seth Krummrich, who was the chief of staff for the Special Operations Command Central. He noted: “I called their advance ‘the red blob.’ We tracked the Taliban advance daily, looking like a red blob gobbling up terrain.”

Additionally, the report made several good recommendations, such as emphasizing the need for future noncombatant evacuation operations to succeed and calling on Congress to establish standard operating procedures for such drawdowns. It also urged the State Department and Department of Defense to brief Congress on plans for noncombatant evacuation operations when an embassy has been designated a high-threat post.

However, such a policy option will likely not establish foreign policy consensus or national security reconciliation between Republicans and Democrats. The Biden administration and the Harris campaign have placed the blame on the Trump administration for the deal it signed with the Taliban in February 2020. On the other hand, the Trump campaign argues that Biden botched the Afghan deal and that his administration could have followed its schedule to ensure a safe American pullout from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was discussed in last week’s presidential debate between Trump and Harris, but without reference to the report. Trump attempted to use the strategic retreat from Afghanistan as an indication of joint Biden-Harris responsibility, emphasizing that the withdrawal left billions of dollars of equipment behind and that Harris played a direct role in the debacle, which embarrassed America on the world stage. Therefore, according to Trump, Harris is unfit to lead as commander-in-chief.

In conclusion, the Trump campaign succeeded in forcing a discussion about Afghanistan during a debate that was watched by 57 million people in the US. Most likely, there will be more debates about Afghanistan in the remaining weeks of the campaign. However, the ultimate arbitration on Afghanistan will come from Afghan Americans living in the US. They can make the best judgment on what transpired in their home country. When they voice their opinions on such a critical policy, it may encourage more Arab and Muslim Americans to speak up courageously about their concerns, frustrations, ambitions and hopes regarding America’s relationship with the Arab and Islamic worlds. This could represent a political victory for Arab and Muslim Americans.

Maria Maalouf is a Senior Media Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Sahra Wagenknecht Holds the Keys to Power in Germany

The Reichstag building in Berlin, seat of the German Bundestag

(This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in Wynia’s Week. Derk Jan Eppink: Sahra Wagenknecht heeft in Duitsland de sleutels tot de macht in handen)

For the first time since the departure of Angela Merkel, as the most prominent politician from eastern Germany, a new East German phenomenon is rising on the horizon of German politics: Sahra Wagenknecht (55). After resounding election results with her Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) in the state elections in Saxony and Thuringia, she is also a newcomer in the state of Brandenburg, where elections will be held on Sunday 22 September. Wagenknecht seems indispensable for forming a coalition, and next year there are federal elections for a new Bundestag. She is a rising star, but who is Sahra Wagenknecht?

A good opportunity to travel to Cottbus once again, to observe her during a rally in front of the ‘Stadthalle Cottbus’. In December 1989 I was in that town to make a report for NRC Handelsblad about the ‘hinterland’ of the GDR, then still unknown territory. Cottbus, in the southeast of Germany near the Polish border and with an old town that has since been quite nicely restored, still shows the remnants of GDR architecture. Being anything other than ‘East German’ is almost impossible here. And that is fertile soil for Sahra Wagenknecht’s campaign.

In front of the Stadthalle several hundred people have gathered to listen to the ‘phenomenon’. She appears precisely on time, überpünktlich, on the stage, which is shielded by an iron fence because in Erfurt she was recently attacked by a man who sprayed red paint over her. Security guards keep an eye on the audience, and directly behind the stage stand two cars: her official car and a black Mercedes with a flashing light. She can no longer go out on the street alone.

Wagenknecht, born in Jena, with an East German mother and a father – from the Persia of the Shah – who studied in West Berlin and above all demonstrated against the Peacock Throne in Tehran. He returned to Persia in the early 1970s – when Sahra was 3 years old – and was never heard from again.

