Toshio Masuda predicts the Nikkei average will reach 100,000 yen and that a golden age for the Japanese economy is coming, in the September 30, 2026 edition of his Free Internet Seminar.
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County math trumps polling every time, and the math ain’t mathin’
In the early stages of the 2024 election cycle, I created a series of pessimistic forecasts for the seven decisive states. I made them to simulate a repeat of the 2020 election, complete with its suburban swings, urban booms (yes, almost everyone knows exactly where that came from), and with the Democrat nominee somehow running ludicrously high ballot counts in rural or “Trump central” mid-sized counties.
I contrasted those concessions with a registration analysis, which turned out to be too bullish in every state but Nevada (and almost right on the money in Arizona), and when blending the two disciplines – produced seven perfect calls, with none of my margins missing by more than two points. Yes, I was more accurate than the most accurate pollsters while completely crapping all over polling. For some reason, the New York Times is no longer interested in interviewing me.
That was then, this is now. Texas is at risk, they’re telling me in the polls. What can we discern about the Lone Star State using a pessimistic model? Lots has changed since Beto O’Rourke gave Ted Cruz all he wanted in the 2018 Senate race in the middle of a suburban reorganization and lingering Trump-Cruz factional drama. Namely, this:
Not just in South Texas, but all over. From the Trans-Pecos region, to the Llano Estacado, to the cities with working-class Hispanics, and everywhere in between. Ken Paxton isn’t defending a Trump +9.0% state full of Bushies who held their nose in 2016. He’s defending a Trump +13.7% that, if we let it stick, crushes the Democrats’ dreams for the future Texas:
How Trump Saved Texas, In One Stunning Image
I could go on and on, but the purpose of this post is to show you my pessimistic math that demonstrates exactly why I think Paxton should win against James Talarico, and additionally, why Talarico is demanding to debate the Texas Attorney General despite polling looking like something out of a dystopian novel.
In the past 10 days, Talarico’s polling average is +3.5%. There is a vast field of difference between a +6 poll (roughly 600,000 margin this year, which is impossible for a Democrat), and a +1-2 poll complete with standard polling problems like response bias, Cornyn-Paxton factional feuding, and straight up incompetence.
But what do the data say?
We need to go back to the 2016-18 timeframe to understand modern Texas. Trump got smoked in the overwhelmingly Hispanic counties of South Texas his first time around, and wore big losing margins in the major metros. No one had seen a Democrat presidential margin in Harris County as large as Clinton’s +12.3% since the old “Solid South” days (1964 and LBJ, to be exact). Still, despite Ted Cruz losing 6.4% of Trump’s 2016 margin in holding off O’Rourke, these counties shifted Republican from the 2016 presidential election to the 2018 Senate election in favor of Cruz:
107 in all, and overwhelmingly Hispanic. 52 counties shifting toward O’Rourke did so by less than 2 points, with many doing so thanks to turnout differentials in midterms or just plain old statistical noise in small counties. O’Rourke’s narrow loss, the closest race in Texas since 1998, was propelled by these shifts:
And finally…
The shifts in Texas from 2018 to 2026 define why Paxton should be expected to win his race for the U.S. Senate.
The model I’m describing today has to determine two things – turnout and margin.
For turnout:
I calculate turnout coefficients as percentage of the previous presidential vote. In Travis County (Austin), there were 468,720 total votes for President and 484,204 for “Betomania” in 2018 (the U.S. Senate race). That means Travis produced 103.3% of its 2016 presidential vote total. In these 15 counties, I have set turnout equal to the 2018 share as described above to give Talarico a strength of turnout he may not have:
Because of the fear of Texas turning blue, “red Texas” turned out in huge numbers, with many counties exceeding 90% of their 2016 presidential vote count. To ensure I don’t overestimate Paxton’s support, in practically every county not shaded in blue, I have averaged the 2018 and 2022 turnout coefficients. For example, using Lamar County (Trump +60.9% on 21,285 total votes), 88.5% of presidential vote in the 2016/18 cycles and 71.6% in the 2020/22 cycles (with no threat of a Democrat winning Texas in 2022) comes out to turnout estimate for this cycle of 80.0% of the 2024 presidential vote.