Wagenknecht started out as a communist in the GDR and became a member of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), of all years in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. She turned into a convinced Marxist, wanted to preserve a ‘reformed GDR’ and was against the reunification of Germany. Anyone who now confronts her with this gets an answer such as she gave recently in the Tagesspiegel, that former chancellor Angela Merkel in the GDR ‘was once secretary of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ), responsible for agitation and propaganda. I assume there are nice quotations from that too, if you look for them’.

The turnaround in Wagenknecht began after her friendship with Oskar Lafontaine (80), whom she would marry in 2014. Lafontaine was an SPD politician, a former candidate to become chancellor and finance minister at the time of chancellor Gerhard Schröder. That combination led to an explosion and Lafontaine left the SPD.

He became a sort of father figure who maneuvered Wagenknecht toward the more practical insights of the social market economy. Her Marxist background can still be heard in her strictly ordered speeches; straight-lined as taught in the Parteischule. Rhetoric is her strong point, and a ‘practical joke’ does not feature in her repertoire. West German politicians are no match for her in debate; she dominates.

Wagenknecht’s winning formula is that BSW is left-wing on economic matters but right-wing on migration, and turns against woke, which she ridicules above all as a fashionable phenomenon of the German greens, the ‘oat milk and café latte politicians’. In Cottbus that goes down well.

Wagenknecht does mark a difference with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) through a businesslike use of language about migration. No tirades against foreigners. She links this theme to the consequences of excessive immigration for housing, education and healthcare. ‘The situation in education is deplorable; the majority of the children do not speak German when they start school’.

She also points to the housing shortage, while more and more asylum seekers are traveling to Germany. Germany is short of 700,000 homes, rents are rising, and East Germans in particular are getting squeezed. Conclusion: Germany cannot cope with this wave of immigration.

Wagenknecht draws loud applause as soon as she starts on the war in Ukraine. She calls the Russian invasion of Ukraine ‘a crime’, but believes that the arms deliveries must be ended immediately as soon as Putin agrees to a ceasefire along the current front line. ‘Then there must be negotiations about what should happen with those territories. The best thing is to ask the people in the Donbas and Crimea in a referendum under UN supervision which country they want to belong to.’

Wagenknecht draws a moral equivalence between Russia and the United States. The listeners go into ecstasy when she starts on that, because the ‘Westbindung’ that has characterized West Germany is entirely absent in East Germany. ‘How many countries has the US reduced to ashes, with millions dead; how many people has America killed with drone attacks?’ It goes down like sweet cake. In possible coalition negotiations in the states of Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg she wants to put the war in Ukraine on the table.

And the state governments must speak out against the stationing of new American long-range missiles in Germany. The red-green government in Berlin, and also the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU, shudder at the thought that East German states will pursue their own ‘Ostpolitik’. She characterizes the red-green federal government as ‘Moral Weltmeister’, which in the Netherlands is known as the wagging finger.

With 13 to 15 percent of the vote in East Germany, Wagenknecht is at the center of power. The CDU as well as the SPD and Greens categorically exclude the AfD. What is called a ‘cordon sanitaire’ in France and Belgium is, in Germany, in the tradition of building walls, called a ‘Brandmauer’. The AfD is too radicalized to be able to form part of a power structure. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) summed up the situation well: ‘Sie ist Partei, sie ist Machtfaktor’. Wagenknecht holds the key.

In Brandenburg the SPD has governed since 1990 and minister-president Dietmar Woidke has threatened voters with resignation if the AfD becomes larger than the SPD. History teaches that ‘me or chaos’ is a risky formula at a time of angry voters. In the polls the AfD is in first place. The greens are struggling around the 5% electoral threshold and the liberal FDP has been wiped off the map throughout East Germany, as has Die Linke, Wagenknecht’s former party. With the Brandmauer in Brandenburg, Wagenknecht gets the keys in her hands here too.

Petite histoire. At her birth in the GDR, Wagenknecht was registered as Sarah in the population register. She later wanted to change this to the Persian spelling of Sarah, Sahra, in honor of her father. The GDR authorities firmly refused. ‘Unlawful’. Upon her registration as a member of the Bundestag she made it Sahra, and that stuck. She is tenacious. Our eastern neighbors are going to have a lot more fun with Wagenknecht.

Derk Jan Eppink is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

HOW TO FIX PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

The Trump-Harris debate—with 67 million viewers, the most watched in 16 years—was a 3-on-1 travesty. Megyn Kelly’s take (4:34) on the moderators shows extreme moderator anti-Republican bias, so ingrained that drastic measures must be taken. There are preliminary indications that Trump may have picked up undecided voter support, but even if so, reform is urgently needed. There are fixes at hand, but getting the Democrats to agree requires that Trump wins the election, as they benefit from today’s bias.

Truly Neutral Rules: (1) candidates and their campaign staffs prepare questions for the opposing candidate(s); (2) each side decides which topics to raise; (3) questions are limited to 30 seconds, to prevent candidates from making speeches disguised as questions; (4) candidates fact-check each other; (5) moderators are time-keepers only, cutting off mics when each time segment expires; (6) keep the new practice of no in-studio audiences.

My views come primarily from my years of watching debates—until, after the first presidential debate in 2016, I soured on watching live contests.

At age 13, I watched the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates. One lesson learned was that appearances do matter: JFK was move-star handsome, well-dressed—he was told that light blue shirt and makeup would work well with he black-and-white TVs of the time—and exuded charisma and charm. Alas for Nixon, he was on the wrong side of all three; his post-shaving five-o’clock shadow showed up by lunchtime. Viewers gave JFK the edge, while radio listeners thought Nixon won.

There were no debates in 1964, 1968 and 1972. In 1968, a very close election, the outcome might have been different had the charismatic RFK, tragically assassinated and not saddled with Vietnam, been the Democratic candidate; RFK could well have swayed enough voters. Debates might have have had to include George Wallace, whose 10 million voters delivered five states and 46 electoral votes in the still solidly Democratic South. Epic landslides made debates irrelevant in 1964 and 1972.

Came 1976, and debates were revived. The GOP tickets introduced a new feature that factored in some debates: the catastrophic gaffe. In the vice-presidential debate, Senator Dole, a genuine war hero, crippled while trying to help a comrade, called the two world wars, plus the Korean and Vietnam conflicts “Democrat wars” (0:46)—adding that the total killed and wounded came to 1.6 million, equal to the population of Detroit. President Ford, in one of his debates with Jimmy Carter, said in response to stellar NY Times foreign correspondent Max Frankel, asking about Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, that their populations did not see themselves dominated by the Soviets; given a change to retract, Ford repeated his view. He was belatedly vindicated on November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell.

In 1980 the race was roughly dead even going into the final week. President Carter and Reagan met alone that might (Independent John Anderson had participated in the first debate, a month earlier). That night, Reagan closed by asking voters: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” He cited Carter’s stagflation economy, and serial retreat abroad, The race margin held through the workweek, but over Saturday, Sunday and Monday, the numbers tipped decisively to Reagan, who won on the issues foremost in voters’ minds.

In 1984, Reagan won in a monster landslide. His debate with Carter’s former vice-president, Walter Mondale, decided little. Reagan had faded at the end of the first debate. This led a journalist to ask Reagan, who was to turn 73 shortly after Inauguration Day 1985, if his age should be an issue.

Reagan answered (0:45), looking at Mondale, then 56, that he promised not to use his opponent’s “youth and inexperience” against him. The audience roared, and Mondale, always a good sport, laughed.

In 1988, Bush handily defeated a weak Democrat, former Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. The year’s noteworthy debate moment came when vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen, who had served in the Congress Senate with JFK, pounced (0:49) on Dan Quayle’s citing having had as much experience in Congress as did JFK when he ran for president. To which Bentsen delivered a zinger: “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. And senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy!” The audience, packed with Democrats, erupted.

In the next five quadrennial debates, only one produced a truly noteworthy moment. The 1992 debates produced no fireworks, and were a veritable three-ring circus. In 1996, 2004, and 2008, ditto. But 2000 produced one extraordinary episode, that may well have cost then-vice president Al Gore the White House, given the razor-thin final margin. (Officially, Bush 43 won Florida, and the Electoral College majority, by only 537 votes in a protracted recount.) In one of the debates, Gore wandered over to Bush, physically invading his personal space (0:17) on stage, a major breach of debate etiquette.