For margin:
In the blue-shaded counties mapped above, I have given Talarico margins five points stronger than O’Rourke’s in 2018. For instance, O’Rourke won Travis County by 49.67% in 2018. For 2026, I’m letting Talarico take it by 54.67%. That wouldn’t surprise me, but him getting five point margin gains over O’Rourke in all of the counties above would shock me. For Brazoria County, thanks to a Cruz lag in 2024, I’ve given Talarico a margin ten points stronger than Beto’s.
In most of the Trump-won counties, I’m deducting five points from Trump’s 2024 margins. Where he has won Hardin County by 75.8%, now it’s going to be Paxton +70.8%, with the turnout averaged as described above. This undercuts Paxton’s likely margins while amplifying Talarico’s urban and suburban performance potential. In counties in which Cruz lagged behind Trump by a lot, I’ve spotted Paxton’s margin right at Cruz’s from 2024, instead of adjusting off Trump’s.
In the following “Trump special” counties, the overwhelmingly Latino counties, I’ve set Paxton’s margin at Trump’s 2020 presidential margin, which revealed the heavy trend in South Texas and beyond:
Whereas Trump won Cameron County by 5.8% (and Cruz lost by 4.3%), I’m setting Paxton’s margin there back to the 2020 presidential margin, which was Biden +13.1%. Based on the Latino counties shifting for Cruz in 2018, I’m not confident Paxton will lose Cameron County by 13.1%, if he loses it at all. Latino-specific polling is usually wildly wrong, and in some of the ridiculous Talarico polls out there, Paxton is hovering around 40% Latino support anyway.
One county that is going to absolutely kill Talarico is El Paso. Trump lost it by just 15.1% in 2024, after having dropped it to Biden by 35.1%. I’m giving Talarico the margin of 35.1%, which is extremely high and probably not going to happen. Beto O’Rourke blew out his home county by 49.4% over Cruz, taking the margin to +100,545, when it had been just +92,328 in a presidential election two years earlier. Talarico taking 35.1% margin at an average turnout gives him a margin of +68,969, or 31,576 short of Betomania 2018.
He will have to make those up somewhere else to get over the top. Since 2018, the minor red counties people don’t know how to spot on a map – the Woods, Fannins, Wises, Graysons, Rockwalls, and Chamberses of Texas – have grown in population and maintained their ridiculous margins – often over 65% in decent-sized counties. I have these estimates – already short-shotted for Paxton by my model – for ballots gained over 2018 margin:
This list goes on and on.
Affording Talarico’s turnout model and margin gains, here is what he stands to gain in the big four over Beto’s raw 2018 margins:
He also makes huge gains in the other key counties I’ve identified above…and is even allowed to flip Collin County and come close in Denton…
Just so he can lose in this model to Ken Paxton by 14,035 votes.
I did not set out in creating this model to make a virtual tie. That is just how it came out with me affording Talarico five point or better gains across the board in all but the “Trump special” Latino counties specified above, with turnout depressed in red counties and pumping at 2018 rates in counties Talarico will need to win.
Now imagine if the red counties don’t lag in margin by five points across the board, and turnout climbs to match 2018 intensity, or even higher now that everyone is warning of the impending doom of a blue Texas. Imagine if most of Trump’s Latino gains do actually stick like they did in 2018.
If the reds turn out and Latinos don’t abandon Trump, Paxton will win this race in the mid-single digits, or better.
PSYCHOLOGY
Talarico isn’t up by 5 or 6 points, despite the two polls in the last week giving us exactly those numbers. I am forecasting 10.251 million votes in the pessimistic model. Therefore, every percentage point of margin is equal to almost exactly 100,000 votes. In order for a Democrat to win Texas by 5 points, a half-million votes, millions of red voters would have to stay home.
If Talarico were up by 5 (or 6) points, he wouldn’t dare ask for a debate. He would be benefitting from a once-in-a-generation electoral fluke and would let sleeping dogs lie.