In 2012 there was a new element introduced: moderator fact-checking. CNN moderator Candy Crowley fact-checked Mitt Romney on what Obama said about the murder by Arab terrorists of three special ops defenders guarding our consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where then-U.S. ambassador, J. Christopher Stephens, also perished. Crowley fact-check was, alas, not fully factual. In the event,Obama was handily re-elected.

In 2016, I watched the first debate only, and was disgusted as the moderator, NBC’s Lester Holt, interceded on Hillary’s behalf after her dismal showing in the first thirty minutes. That did it for me and suffering through debates, praying that my preferred candidate wouldn’t make a fatal gaffe. In 2020, it is generally conceded that Trump’s constant interrupting of Joe Biden cost him the win. Lest Trump do better a second time, the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) used Trump’s recent recovery from Covid as an excuse to deny him a second debate. As if the candidates could not have been in separate booths, socially distant. The GOP co-chair of the CPD called (4:01) the performance of the ABC moderators the worst he’d ever seen in the 33 debates he’d run as CPD co-chair, from 1988 through 2020. (In 2024, Biden rejected CPD debate sponsorship.)

True, no amount of reform can nullify advantages of looks, charm, charisma. And sheer luck can play a role. But lots can—and should—be done to minimize bias and caprice. The voters—for whose benefit political debates are presumably aired—deserve maximum transparency.

Bottom Line. An earlier generation of moderators tried to be fair: Their biases—impossible for anyone to completely eliminate—never decided a debate. Today’s generation of pseudo-journalists that moderate political debates are overwhelmingly—about 90 percent—ardently pro-Democrat. Reforming debate rules would enable voters to better appraise candidates.

John C. Wohlstetter is the author of Presidential Succession: Constitution, Congress and National Security (Gold Institute Press, 2024)

We must end the Russia-Ukraine war

A damaged building in Kyiv, Ukraine with the Ukrainian flag

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: We must end the Russia-Ukraine war)

Presidential candidate Kamala Harris repeatedly promises “unwavering” support for U.S. aid to Ukraine against what she calls Russia’s “unprovoked war ” of aggression. But in a recent interview , her presidential opponent, former President Donald Trump, made a statement about the Russia- Ukraine war that the mainstream media would not report: “Biden was saying all the wrong things … one … was … ‘ Ukraine will go into NATO’ … (and) I said, this guy’s going to start a war.”

Trump was right – although the popular narrative is that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unlawful invasion into Ukraine was “unprovoked” this is not technically or historically true. The fault for the invasion is Putin’s alone, but the Biden-Harris administration and NATO bear some responsibility for its provocation.

Understanding this can guide U.S. policy makers in bringing a quick end to a costly conflict – ultimately cooling tensions currently fanning the flames of nuclear war.

For context, consider the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 , when U.S. security policy established the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ sphere of interest and rejected the influence of other global powers. This included the Cuban missile crisis, when the Soviet Union built missile-launching sites in Cuba. The doctrine states: “We … declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

In 1990, with U.S. victory in the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, diplomatic gestures and political assurances by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (and other Western leaders) created the impression that NATO would not expand east — in exchange for Russian support of German reunification.

But, eastward expansion is exactly what NATO did, creeping ever closer to Russian borders.

Though no formal, legal guarantee was given to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents, informal assurances, were “repeatedly” given then and again later , that NATO would move (in Baker’s words), “not one inch eastward.” More importantly, the documents show this is what the Soviet Union was “led to believe.” Although these assertions are hotly debated, a significant number of scholars, experts and practitioners agree .