If he were up by 1 or 2 points, debating Paxton risks exposing his (Talarico’s) ludicrous left-wing positions (anti-Christian, anti-oil, anti-gun, anti-meat, etc.) and forcing Texas Republicans to set aside the Cornyn-Paxton animosity and vote the party line.
You only demand debates in a race like this if your math looks exactly like mine. Flipping a Trump +14 state that just underwent a major Latino realignment is a much taller task than O’Rourke trying to flip a Trump +9 state with suburban slippage.
CONCLUSION
Every football team that steps onto a field has a chance to win. Sometimes that chance goes away after the first drive. Talarico’s pathway requires him to blow past O’Rourke’s margins in the key counties, benefit from 2014 (or worse) turnout in the red counties, and revert the Latino vote back to 2016-18 levels.
The demand for debates is the absolute tell that Talarico himself doesn’t believe the polling.
If Texas Republicans vote, Ken Paxton will be the next Senator from Texas.
Seth Keshel, MBA is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.
Toshio Masuda argues that the U.S. midterm elections lay bare President Trump’s ill intentions, in the September 29, 2026 edition of his Free Internet Seminar.
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In brief
On The Capitol Show, Maria Maalouf speaks with Captain Douglas Shukwu about his presidential ambitions, his criticism of Nigeria’s leadership and his vision for national renewal.
From the programme’s own description: Shukwu discusses protecting Christians and Muslims from terrorism, restoring young Nigerians’ confidence in their country, creating jobs and strengthening partnerships with the United States.
This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in WNL. Duits crimineel-links feestje is waarschuwing voor Nederland.
Alongside justified concerns about the rise of the AfD, the radical-left parties in Germany also deserve critical attention. Remarkable support from Berlin’s crime clans should worry us too.
The Netherlands has more self-appointed Gaza experts than Germany experts, but it is high time we looked more carefully across our eastern border. Germany is in its greatest political transition since reunification in 1990, albeit in the wrong direction. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is polling as the largest party in all of Germany.
The capital, Berlin, has meanwhile degenerated into a hotbed of antisemitism, the worst since the Second World War. Amsterdam’s mayor Halsema would do better to look at Berlin than to sit down amiably with New York mayor Mamdani, who is not free of antisemitism.
When the AfD emerged as the largest party in the German state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, political Berlin reacted with resignation. It was only East Germany. The AfD seemed like the big bad wolf in a sparsely populated area full of ‘Ossis’. The big surprise, however, came from Berlin, where Die Linke, legal successor to the former East German ruling party SED, became the largest. Led by lead candidate Elif Eralp, Die Linke won 25.7 percent of the vote; the Christian Democratic CDU stalled at 18.8 percent.
The heirs of the GDR could have celebrated a cheerful victory party, had it not been for some mysterious guests who turned up to celebrate with them: the bosses of Arab crime syndicates in Berlin. There was Issa Remmo, leader of the Remmo clan, notorious for drug trafficking, extortion, protection money and money laundering. Method: brute violence. The center of this underworld is the district of Neukölln. In his wake came other gang leaders to celebrate the victory. The leadership of Die Linke did not know what to do with these unexpected gang leaders.
With its 3.9 million inhabitants, Berlin records more criminal offenses than all of Poland, with a population of 37.6 million citizens. After the fall of the Wall in 1989, many expected Berlin to become a shining star in Europe. At first it looked that way, but the city became a magnet for criminals. Crime clans from the Middle East, from Syria and Lebanon, found their way to West Berlin. In the mid-1970s, gang members traveled from Lebanon, ravaged by civil war, to the GDR and then via East Berlin to West Berlin. From there, crime syndicates grew to unmanageable proportions.
Die Linke and the clan leaders were soon on the same political wavelength. Political telepathy. According to Die Linke, the tough approach to the Arab clans was ‘racist’. That was music to the ears of the clan leaders. In Die Linke’s analysis, Berlin’s policing is ‘too harsh’. Hence: ‘less police’ resulting in ‘less crime’. Applause from the gang leaders guaranteed. Fighting clan formation was, according to Die Linke, ‘Islamophobic’. Once again, happy gang leaders.