Subsequent events point to Russia wanting cooperation and peace in exchange for security. For example, in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, Russia guaranteed a free and independent state to Ukraine , along with the U.S. and United Kingdom, if Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

But in 1999, Western allies began turning former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO members, extending farther east –to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States – all while Soviet leaders protested that the U.S. was in violation of a non-expansion arrangement. In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, U.S. National Security Advisor under former President Jimmy Carter and a fierce anti-Communist, even offered a detailed argument and timeline for NATO expansion, including Ukraine .

Almost a decade later, in 2008, President George W. Bush was told by advisors that Ukraine in NATO was considered a military threat and “redline” for the entire political class of Russia. International affairs expert Jeffrey Sachs explains , “It is exactly as if Mexico said, ‘We think it would be great to have Chinese military bases on the Rio Grande. We can’t see why the U.S. would have any problem with that.’” But today, Biden-Harris and allies assert that Ukraine will become a NATO member. NATO has, in fact, added sixteen (16) new members since 1990.

George Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and author of U.S. policy for Soviet containment, gave a warning in 1997 that should have given today’s policymakers insight into the Russian psyche and response: “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era … ”

Even in November 2021, at the brink of the Russian invasion, Putin told his foreign ministry to push for guarantees about Ukraine’s neutrality. Other concerns were the West’s supply of modern lethal weaponry to Ukraine, NATO military infrastruture and maneuvers close to Russian borders, and the presence of U.S. anti-missile defense systems in Romania and Poland. Putin asked for “legal guarantees” regarding neutrality because Western “verbal commitments” had not been kept.

In December 2021, as Biden protested Russia’s build up of military forces on Ukraine borders, Putin continued to demand legal guarantees.

Could Russian expansion, first into Crimea (2014) and then into four Ukraine provinces (2022), be considered (from the Russian point of view) self-defense?

Putin also saw opportunity in the destabilization of the Crimean government (which favored Ukraine’s neutrality) during the Obama adminsistration, and in a weak U.S. administration under Biden-Harris, invading Ukraine almost immediately after the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal.

Today, Putin continues to ask for security guarantees regarding Ukraine’s neutrality.

Recognizing that NATO expansion provoked Putin’s (destructive) attempt to reestablish a zone along Russia’s western border should make it clear that sending U.S. weapons to Ukraine will not end the war, only escalate it . Moreover, Ukraine, full of government corruption and dependent on Western resources, is not NATO-ready.

Tragically, the false narrative that Putin wants “uncontrolled expansion to the west” has trapped NATO into a war that grinds on without end, sacrificing some 500,000 lives, weakening Europe, plunging the U.S. farther into debt, and driving Russia toward China, both of whom benefited from supposedly punitive U.S. sanctions.

Lasting peace can only come through U.S.-initiated negotiations, based on guarantees of Ukraine neutrality and non-expansion of NATO. Geographical concessions to Russia are likely while Ukraine gains back monetary concessions for the loss of territory, critical infrastructure, and life.

An estimated over 34,000 Ukrainian civilians and 200,000 Ukrainian forces have become casualities of this war. War is expected to continue to grind on, without a decisive victory. How much longer until commonsense diplomacy and peace prevail?

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Economic policies may offer gains for US presidential rivals

US twenty dollar bills spread out

(This article was written by Maria Maalouf and appeared in Arab News. Economic policies may offer gains for US presidential rivals)

Donald Trump and Kamala Harris are both advancing populist economic messages aimed at the American electorate. Populism, by definition, involves the promotion of political ideas that resonate with the general populace, often setting them in opposition to a perceived elite.

This economic rhetoric primarily targets low-income voters, who made up 35 percent of the total 168 million eligible voters in the 2020 presidential election. In the upcoming Nov. 5 election, campaign experts estimate that low-income voters could constitute up to 7 percent of the undecided electorate — a segment that could prove decisive. Among them are blue-collar workers in industrial states like Pennsylvania, where job declines have had a significant impact.

The economic themes of this election cycle diverge from those of previous campaigns, which largely centered on middle-class benefits. The current discourse has shifted leftward, focusing on addressing the economic needs of a demographic that may determine the election’s outcome.