Then the legal successor of the GDR stepped it up a notch. Israel was the source of all evil in the Middle East and ‘antisemitism’ became a weapon of political propaganda. The Arab clan world could not have put it better. That is what Die Linke propagated, and it ensured that 51% of the Muslim vote went to that party. Jewish citizens in Berlin became a target; the ‘Nie Wieder’ faded. The Berlin bourgeoisie was frightened by Die Linke’s communist demand: the expropriation of home ownership. Economic philosophy: if the rich are expropriated, the poor can live better!
This trend of antisemitism exists in Amsterdam too. Jewish citizens have to be careful in public. Criticism of Israel, which has been fighting for its survival in the Middle East since its founding in 1948, is recycled by the political left in European cities into antisemitism. With ‘students’ smashing everything in the front line and fearful administrators who think they are calming things down but make everything worse. It is a slippery slope toward times that seemed to be behind us.
Should PRO ever organize another Gaza event in Amsterdam: keep an eye on the visitors. You never know who might walk in.
This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in Wynia’s Week. De asielkwestie zal de bloedgroepenstrijd in de Europese PRO-fractie verhevigen.
Social democracy is a conviction; Green is a religion. The merger ran into rejection symptoms because the first is willing to compromise, while for the second Green dogma prevails. It was not surprising that the merger of the PvdA and GroenLinks delegations in the European Parliament became the last piece of the puzzle.
Should PRO join the group of the European socialists or the European Greens? Party members chose the socialist group in a referendum, which does not mean the Greens will give up their faith. The struggle continues in the joint ‘PRO delegation meeting’. The factional debate has been parked for now, but it will return when the lists are drawn up for the 2029 European elections. Who will be lead candidate?
Heresy
A party committee led by party grandee Mariëtte Hamer came out in favor of joining the Party of European Socialists (PES), the second-largest group in the European Parliament. In her view the ‘power element’ must prevail, but according to convinced Greens there is only one faith. And share a pillow with that, and the devil sleeps between you.
For a sectarian club, compromise is heresy. The PES is used to compromises, for example with the (German) Christian Democrats. Greens think fundamentally differently about asylum, and that will remain a major theme in the next European elections. This puts enormous pressure on the PRO delegation within the socialist group, half of which consists of Greens. Will, for example, the ultra-Green Tineke Strik, who came up through the Dutch Council for Refugees, support a stricter asylum policy? Highly unlikely. For Greens, compromise is synonymous with betrayal.
The ‘power-building’ argument is also relative. Political developments in the EU are heading to the right. Look at developments in Germany, France, Spain: as soon as there are elections, the voters strike. Italy under Giorgia Meloni is currently more stable than Germany under Chancellor Merz. And France is charging into the jungle.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wants to bring forward the decision on the EU’s multiannual budget because voters in many member states are turning right. As a result, new, more right-wing governments in Northern Europe are resisting the European mega-budget of 2,000 billion euros. Combined with excessive immigration and economic stagnation (due to climate and energy policy), Brussels will become even more of a whipping boy than it is now.
#MeToo
The harsh internal, almost sectarian, party culture of the Greens proved not conducive to smooth relations in the European Parliament, as Green delegation leader Bas Eickhout (49) found out. He was ‘co-chair’ of the Green group in the European Parliament and had a relationship with the 25-year-old Austrian member Lena Schilling. She was also a member of parliament, not a subordinate, and there was mutual consent. The relationship fell within ‘Green norms’.
A former chairman of the Green group, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, was once a prominent Franco-German charmer who saw his Green group, including staff, as an amorous field of work. Cohn-Bendit was adored. He was lucky, because there was no #MeToo yet. There is now, and it was used above all as a weapon against ‘the right’, preferably ‘white men’. But such men turned out to exist in left-wing circles too; in the arts, academia and politics.
Eickhout had rotten luck with his ‘co-chair’, the German Green Terry Reintke. Her main mission was the fight against ‘sexual harassment’ and her hashtag: ‘#MeToo’. Reintke waged a crusade and would certainly show ‘keine Gnade’ to Eickhout, popular with women, who cut his losses and resigned. He will undoubtedly find a new job at an NGO in Brussels, ‘to continue the struggle’. And Reintke has the Green realm to herself. Internally, the Greens are even worse than the Vatican.
Eastern Bloc methods
Much of this kind of thing, however, goes unseen in Brussels. The Dutch House of Representatives, with 150 members, has 260 accredited journalists. They knock everyone over in the corridors. At the European Union, of which the European Parliament is only a part, 21 Dutch correspondents are accredited. An MEP is glad when a correspondent calls at all.
It was to be expected that the merger of PRO’s two wings, PvdA and GroenLinks, would be problematic. The European wings come from two different worlds of thought. In the House of Representatives, the PvdA wing is being devoured by GroenLinks. There were already several PvdA MPs, such as Kati Piri, who belong more with GroenLinks than with the PvdA, whose culture and history are being filtered away. The ‘Red Rose’ has disappeared, and anyone entitled to the Drees medal must now have been a member for 65 years (!) instead of 60. Why not 100 years? The goal is to abolish the Drees medal. These are really Eastern Bloc methods, which ordinary social democrats do not notice.
A flea circus
Other European groups are crackling too, such as the European liberals. Renew, a French-dominated group at the wish of French President Macron, houses both the VVD and D66. Both have always sat in the same liberal group, and their members were ‘pro-European’ to varying degrees. Bolkestein’s Euroscepticism never got through. In The Hague the VVD regularly displays criticism of the euro for its grassroots in the country, but in Brussels there is no sign of it.
Malik Azmani (VVD), for instance, was rapporteur on the important EU Return Regulation as part of a stricter asylum policy: the option of forced return is necessary, because otherwise asylum is a one-way street, as it is now. Rapporteur Azmani looked like a ski jumper who started to wobble after take-off and crashed hard, nose in the snow. He was caught in a split. The VVD was in favor, but his own liberal group, with the French liberals in the lead, was against. The shadow rapporteur, the Christian Democrat François-Xavier Bellamy, took over the file and built a center-right majority.
In the confusion Azmani abstained, while the other VVD MEPs voted for the tough approach. D66 members, led by Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, voted against. Renew looked like a flea circus. The liberal group once had two pillars: the British and the Germans. The British left; the German liberals are camping below the 5% threshold, and the French liberals are hopelessly fickle.
Bible-firm
The European Christian wing, made up of the SGP and ChristenUnie (CU), has a longer history. For decades they worked together, but in 2019 their paths parted. The SGP stayed in the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), but the ChristenUnie moved to the large group of Christian Democrats (EPP). The bone of contention was The Hague: the CU was in the Rutte III cabinet (with VVD, CDA, D66) and the SGP in opposition. Relations soured, in Brussels too. The CU vetoed FvD joining the ECR, but lost the vote and left for the EPP. The SGP had an immense problem: in European elections the party won half a seat; the CU one and a half. That way they each had one. Brotherly sharing.
The consequence of the split was that the SGP had to win a whole seat on its own from then on. MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen ran a clear, conservative campaign in the 2024 European elections. The CU drifted onto a more left-wing track in Europe, as had already happened in the House of Representatives. Bible-firm voters preferred the SGP, while the CU lost its seat and disappeared from the European Parliament.
Storms
Anyone who projects current political developments in the EU member states onto the European Parliament should not be surprised when the traditional center axis breaks. The trend in the large countries, and the small ones too, can be found in the European Parliament. The ‘political center’ is getting ever smaller; the extremes larger. Germany and France foreshadow this. It will be interesting to see whether the PRO delegation weathers these storms.
This article was written by the editors and appeared in Brussels Signal. Orbán denounces ‘neo-communist tactics’ as Fidesz rallies behind detained ministers.
Featuring Hermann Tertsch, Distinguished Fellow, Gold Institute for International Strategy
Viktor Orbán has accused Hungary’s governing Tisza party of “neo-communist tactics” after prosecutors detained two ministers from his governments on September 28.