Two prominent examples of this populist economic messaging are Trump’s proposal to eliminate taxes on tips and Harris’ commitment to subsidized housing and a federal ban on price gouging for food. Harris has recently shifted her position to align with Trump’s no-tax-on-tips policy. Trump, in turn, accused Harris of idea theft, labeling her a “copycat” and a “flip-flopper,” asserting on his social media platform, Truth Social, that “this was a TRUMP idea — she has no ideas, she can only steal from me.”

Harris has been criticized for a lack of detail in her economic policies, leading The Economist to describe her platform as offering “only the vaguest of policy proposals.” Conversely, Trump’s tax suggestion is likely to have a more substantial impact on the economic direction of the next administration than Harris’ initiatives.

Harris’ proposed economic models, such as capping grocery prices, face significant challenges. Many states and cities already have laws against food price increases. Moreover, the implementation of federally subsidized housing is complex, as it involves the interplay of local government regulations, zoning laws and building codes. States in the US often employ the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to provide tax credits aiding rent payments, relying on local funding to support affordable housing. Even if Harris now supports Trump’s no-tax-on-tips proposal, her interpretation and implementation could differ, potentially introducing new tax categories.

Trump is vigorously promoting his policy as common sense, claiming that it was inspired not by economic theory but by a conversation with a restaurant owner who lamented the high taxes on tips. Early assessments indicate that this policy, if enacted, could significantly alter the federal budget. According to one association’s report: “While servers aren’t the only tipped workers, the restaurant industry is the second-largest private sector employer in America, employing roughly 15 million people … Restaurants are also the No. 1 employer of single mothers, Americans without college degrees and the recently incarcerated. The tips generated by these positions are critical to the financial health of these often-forgotten groups.”

The potential consequences include reduced tax revenues, an increased budget deficit and the possibility of tax evasion. The policy might also bolster the cash economy, although the prevalence of credit transactions, such as tips paid by Visa, could mitigate this. Congressional approval is necessary for the policy to become law, which could either complicate or simplify the enforcement of minimum wage laws across states. The labor market might also shift, with workers gravitating toward sectors benefiting from the no-tax-on-tips policy. However, no comprehensive study has yet evaluated the policy’s full implications.

The Los Angeles Times observes similarities in the economic plans of Trump and Harris, suggesting that the latter’s version of the no-tax-on-tips plan could mirror Trump’s. If both candidates agree on the need to support economically disadvantaged Americans, it could signal the potential for bipartisan solutions to the nation’s economic challenges. However, the current divisive campaign rhetoric suggests that reconciliation remains unlikely.

Maria Maalouf is a Senior Media Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

No Respect from the Enemy

German police vehicles and officers on a city street

(This article was written by Hermann Tertsch and appeared in El Debate. Sin respeto del enemigo)

The Islamic State has announced new attacks following the one in Solingen in Germany, which cost three dead and seven wounded in a knife attack by an illegal Syrian immigrant who was under a deportation order. In a communiqué it calls on all Muslims to murder Europeans in revenge for the war in Gaza. The Islamic State wants to profit from the climate of hatred toward Israel and the West that has broken out among Muslims residing in Europe, massively supported by the left and by some European governments, as a result of Israel’s war against Hamas. This has happened before: that the Islamic State strives not to be eclipsed by Hamas or other jihadist groups.

What is indeed novel, according to German experts on jihadism, is that the communiqué, in its pages titled “Jihad in Europe,” not only displays the usual ferocious hatred but openly mocks Germany, its government and the West in general. The murderers are laughing at us. And they expound at length in their mockery of the German government’s anti-terrorist measures after this attack, which has shaken Germany like few others. And which has laid absolutely bare that the German security forces have lost control over an Islamist population that arrived in waves ever since Chancellor Angela Merkel opened the border in September 2015. Germany will one day have a government that declares Merkel one of the beings who has done the most harm to the nation and to all of Europe, surpassed only by the great Nazi and communist murderers of the 20th century. In any case, Germany then received the coup de grâce to its internal security and to its social cohesion, the two immense achievements that had brought peace and immense prosperity after 1945.