The former prime minister said the new authorities were producing fresh victims every day and would not break what he called his patriotic community. He argued that Tisza had staged political theatre rather than face rising taxes and fuel prices.
Balázs Hankó and Miklós Seszták were taken into custody hours after parliament voted 139-0 to suspend their immunity. Fidesz and its Christian Democrat allies boycotted the sitting.
Hankó is being investigated over the National Cultural Fund, where prosecutors say 17.3 billion forints (about €44 million) went to awards outside the fund’s statutory purposes. Seszták is accused of taking bribes worth some 11 billion forints (about €30 million) tied to bus procurement and construction contracts.
Balázs Orbán, political director to the former prime minister, described the events as a political prosecution in the style of the 1950s. He said the method had been copied from Poland, where he claimed the government had already used similar means against its opponents.
Kinga Gál, a Fidesz vice-president and MEP, called September 28 “a dark day for Hungarian democracy”. She accused Prime Minister Péter Magyar of pressuring police and prosecutors while building a political police force to pursue his opponents.
András László, also a Fidesz MEP, said the judiciary was acting on Magyar’s personal instructions. He said the Prime Minister had announced the proceedings on social media before the authorities opened them.
László tied the detentions to a second vote at the same sitting, in which no MP backed President András Baka’s nominee for prosecutor general. The service pursuing the two men has had no confirmed head since its last chief resigned under pressure from Magyar in July.
János Bóka, the Fidesz parliamentary leader, said his group would not assist political theatre and stayed away from the vote. He said those who set the case in motion would be called to account.
Outside Hungary, Vox MEP Hermann Tertsch declared his solidarity with Hungary and described the proceedings as part of a globalist offensive led by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Fidesz and Vox sit together in the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament.
Magyar’s own immunity was lifted the same morning at his request, over a 2024 incident in which prosecutors say he threw a man’s phone into the Danube. The European Commission, which froze billions of euros over rule-of-law concerns during Orbán’s final term, moved to unblock the money after the change of government.
Both former ministers deny wrongdoing and none of the three has been charged.
Read the full article at Brussels Signal
Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, D.C. foreign policy and defense think tank.
This segment aired on NTN24. Club de Prensa, 28 September 2026.
Featuring Hermann Tertsch, Distinguished Fellow, Gold Institute for International Strategy
In brief
Hermann Tertsch joined NTN24’s Club de Prensa to discuss the possible return of Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado and Delcy Rodríguez’s dealings with Washington.
From NTN24 (translated): Hermann Tertsch, MEP for Spain’s VOX party and vice president of Patriots for Europe, and journalist Javier Villamor spoke with NTN24’s Club de Prensa about the eventual return to Venezuela of democratic leader María Corina Machado and the role of the regime’s acting head, Delcy Rodríguez, toward Washington.
The interview is conducted in Spanish. NTN24’s headline: “Delcy Rodríguez está engañando a Washington, esa criminal no puede seguir en el poder”: eurodiputado de Vox.
Watch the full segment at NTN24
Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, D.C. foreign policy and defense think tank.
Jon Ossoff (D-inc.) vs. Mike Collins (R)
Author’s Note: Other 2026 forecasts can be found in the Central File.
Jon Ossoff (Democrat) is seeking his second term in the U.S. Senate, having first been elected in a January 2021 runoff after the controversial November 2020 election held both Georgia Republican Senators under 50%. Ossoff is 39 and thought to be a contender for the 2028 (or future) Democrat presidential nomination.
Mike Collins (Republican) is finishing up his second term as the U.S. Representative of GA-10, a district covering parts of northeastern Georgia. His voter base is mostly rural and the district is not competitive.
Georgia has recently become one of America’s most hotly contested battlegrounds and was carried by Donald Trump in 2024 by just 2.2%. Prior to the 2020 election, it had backed six consecutive GOP presidential candidates.
Demographic Statistics
Betting markets overwhelmingly favor Ossoff, as incumbent, against Collins.