The mockery of the jihadist enemy sounds very much like the mockery of the murderer Nicolás Maduro these days, who laughs at everyone because he knows that he kills and knows how to kill and is willing to do so, and for that reason he has the upper hand over all those who, from within the democracies, are not going to do anything to him. Maduro counts on an army of accomplices among those who rule in the countries that supposedly defend those who win elections against those who lose them and torture and murder to remain in power. The jihadists too count on their accomplices: the volunteers who are aware of the interests of Iran or Qatar or so many others, and the involuntary ones, who are all those Westerners who do not understand that they are facing people who want to exterminate them.

The Islamic State communiqué openly laughs at its enemy, to whom it denies all respect and in whose fear and confusion it demonstrably delights. It alludes to the ban on carrying knives in Germany, which has been proposed after the recent attacks, and suggests to its followers that they can also use “hammers and birthday cakes.” The novelty of the communiqué lies in this mockery, which is a sort of coming out of the closet from restrained mockery into the lewd laughter of humiliation. With the following message: “We laugh at you because we are going to beat you, because we believe and you do not, because we defend what is ours and want to impose it and you no longer even know what is yours.” It should surprise no one. It marks a grave trend that has been developing for decades but is now widespread. The radicalized Muslim communities in Europe have always cultivated hatred and contempt for the decadence and immorality of their Western hosts.

But not open mockery. As the German singer and songwriter Heinz Rudolf Kunze said years ago in a song called Willkommen Ihr Mörder (Welcome, Murderers): “When they are among themselves they laugh a lot at us,” at us Westerners who are so tolerant that we do not defend what is ours. At the weak Westerners who let them take from us, little by little, everything: from space in medical consultations, to aid with the taxpayer’s money for those who never contribute anything and who spread a parasitic culture of good conscience because it weakens the enemy, to the granting of housing and even the streets they occupy to pray without anyone daring to dispute their occupation of public space.

In the communiqué they now openly laugh at the impotence of the German government to halt these attacks and say that if the authorities are going to set about measuring the length of blades, some people can resort to a birthday cake — with explosives inside, of course — or to some good hammers, which also kill. All of this reflects the untenable situation that has been created by Western governments that try to confront jihadist terrorism as if it were a Western criminal phenomenon. And on top of that they attack those who do know how to deal with these forces of criminal fanatical delirium because they know them from within — see the Israeli security forces.

Western civilization is beginning to enter its death throes in a lack of self-respect that has already crystallized into the general contempt of its worst enemies. Those who are incapable of defending their own people and what is theirs have no excuse. But on top of that they receive the deserved contempt of their enemies. To those of us who still believe there is a remedy, however hard and traumatic and perhaps by now very dramatic, I leave the phrase of Ramiro de Maeztu: “To be is to defend oneself.” If we want to go on being, let us defend ourselves from the enemies and the traitors alike.

Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Escalation in Ukraine could lead to a nuclear conflict

A military rocket launcher displayed outdoors

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: Escalation in Ukraine could lead to a nuclear conflict)

Since Russia’s unlawful invasion into Ukraine, the Biden-Harris administration has shirked diplomacy in favor of policies that increasingly guarantee escalation of the war. Now Ukrainian soldiers claim about 480 square miles in Russia’s Kursk region with U.S. and NATO armored vehicles and weapons – killing and injuring Russian civilians.

This should concern Americans. But the Biden-Harris administration has no objections, only justification . Moscow believes the U.S. not only created the conditions for the incursion, but also helped plan it .

“The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians ,” Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk. Imagine the jarring psychological impact on Russian citizens watching German-built tanks roll in – reminiscent of World War II.

Despite what D.C. hawks claim, Putin has repeatedly communicated, before and during the war, that NATO enlargement to Ukraine initiated his invasion , not Russian expansionism into Central Europe. However, the tragic irony is that although Russian expansion is not likely, a broader and nuclear war could be.