Warnock’s seat: Georgia, a former “Solid South” Democrat stronghold and the home of Jimmy Carter, was free of Republicans representing them in the U.S. Senate from the time of Reconstruction until 1981, when Mack Mattingly took office after having been elected in 1980. Mattingly only made it one term, but that seat was recaptured in 1992 by Paul Coverdell, who died in office and was replaced by a Democrat (thanks to a Democrat Governor). Republicans, in keeping with the new partisan loyalty to the GOP, recaptured the seat in 2004 and held it with two different Senators until Kelly Loeffler ran into the 2020 COVID election buzzsaw and dropped the seat to Raphael Warnock.
Ossoff’s seat: Republicans pried this seat from Democrats in the 2002 midterms, winning it three times before David Perdue got smacked in the face by mail-in ballots on November 3, 2020, prompting a runoff that Ossoff (along with Warnock for the other seat) won. It turns out that it wasn’t just Joe Biden needing every extra mail-in ballot that was counted after Election Day:
These seats have very strong correlation to Georgia’s presidential voting tendencies, which are presently extremely competitive.
Ossoff breezed to renomination with no contender for his spot. Collins, on the other hand, had to navigate the typical GOP minefield for his – with a runoff necessary:
Collins defeated former football coach Derek Dooley in the ensuing runoff. Earl Carter, his opponent in the first round, is the sitting U.S. Representative for GA-1, based on the Atlantic Coast and also far removed from the cosmopolitan political environment of Atlanta that GOP gubernatorial nominee Rick Jackson navigated.
Notice the regional splits here, with Fulton County highlighted:
The Atlanta metro didn’t get its guy, and that’s bad news for Collins given the overblown influence Atlanta now enjoys in statewide politics.
RCP Average: Ossoff +8%
Polling this cycle is all over the place, but with the exception of Quantus, no recent polling has shown a competitive race.
The four major aggregators all have Ossoff favored, and I must say I’m surprised Inside Elections has this as a “tilt” race. “Tilt” usually means a margin inside two points. Georgia is also too competitive with too much overwhelming red geography to allow for a blowout Democrat win – at least for now. Ask me again in 2036 if current trends continue:
Why Georgia May Be Doomed* (Capt. Seth Keshel, June 17)
Georgia doesn’t register voters by party; however:
When I made my final forecast (accurate) for Trump’s 2024 victory in Georgia, I noted that my research had revealed a parallel for voter registration in nearby Duval County, Florida (Jacksonville metro), that had tracked with the presidential movement of Georgia for two decades. When Duval moved left, so did Georgia. When it moved right, so did Georgia. This trend lived on in 2024, as Trump flipped both Duval County and Georgia in actual results.
Duval County is nearly one point to the right in registration from the November 2024 election as it stands today:
This is a likely sign that Georgia is still winnable at the presidential level, but I wouldn’t expect it to be a sign that this Senate race is going to Collins given standard midterm and incumbency dynamics.
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, one of the most notorious 2020 election personalities still in office, claims the state runs amazing elections. Those of us who have studied election integrity for years would disagree:
You can read about the rest of the election-related deficiencies in Georgia in my 2024 recap:
Georgia – 2024 Election Compendium (Capt. Seth Keshel, December 9, 2024)
There are definitely states that are worse off, but Georgia is firmly within the “elevated concern” category when ranked nationally, and the election integrity picture there doesn’t favor Collins.
These are the major factors for the U.S. Senate race in Georgia:
Here is how the key factors in this race stack up:
Forecast for Georgia U.S. Senate
Ossoff is limited in terms of margin by the states deeply polarized electorate and is most likely to capture the swingy suburban vote that was once reliably Republican. I must caveat, however, that black turnout in other states in which data can be found appears to be down a lot from previous cycles. It is still early and this can change, but Democrats rely on maximum black participation and support levels throughout the state (especially core Atlanta). Collins’s only real shot here is if that turnout tanks. If it does, I will reassess this race closer to the election.
Ossoff, as of late September, is on his way to a fairly easy reelection win.
Seth Keshel, MBA is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.
Toshio Masuda sets out to prove that “Japan is the land of the gods” in the September 28, 2026 edition of his Free Internet Seminar.
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