The U.S. has become a de facto combatant in the Russia-Ukraine war; we are no longer neutral bystanders. But hardly anyone seems to notice our insidious walk-up to triggering a broader war or nuclear strike.

President Joe Biden continually insisted (“Okay? Let’s get it straight here, guys”) that the U.S. must limit the type of weapons we send to Ukraine, and the ways the weapons could be used against Russia, to avoid a direct NATO conflict with Russia and prevent, in his words, “World War III.”

But the Biden-Harris administration has continuously changed policy to supply Ukraine with increasingly more weapons, with more sophisticated and advanced capability and more lethality . U.S. policy previously held that U.S. weapons could only be used to attack Russians within Ukraine, but our weapons are now increasingly being used within Russian territory .

Russia has warned that the U.S. would “cross a red line” as a “direct party to the conflict” if it supplied longer-range missiles to Kyiv.

But in April 2024, in a major policy shift, the Biden administration secretly shipped a longer-range version of ATACMS to Ukraine with a range of about 190 miles and capability to strike deep into Russian territory. Ukraine used these to target a Russian military airfield in Crimea and troops in the southeast of Ukraine. However, the condition that U.S. missiles could not be used to attack inside Russia still holds.

But for how long? Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to push the U.S. to lift restrictions, demanding to strike Russian targets as far as 300 miles into Russian territory.

And, in May 2024, the Biden-Harris administration did another major “about face,” allowing Ukraine to use U.S. artillery and “fire short-range rockets from HIMARS launchers” to conduct “limited” strikes against military targets inside Russian territory. NATO powers –Germany and others, including France – are following suit.

This is the first time a U.S. president has allowed strikes within borders of a nuclear-armed adversary, despite Putin’s warning that this could provoke retaliation and war . Biden’s White House gaslights the American people, characterizing the strikes as “acts of self-defense.”

In June 2024, Russia expanded tactical nuclear weapons drills to a military district bordering Baltic NATO member states plus Norway, Poland, and Finland. Coincidence? Of course not.

This summer the first fighter jets – the U.S.-made F-16 – also arrived in Ukraine and started operations against Russia, despite Biden’s previous assurances (“ don’t kid yourself ”) that sending offensive weapons like F-16s or tanks would, again , start “World War III.” The U.S. has also sent M1Abrams tanks.

How far will we go? Humiliating and provoking a Great Power with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, run by an authoritarian government, is not smart. We cannot predict what Russia may do if we continue in this way. Knowing and understanding the “red line” of an adversary isn’t weakness, it’s wisdom.

Escalation to nuclear combat could come at the U.S. in unanticipated ways. Putin, angered and embarrassed by the strikes and incursion into Russia, could decide to use a radiological or tactical nuclear weapon, on his own evacuated terrain in Kursk. Employment of such an “area denial weapon” would severely restrict any efforts to traverse or occupy the terrain and create a buffer, plus send an extremely powerful and unmistakable message to Zelenskyy, Biden and NATO.

Recent headlines that Ukraine is “turning the tables” on Russia are deceptive. As Ukraine moves further into Russian territory, Russia makes equal gains in the east of Ukraine, capturing the city of Serhivvka and advancing ever closer to a vital logistics hub. Since February 2022, Russian troops have claimed more than 18% of Ukraine , resulting in “horrific casualties” for Ukrainians. War is expected to grind on, without a decisive victory.

How far then, will we go? The further we escalate, the more desperate all leaders will act. Once broader or nuclear war starts, it will be too late to “un-ring the bell.”

Yet, no Western leader save Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has given serious discussion, thought, or action to the negotiation of peace. In fact, Orbán visited Zelenskyy to discuss peace, but was visciously ridiculed for also visiting Putin to do the same. Why?

Why is Western diplomacy dormant in detering the ongoing devastation of Ukraine, and a potential walk up to world-wide war?

It is incumbent upon the United States to stop the escalation of weapons and warfare, and bring about immediate ceasefire and peace negotiations, based on Ukrainian neutrality and Russian reparations. Only wise U.S. leadership can bring peace and stop a potentially bigger and more devastating war.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.